Huichon Power Station Opened

Photo released by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on April 6, 2012 shows the inauguration ceremony held at the Huichon power station in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), on April 5, 2012. The DPRK said on April 6 that its Huichon power station has started operations, which will help ease electricity shortages in the capital. The power station, located in Jagang Province, will also help protect cultivated land and residential areas along the Chongchon River from flooding, and ensure an ample supply of water to the industrial establishments in Huichon and Namhung areas, according to official media reports. (Xinhua/KCNA)

The DPRK opened the Hu’ich’o'n Power Station in Chagang Province on Thursday (5 April).  Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium President Kim Yong Nam, DPRK Cabinet Premier Choe Yong Rim, National Defense Commission [NDC] Vice Chairman and Minister of the People’s Armed Forces VMar Kim Yong Chun, KWP Secretary Choe Tae Bok, KWP Secretary and Director of General Affairs Tae Jong Su, Gen. Yun Jong Rin and DPRK Vice Premier and State Planning Commission Chairman Ro Tu Chol were among the members of the central leadership to attend the opening ceremony.  Choe Yong Rim delivered the keynote address.  Choe was last reported to have visit the construction site of Huichon Power Station on 20 February 2012.  Xinhua reports:

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) said Friday that its Huichon power station has started operations, which will help ease electricity shortages in the capital.

Premier Choe Yong Rim told an inauguration ceremony on Thursday that the Huichon power station was “a brilliant fruition of the wise guidance of late leader Kim Jong Il,” official newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported.

The power station, located in Jagang Province, will also help protect cultivated land and residential areas along the Chongchon River from flooding, and ensure an ample supply of water to the industrial establishments in Huichon and Namhung areas, according to official media reports.

The Central Committee and Central Military Commissions of the Workers’ Party of Korea sent a joint congratulatory message to builders and members of shock brigades.

The party “will always remember the heroic feats performed by the builders who erected a gigantic structure for the country’s prosperity and its people’s happiness,” the message said.

The message said it took only three years to complete the construction of the power station, a project which normally needs more than 10 years to finish.

The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly issued a decree on April 1 awarding the Kim Il Sung Prize for the design of the Huichon power station.

DPRK Premier Choe Yong Rim delivers the keynote address during an opening ceremony of Huichon Power Station in Jagang Province on Thursday, April 5 (Photo: KCNA)

Photo released by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on April 6, 2012 shows the Huichon power station in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK said on April 6 that its Huichon power station has started operations, which will help ease electricity shortages in the capital. The power station, located in Jagang Province, will also help protect cultivated land and residential areas along the Chongchon River from flooding, and ensure an ample supply of water to the industrial establishments in Huichon and Namhung areas, according to official media reports. (Xinhua/KCNA)

Yonhap reports:

North Korea said Friday that it has dedicated a new hydroelectric power plant in its central northern area bordering China, a project long touted as a symbol of its bid for the construction of a “strong and prosperous state.”

“The construction of the Huichon Power Station has been completed in the DPRK,” the North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, adding that a dedication ceremony took place on Thursday.

DPRK is the acronym for the North’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“The builders finished the construction of the power station in a matter of three years though it would have taken more than a decade at normal pace,” the KCNA said.

Chronic shortage of electricity and other energy has long been one of the problems beleaguering the North’s moribund economy, which has been under sanctions by the international community due to its nuclear and missile tests.

“The completion makes it possible to more satisfactorily settle the shortage of electricity in Pyongyang, protect cultivated land and residential areas along the River Chongchon from flooding and ensure an ample supply of industrial water to the industrial establishments in the Huichon and Namhung areas,” KCNA said.

The plant, which has a generating capacity of 300,000 kilowatts, was launched by late leader Kim Jong-il, who reportedly visited the construction site eight times before his death last December to order an early completion of the project.

North Korea has designated 2012 as a moment in its history to rise as “a great, powerful and prosperous nation” — a propaganda slogan that was spearheaded by Kim Jong-il.

New economic goals were announced in 2009 that called for undertaking major construction projects as well as modernizing farms and factories in time for the centennial birth of the communist country’s founder, Kim Il-Sung, on April 15.

Earlier, North Korea announced plans to launch a satellite on the back of a long-range rocket as part of the April celebrations. The international community has urged Pyongyang to cancel the launch, warning that it would be seen as a violation of a ban on missile activity.

The Associated Press reports:

The opening of the Huichon Power Station in Jagang Province, north of Pyongyang, was the first big ceremony in a month of celebrations timed for the April centenary of the birth of late President Kim Il Sung.

The power station on the Chongchon River, which had been under construction for more than three years, was a favored project of late leader Kim Jong Il. Kim had visited the project at least five times before his December death.

Son Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s new leader, visited the construction site with his father in August 2011.

The power station is North Korea’s largest, with two dams and a network of tunnels. The dams harness water from the Jangja and Chongchon Rivers. Construction on a second power station further down the Chongchon River is due to begin soon, said the top officials who spoke at Thursday’s ceremony.

North Korea suffers from an acute power shortage.

New economic goals announced in 2009 called for undertaking major construction projects such as the Huichon Power Station as well as modernizing farms and factories in time for the April 2012 festivities.

North Korea will celebrate the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth on April 15.

North Korea also has announced plans to launch a satellite on the back of a long-range rocket as part of the celebrations. The United States and other nations have urged Pyongyang to cancel the launch, warning that it would be seen as a violation of a ban on missile activity.

Ryugyong Hotel to Partially Open by April 2012

The Ryugyong Hotel as it stood from 1992 to 2007 (R) and after construction resumed in 2009 (L) (Photo: Yonhap)

KCTV image of a fireworks display held to celebrate May Day in 2009

25 years after ground was broken, part of the Ryugyong Hotel is scheduled to open by April 2012 when the DPRK commemorates the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.  Yonhap reports that interior construction and finishing work is proceeding so that the Ryugyong’s 1st through 25th floors will be ready for occupancy by April 2012.  The DPRK plans initially plans to house European companies and international organizations on the completed levels of the 105-story structure.  Located in the Pot’ong River City District (Pot’onggang-kuyok), construction on the Ryugyong began in 1987.  It was developed in a joint venture between Paektusan Architecture and Engineering in cooperation with a French construction company.  In addition to hotel rooms, the Ryugyong was intended to have revolving restaurants, a bowling alley and night club, as well as its own medical clinic.  There were several attempts to market the space to foreign investors which included allowing the operation of hostess lounges on the premises.  By 1992, construction of the Ryugyong ceased.

The Ryugyong Hotel prior to the resumption of construction

For 16 years the Ryugyong stood as a vacant concrete shell with a solitary tower crane at its pinnacle.  The lack of activity at the site did not stop other projects from taking place nearby.  In 1993 the Monument to the Fatherland Liberation (Korean) War was officially dedicated, located 1/3 of a mile (.54 km) north of the Ryugyong.  During 2000-2003 the Chung Ju-yung Indoor Stadium, which abuts the Ryugyong site, was constructed and dedicated.  In 2008 the DPRK completed an agreement with the Orascom conglomerate which included the completion of the Ryugyong.  The building was the focal point of a fireworks display held to celebrate International Labor Day (May Day) in 2009 and has appeared on several occasions in DPRK media.  In April 2011 the construction site was visited by DPRK Premier Choe Yong Rim.

Flickr user Kernbeisser has a small gallery of ground imagery from different perspectives of the Ryugyong under different phases of construction which can be viewed here.

An image of the Ryugyong Hotel's construction site from October 2010. The yellow line at the right marks the boundary of an elite residential area where Kim Jong Il's official wife, Kim Yong Suk, resides (Photo: Google image)

The construction site of the Ryugyong Hotel in 2009 (Photo: Google image)

The unfinished Ryugyong Hotel, prior to construction resuming in 2008 (Photo: Google image)

Money, it’s a Gas

Daily NK reports that the currency change under way in the DPRK was announced at 14:00 by the radio broadcasts directly piped into the homes of North Korean citizens.  Street markets have remained shuttered since 11:00 as of Monday, 30 November.  Daily NK also reports that on 1 December the currency decision was announced in special call meetings of county and town KWP and People’s Committees and that county branches of the DPRK Central Bank had commenced the new currency exchange of old Won for new.  In the closest we may get to an official announcement, Xinhua reported the DPRK’s currency revaluation.

Daily NK recalls the previous revaluation of North Korean currency in 1992 with some fascinating analysis and anecdotes contrasting the currency switch in 1992 to the one that occurred this week.  DNK suspects the DPRK Leadership is turning tricks in revaluing the won.  The ROK press has begun editorializing about the revaluation in different degrees.  Dong-A Ilbo, while making amends to Daily NK, concludes that “the strong resistance against the revaluation by the North Korean people might have put the Communist regime in a fix.”  Korea Times opines that the DPRK “seems to be gambling economically and politically with the redenomination.”  Korea Herald concludes “the currency redenomination rather looks like a move back to tighter control.”  Chosun Ilbo brings up the DPRK’s upcoming possible return to the Six-Party Talks: “there is a strong possibility that North Korea will take a more accommodating stance in talks with Seoul and Washington.”

Chosun Ilbo also carried a report containing excellent analysis combining the economics of the revaluation with the brutal power play at work here.   To parallel its labor mobilization campaigns, the DPRK Leadership has engaged in a battle campaign of its own against the public markets over which it previously had a kind of gedogen.  In July of this year the SPA Presidium set up a Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessity, perhaps a harbinger of the current realities in the DPRK and an indication of North Korean tightening its belt.

All the while, the North Korean press remains mute about the currency revaluation.  But KCNA’s bulletin about the 100 Day Battle Campaign can’t be an accident.

Guidance Train Coming Down the Line

(n.b. Kim Jong-il’s last known appearance was around 1 November at the Unhung Cooperative Farm in Thaechon County, North Pyongan Province)

At the 8 Feburary Vinalon Complex. (Photo: KCNA)

Continuing with his working for the weekend m.o., Kim Jong-il (or his body double or auto-icon) rode his customized train coach to South Hamgyong Province, and undisclosed locations, for five (5) guidance tours and two (2) concert performances.  This marked his first visit to South Hamgyong since late June/early July of this year.  General-Secretary Kim visited three famous production sites during his swing through South Hamgyong and he participated in his first inspection of a North Korean military base since he watched KPN exercises in mid-September.

He began his tour of the Hungam area attending a concert of the “art squads” of the 8 February Vinalon Complex and the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex.  These music groups are supposedly quite versatile, singing and playing “colorful numbers of diverse genres.”  It was neither disclosed nor photographed by the Korean Central News Agency whether “Footsteps” was performed among old chestnuts such as “Are We Living in Days Like Those?” and “My Beloved Factory.”  Although in his remarks to the art squad’s secretaries General-Secretary Kim referred to the “revolutionary position of the workers of the DPRK thanks to the large contingent of such dependable workers of the new generation.”  Kim Jong-il moved on to the 8 February Vinalon Complex and the construction site of a gas facility at the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex.  The art squads of the respective factories moved onto Pyongyang (most likely on General-Secretary Kim’s orders) for an engagement earlier this week at the People’s Palace of Culture.

Hungnam Fertilizer Complex construction site (Photo: KCNA)

General-Secretary Kim’s last visit to these industrial sites was in early February of this year.  At the 8 February Vinalon Complex he “looked round the dyes and agricultural chemicals produced at the newly-built production processes for hours.”  During the guidance tour, Kim Jong-il alluded to the Taean Work System, juxtaposing it against the circumstance that the management and labor of the 8 February Complex were basically left to fend for themselves in renovating the place.  He praised them for the renovations, “even under hard conditions where everything was in short supply. . .demonstrat[ing] the might of the Juche-based industry.”  Several hours later, Kim Jong-il and his travel party took a short ride (less than 2 miles) to the construction of an ammonia factory at the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex.  It is a bit puzzling why a person with a few health problems would decide to visit chemical factories.  Nevertheless, General-Secretary Kim conducted a bit of a pep rally in order to ensure the project’s completion before the end of the 100 Day Battle Campaign ( “setting forth the tasks to be fulfilled to wind up the project earlier than scheduled”).

A day or two later, Kim Jong-il and his travel party moved on across the

(n.b.: I found this text already entered into the photo description when I went to upload it) Hamju, DPRK: Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, gives field guidance to the Tongbong Cooperative Farm in Hamju County. He goes round various places including a mechanized workteam and a store for seed potato and sees varieties of crops produced by the farm to acquaint himself in detail with the farming this year. (Taken recently) KCNA PHOTO

Songchon River to Jongpyong and Hamju Counties.  The first stop was to the “newly-built” Kumjin River Kuchang Youth Power Plant, named after the Kumjingang Youth Shock Brigade members who helped construct it.  The Kuchang Power Plant is the second power plant constructed in Jonpyong County, and was under construction since 2006.  While the project is complete, it is not clear whether it will be fully functional, a concern which Kim Jong-il highlighted in his instructions to the Party officials escorting him during the tour.  However, General-Secretary Kim stuck to his laudatory guns, “expressing great satisfaction over the fact that the senior functionaries of the county. . .have invented the valuable things that can contribute to improving the people’s standard of living.”  Whether they know how to game their political connections or have direct connections to KPA shock brigades, Jonpyong officials such as Ri Yong-hun and Choe Kum-sun were held by Kim Jong-il as Party and People’s Committee officials whom “other functionaries should emulate.”

Kim Jong-il then moved on to Hamju County, where he maintains a residence and in 2007 where he voted in Local People’s Committee elections.  For the third time in 2009 he visited the Tongbong Cooperative Farm.  Hamju County has several cooperative farms and a third tour of the same cooperative farm may indicate something about the DPRK’s problems with its agriculture.  That said, Tongbong Cooperative Farm was serving General-Secretary Kim’s propaganda purpose because it is “upholding the great general’s teaching on farming methods” and conforming to the methods of two-crop farming and the use of organic fertilizers that are forming the dual cornerstones of the KWP’s green and agricultural revolutions.

Over the weekend, General-Secretary Kim inspected KPA Unit 1224, at an undisclosed location.  This may be his first visit to the KPA unit, which may be part of the Operations Department.  During his inspection tour he visited the living quarters and ideological education centers and watched training exercises.  In the KCNA bulletin, Kim Jong-il’s remarks about the role of

Huzzahs at the photo session with the workers at the power plant (Photo: KCTV)

the KPA are taken directly from the DPRK Constitution.  The KCNA report noted that the “interior facilities with all the amenities and their compound kept neat and tidy like a park.”  While I don’t want to question the housekeeping of a KPA unit, it should be noted that the cleaning of KPA barracks prior to an inspection tour is mandatory, and compelled by both commanding officers and the State Security Department.  Kim Jong-il began, and ended, this batch of guidance tours with an art performance, a concert.  His final recent appearance was attending a concert given by the art squad of the Ministry of Public Security.  The musically-inclined members of the “interior forces of the supreme commander” broke out the guitars for “Let’s Defend Socialism.”  Again, no word on whether any of the singers performed “Footsteps.”

The dispatch that Kim Jong-il was either dead or using a stand-in seems to have found its way to the General-Secretary.  While this activity will do little to allay the naysayers, the number of Kim Jong-il’s appearances is staggering.  His recent guidance tours and concert going bring the number of appearances to 135 for 2009.  It can only be expected that he will continue this kinetic pace through year’s end which dovetails with the conclusion of the 100 Day Battle Campaign.  The reports made a particular effort to underscore that his health is at least stable, and sought to establish that he has whatever physical and mental stamina pre-existed his stroke(s).

The bird's eye view is mounted (Photo: KCTV)

With so many different appearances, Kim Jong-il reiterated every ideological mode the KWP is trying to peddle.  There were numerous references to kangsong taeguk, the Three Revolutions and the Green Revolution.  He seemed to bypass Hamhung for Hungnam.  With its organized crime gangs and a problem with methamphetamine, visiting the city centre of Hamhung is a dicey proposition.  The two complexes he visited in Hungnam have production units within them that are subordinate to the Second Economic Committee.   As has been standard practice with his cooperative farm appearances, corn was highlighted as a staple food and General-Secretary Kim addressed the problems affecting North Korean citizens in rural areas.  During his appearance at Tongbong Cooperative Farm, he made a point of setting forth a policy of producing and delivering additional machinery to cooperative farms in the rural DPRK, although whether this is actually possible or any cadres will implement his instructions are anyone’s guess.

On chronic succession watch; Kim Jong-il targeted some of his remarks during his swing through Jonpyong and Hamju Counties  to the virtues of youth.  He noted that “our revolutionary cause. . .is being firmly maintained because the great army of youths–the most lively combat unit–is in charge of the defense of the fatherland and the socialist construction.”   In praising the current Party and State elders in Jonpyong County he said that “members of the Youth Shock Brigade, in the future as well, would continue to take the lead in advancing the glorious struggle for the fatherland’s prosperity and development of the people’s happiness.”  As mentioned above he referred to “the new generation” during the factories’ concert.  The dulcet chimes of “Footsteps” are not sounded and there is no aubade written to the Morningstar General.  But these references to “youths”  now, and in the future, have been interpreted by earlier cogent analysis of a possible second hereditary succession in the DPRK.

Kim Jong-il grinning during his inspection tour of KPA Unit 1224. Gen. Hyon Chol-hae is at the far left, and a man who appears to be MPAF General Political Bureau Senior Deputy Director Gen. Kim Jong-gak is at the far right. (Photo: KCNA)

And in the bucket drop of cohort analysis, the question may be who did not travel or attend a concert with Kim Jong-il?  The usual gang of three appeared at all of these places with General-Secretary Kim: KWP Secretary Kim Ki-nam, the Boswell of the Suryong, was present to attain total coverage; KWP Financial Planning Director Pak Nam-gi was around to allocate whatever monies and resources the National Defense Commission hasn’t already siphoned, and; Jang Song-thaek was hiding from the cameras and otherwise waiting for the General-Secretary to give him the names of cadres’ heads to crack.  Mr. Jang also participated in the inspection of KPA Unit 1224 under the auspices of his NDC membership.  In South Hamgyong, Kim Jong-il was escorted by KWP Provincial Secretaries Thae Jong-su and Kim Yong-gyu.  Seen in photographs, but not named in the accounts were Organization and Guidance Department Senior Deputy Director Ri Je-gang and Propaganda and Agitation Department Senior Deputy Director Ri Jae-il.  At the inspection of KPA Unit 1224, Kim Jong-il was joined by MPAF and NDC Vice Chair VMAR Kim Yong-chun, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Ri Yong-ho and MPAF General Political Bureau Senior Deputy Director Gen. Kim Jong-gak.  Seen in Unit 1224 photographs, but not named in the reports were NDC chiefs Gens. Ri Myong-su and Hyon Chol-hae.  At the MPS concert, Kim Jong-il was joined by most of these other folks, as well as Jang Song-thaek protege Gen. Ju Sang-song, Minister of Public Security, and MPS Political Bureau Director, Col. Gen. Ri Pyong-sam.  Other than a few undisclosed members of the Personal Secretariat, did I miss anyone?

This guidance tour posting is brought to you in part by Taedonggang Brewery Beer.  Taedonggang: the Suryong of Beers.

Guidance Train Coming up Around the Bend

(n.b. Kim Jong-il’s last known appearance was attendance at a concert of the KPA 33rd Art Festival around 26 October)

The Party Center at the Suphung Power Station (Photo: KCNA)

Kim Jong-il seems to be making a habit of conducting guidance tours later in the week and into weekends.  I suppose if the masses are compelled to work the weekend, then General-Secretary Kim should create the appearance of being busy himself.  Not unlike last week, the guidance tours moved from north to south and whether it’s medical or climatological, General-Secretary Kim has traded his suede overcoat for his winter parka, and in Taechon the notorious fur hat.  The first stop on the second round of North Pyongang guidance tours was to the Suphung Power Station.  The Suphung Power Station actually seems to function, at least some of the time.  Kim Il-sung officially opened the power station in 1958.  General-Secretary Kim has been reported as visiting the Suphung Power Station on two prior occasions.  Because it was erected during one of the DPRK’s more triumphant periods, and more successful mobilization campaigns, it is likely that Suphung is being held up as a model for the KPA and Workers’ Organization members presently toiling at the behemoth Huichon plant.  In perhaps the closest approach the North Korean press will get to “meta” General-Secretary Kim toured “the monument to the on-site instructions of President Kim Il-sung and the room for education in the revolutionary history.”  As Suphung seems to function, or is “thriving” in the current DPRK idiom, there was little guidance to offer except to take care of the machines:  “The most important task facing the power station is to improve the management of equipment and technological control to operate it in full capacity.”

Kim Jong-il moved on to visit the Amnokgang Gauge and Instrument General Factory, the Suphung Bearings Factory, the 10 October Factory and the Amnokgang Daily Neccessities Factory before making a stop at the North Pyongan Chicken Farm.  He remained in the area of North Pyongan near Sakju County.  This was the first time General-Secretary Kim was reported to have visited any of these locations.  Sakju County consists not so much of towns and villages, but is comprised of nodongjagu which are designated workers’ districts.  It is likely General-Secretary Kim and his travel party availed themselves of his residence in Changsong county.

Grou photo in North Pyongan guidance tour (Photo: KCNA)

The number of locations KCNA reports General-Secretary Kim as visiting exceeds the number of photographs that appeared both in the North Korean press and the television news broadcast, so it is likely one of these factories is involved in the North Korean defense industry.  It is also likely Kim Jong-il had car pull up the entrance and did not tour one or more of these locations.  During the guidance tour General-Secretary Kim marveled at the “various type CNC [computer numerical control] machine tools at work.”  Which ever factory was photographed the machinery certainly does not resemble the usual 1950′s-era heavy equipment.  During this Kim Jong-il emphasized heavy industry, a departure  from many recent guidance tours that were primarily to light industry and food production.  Like his Suphung Power Station tour, these factories were held up as exemplary enterprises, remarking that  “all units [should] learn from the enterprising work style of the factories.”

The back-end of Kim Jong-il’s was taken up with food production.  During his tour around Sakju County, he visited the North Pyongan Provincial Chicken Farm.  This was an opportunity for him to drape a white lab coat over his outerwear.  The KCNA report finds that the farm is using chicken excrement as a fertilizer, which is a method used organic farming. General-Secretary Kim said that “It is very gratifying that officials and the workers of the farm are raising a lot of ducks and pigs by making an effective use of the excrement of chickens.”  I am reminded of Lyndon Johnson’s remark that “in politics. . . overnight, chicken shit can turn into chicken salad.”  Is General-Secretary Kim channeling the man who was

As Emeril has said, people always check for broken eggs, but never actually smell for rotten eggs. (Photo: KCNA)

President of the United States at the time the USS Pueblo was captured by the Korean People’s Navy?

During the weekend, General-Secretary Kim visited the main building at the Unhung Cooperative in Taechon County, North Pyongan Province.   This was his first known visit to the Unhung farm.  From the outset of this inspection tour (as against guidance), one might sense Kim Jong-il is trying to deflect external concerns about the DPRK’s food supply (“bringing about the richest harvest ever known”).  The DPRK seems to be trying to keep with its South Korean counterparts and its Japanese neighbors with “the WPK’s policy of green revolution.”  The Unhung guidance tour also found General-Secretary Kim alluding to the plight of the DPRK’s rural population ( “to settle the rural question” ).  Kim Jong-il also held forth on the implementation of an “agricultural revolution” which can only read as a tacit concession that the DPRK’s recent food policies are a failure.  He said, “it is necessary to strengthen the assistance to the countryside and improve the state supply to it, and, at the same time, strengthen the guidance to the rural economy and its management.”  The idea to “strengthen the guidance” of local management may refer to a possible Central Party crackdown on mid-level Party and State officials.  A recent interview with North Korean citizens that appeared in the Japanese press put the blame on the DPRK’s unrelenting food crisis on corruption among local officials, and not General-Secretary Kim (although this perception is open to interpretation).   The Unhung inspection and the guidance tour of the North Pyongan Provincial Chicken Farm are intended to assuage the anxieties of North Korean citizens consuming meager amounts of corn porridge.

Kim Jong-il being briefed at the Unhung Cooperative Farm. Jang Song-thaek and Ri Je-gang are at the far right assuming the posture of two people gossiping in church. (Photo: KCNA)

This recent round of guidance and inspections found General-Secretary Kim serving again as the DPRK’s head cheerleader.  He was in laudatory form and the essence of these reports was him telling these workers to keep up the good work, and take care of the equipment.  There was also an emphasis on classic socialist (or, communist) themes of science and pressing forward.  At all of the locations, the KCNA reports noted that any accomplishments were the results of collaborative efforts among workers, party officials and management.  The reports also make a point of saying any accomplishment was “done on their own” which may imply a diminished role from the Central Party.  Amid the 100 Day Battle Campaign, and with General-Secretary Kim’s recent nostalgic remarks about past “speed campaigns” this may read as a conjunction (or reiteration) of Chonsgan-ri and the Taean Work System.  It also seems that the KWP has modified their ambitions in terms of kangson taeguk.  These guidance reports contain little to no reference to “strong and prosperous state” prefering “a thriving nation.”

The travel party escorting General-Secretary Kim was the usual trio: Secretary Kim Ki-nam, KWP Financial Planning Director Pak Nam-gi and stalwart Jang Song-thaek.  Not mentioned in the KCNA reports, but photographed at the Unsung Cooperative Farm was Organization Senior Deputy Director Ri Je-gang.  During all of the guidance tours, Kim Jong-il was escorted by North Pyongan KWP boss Kim Phyong-hae.

Corn porridge is increasingly becoming the central meal of North Korean citizens. (Photo: KCNA)

One further note about this week’s and last week’s guidance tours which directly concern the North Korean nuclear issue.  In the previous two weeks of guidance tours, Kim Jong-il was joined by Ju Kyu-chang, a Member of the National Defense Commission and the Vice Chair of the Second Economic Committee.  It is likely that Mr. Ju’s presence relates to policy matters concerning the DPRK’s nuclear program, as he is one of the nuclear program’s political managers.  Perhaps more interestingly is Kim Jong-il’s visit to the Unhung Cooperative Farm.  The Unhung Cooperative Farm in Taechon County is a quick twenty (20) mile guidance train (or Mercedes motorcade) ride to the Nyongbyon facility.  According to Yonhap channeling a KCNA bulletin, the reprocessing of the fuel rods occurred at the end of August.  This does not rule out Kim Jong-il making an unreported inspection tour of the Nyongbyon facility, or at the least, teasing Pyongyang watchers about the possibility of such a trip.

Propaganda banners in a Pyongyang factory for the 100 Day Battle Campaign (Photo: KCTV)

KN-02 Tests Not for an Outside Audience (Necessarily)

The DPRK knew that conducting tests on the KN-02 surface-to-surface missiles would attract external attention.  Despite brushing off the tests as routine military exercises, South Korea is entirely justified in its concerns.  The South Korean Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that it may raise the issue with the UN Security Council, under the pretext that the North’s missile test contravenes the UNSC’s resolutions/sanctions.  But this diplomatic maneuver may be a panacea for inadequacies in South Korea’s defense capabilities: concurrent to the Foreign Affairs Ministry blowing the whistle on the DPRK came an allegation from GNP Rep. Kim Dong-sung that South Korea’s internal communications system was outmoded.  Mr. Kim’s allegation was denied, and it also applied to early alert systems monitoring the DPRK’s artillery on the border between the two countries (hey, doesn’t the American presence in South Korea mean we have our Korean ally’s back in an exigency such as this?).  And yet, this allegation appeared at the same Dong-A Ilbo reported an SK National Police Agency report found broken radar equipment on Dokdo Island on South Korea’s east coast during the North Koreans’ April satellite/ballistic missile test.  The KN-02 missile seems to present strategic concern to South Korea because potentially decrepit communications equipment may not sound the siren for a missile that, once operational, has an estimated range of 130 km to 160 km (81 to 100 miles).

These were merely Seoul’s local circumstances surrounding the Columbus Day missile tests (insert your Marx-based notions of imperialism here).  In Belfast and Moscow,  US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conveyed that the missile tests did nothing to alter the US approach to nuclear negotiations (without, of course, joining Six Party Talk partners South Korea and China and saying they were routine).  Then again, in meetings with the Russians, Secretary Clinton learned the Federation was not as eager to immediately sanction Iran for its Qom adventures, as the US, UK or soon-to-be constituted EU.  Russia’s policymakers and elites are generally divided on how both to view and handle the Iranians, but the stated  preference for Iran is the P-5+1 forum (does P-5+1=Six Party Talks: Geneva Edition?).

This all presupposes that when the National Defense Commission authorized testing of the KN-02,the North Koreans were asking for external attention.  They know that amid motions to bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations over their nuclear program, external scrutiny and huffy speculation is a by-product.  Unlike previous strategic weapons tests in 2009, the DPRK did not precede the test of the KN-02 with a Rodong Sinmun editorial or the appearance of a KPA propaganda official reading a statement on KCTV.  This missile test came rather quietly and it is only reasonable to assume that it was (from a DPRK perspective) routine.  The April 2009 satellite launch, the May nuclear detonations in Kilju County and the July missile tests were conducted in the context of the 150 Day (Battle) Campaign.  The 12 October missile test occurs just as the Korean Workers’ Party begins another 100-Day (Battle) Campaign–these are labor mobilization campaigns intended to increase production in  light and heavy industry and complete badly-needed infrastructure projects (e.g., Huichon Power Plant).  They originated with post-war rebuilding efforts, and are correlated in current propaganda in the Chollima Movement of the 1950′s.

These campaigns’ current doctrine is the construction of the strong and prosperous fatherland  (kangson taeguk) in advance the 2012 anniversary of the birth of the late (and eternal) DPRK President Kim Il-sung.  Because the Battle Campaigns are labor-based, then arguably broad swaths of North Korean citizens are engaged in the prosperous half, and strategic weapons’ tests are the strong half.  As to prosperity, the results of the 150 Day Campaign were not what the Party and State wanted.  Production ceased in certain factories and construction projects were not completed.  There were reports of raw materials diverted through corruption or simply not delivered because the resources were not available when ordered.  Certain factories tasked with boosting production could not operate because of energy shortages, as well as high absentee rates among workers due to hunger and fatigue.  Local Party cadres and local Public Security officials were waiving age restrictions on market trading permits if they participated in the “volunteer” construction and road labor.  These Battle Campaigns, then, become a tool of population control.

The Korean Workers’ Party currently contends with waning influence in many North Korean quarters.  Since the economic collapse of the 1990′s, the communications and power monopoly the KWP previously enjoyed has dropped.  The formal gedogen policy of the 1 July Decree toward markets further undercut Party control on the minds, and the hearts, of North Korean citizens.  So, if your population has commenced to buying imported Chinese goods, is watching bootleg Chinese, South Korean and even US media and employees of state-owned factories are spending more time in the markets, then one solution is to make very attempt to relocate them away from such distractions.  The Battle Campaign has also become an opportunity for the DPRK’s internal security apparatus to commence audits of local agencies and offices tasked to monitor and control the population.  The KWP Organization and Guidance Department in coordination with the KWP Administration Department and the Central Public Prosecutor’s Office are using the campaigns as a pretext to investigate corruption within the Public Security Ministry and State Security Department, as well as their own subordinate officers.  These security agencies’ inspection regime are not responding with a light hand, and the number of forced labor sentences seems to be going up, as well as public, summary executions.

The announced detonation of a nuclear device or testing new missiles in Kangwon Province might attempt to placate a hungry, exhausted population, beset by official corruption and resorting to desperate means to earn money to purchase food.   North Korean citizens seem well aware that the DPRK’s military-defense industry expenditures are diverting badly needed materials and human resources from a population that need them the most.  Propaganda is only so useful in addressing the “strong” half of  “strong and prosperous” state.  But the Central Party could be gambling on a message that collective sacrifice to weapons’ programs always grabs the world’s attention and gains respect (or fear) for the DPRK.

That written, it is entirely a flight of fancy if one believes that Kim Jong-il can magically shut off the spigot of money and resources consumed by the military-defense industry in the form of the Second Economic Committee.  We should stop viewing the North Korean military as a monolithic, unitary institution, but as a group with diverse and competing interests.  The security and control mechanisms on the Korean People’s Army are likely quite effective.  When dealing with possible and powerful military factions in the DPRK, General-Secretary Kim is not concerned with the general-grade officers and NCO’s of the KPA.  Nor should is he likely concerned with the NDC Operations Department, commanded by loyalist Gen. O Kuk-ryol.  The Operations Department (formerly the KWP Operations Department) has been a constituency which General-Secretary Kim cultivated in the 1970′s, and recent reports say he is further building up.  Kim Jong-il is also well protected behind three concentric layers of security (Military Security Command-State Security Department-Guard Command) whose mission is thwarting any military coups against the Supreme Commander.

So, when a nuclear device is detonated or the KN-02 is tested, and Pyongyang watchers speculate that General-Secretary Kim is pacifying the hawkish elements of the KPA, the biggest known-unknown for him are the powerful managers of the Second Economic Committee.  Theoretically, the Second Economic Committee reports directly to General-Secretary Kim, and is organizationally subordinate to the constitutionally enhanced National Defense Commission.  It is also a constituency to which he has given his attention for almost thirty (30) years.  But the 2EC is a hybrid organization that draws its personnel equally from highly intelligent civilians who conduct its research and development and well-trained members of the KPA.  The 2EC has one-quarter (25%) of the NDC’s membership and its managers are long-term and politically entrenched individuals.  The 2EC’s  knowledge of North Korean weapons systems, its monopolizing the country’s finite resources and its access to military personnel certainly provide leverage and policy pressure it can exert on General-Secretary Kim.

Kim Jong-il has announced an intention to pursue a course of action that could portend decreasing the resources and attention for the Second Economic Committee.  It is more likely, however, that relations between General-Secretary Kim and the North Korean military-defense industry are hunky-dory.  But if an institution’s future becomes uncertain, and the masses support for the Suryong is shaky, perhaps a missile test is in order to pacify a more powerful constituency.  After all, the most capacious question mark when observing the DPRK Leadership is how these people and institutions truly interact with one another.