Torrential Rains Continue to Inundate DPRK

A flooded village in Sinhung, South Hamgyong Province in KCTV footage from July 2010. North Korean media reported on 6 August that torrential rains continued in the first week of August (Photo: KCBS/Yonhap)

ROK military authorities have announced that 91 land mines have been found, washed in from the DPRK due to heavy flooding.

Korean Central TV reported that heavy, torrential rain continues to inundate the DPRK.  The country sustained widespread damage and loss of life due to flash floods during July.  According to Yonhap heavy rain has continued during the first week of August:

“Relatively heavy downpours recently fell in North Pyongan, Jagang, Ryanggang and part of South Pyongan provinces,” Pyongyang’s official Korean Central TV Broadcasting Station, monitored in Seoul, said in a weather report.

During the period from July 31 until noon of Aug. 6, Junggang in Jagang Province received 191 millimeters of rain, the most in the country, followed by Wonsan, South Hamgyong Province, with 188mm, Manpo, Jagang Province, with 156mm and Sijung, a county in the same province, with 139mm, the report said.

Taechon and Chonma, both in North Pyongan Province, received 130mm and 129mm of rain, respectively, while 113mm fell in Songwon of Jagang Province, it added.

KCNA reported on July storm damage on 5 August.  Previously KCTV reported, and KCNA issued a report, that Kim Jong Il was managing some of the government response to flash flooding:

According to information available in a relevant organ, some 5 560 dwelling houses and more than 350 public buildings and production-related facilities were destroyed or inundated and some 14 850 hectares of farmland submerged, buried or washed away in the country.

A total of 673 dwelling houses collapsed in Jagang Province and 486 in South Hamgyong Province. Even casualties were reported from the areas and their residents have seriously been affected by heavy rains.

Not a small number of industrial establishments were damaged or flooded, inflicting an adverse effect on the economic growth and the people’s living.

Two 150 000KVA transformers, a 75 000KVA transformer and other power equipment were broken and roadbeds buried under landslides, blocking up railway traffic in some areas.

Some river embankments were crumbled and roads and bridges waterlogged or wrecked in South phyongan and Kangwon provinces and other areas.

Many sections of irrigation channels were also seriously damaged.

An estimated 7 380 hectares of farmland got submerged in such granaries as South Hwanghae, North and South phyongan and South Hamgyong provinces alone.

In this July 2010 video image from Pyongyang‟s state-run Korean Central TV Broadcasting Station, a North Korean military chopper rescues workers trapped by a flash flood in Sinhung, South Hamgyong Province. (KCBS/Yonhap)

Chosun Ilbo citing a Tuesday (3 August) RFA story reports that “hundreds” may have been killed in the floods:

Heavy rains since mid-July have inflicted heavy losses in North Korea, with 120 killed in Hungnam, South Hamgyong Province alone, Radio Free Asia reported Tuesday.

Quoting a source in Chongjin in the province, the radio station said over 2,000 people along the Songchon River were completely isolated when localized torrential rain that fell in Hungnam for three hours on July 22 flooded the dikes. Most of them were rescued by military helicopters and fishing boats, but 120, including 40 middle school students mobilized to help farmers, died.

A source in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province said rumor has it that over 160 drowned in Hungnam. There are said to have been many casualties in Kaechon, South Pyongan Province as well.

Some 60 Workers’ Party officials heading for Mt. Baekdu on an inspection tour were stranded on their train as part of the railroad was washed away in Unhung, Yanggang Province, said a source in the province. All markets were closed due to destroyed roads and railroads, further aggravating the suffering of the locals.

In reporting that the country has not yet asked for foreign assistance, Yonhap recounts conditions in the DPRK that exacerbate flooding:

North Korea is considered vulnerable to torrential rains because of serious deforestation and a lack of investment in flood controls. In 2007, more than 450 people were reportedly killed and some 150 others injured due to heavy rains.

North Korea’s official media have been reporting on property damage since the rainy season began several weeks ago in the region. But they have kept mum on any possible human losses while a U.S. media outlet said last month that as many as 120 people were killed amid heavy rains in the communist state recently.

“No request has been made by North Korea for international aid regarding rain damage,” a South Korean Unification Ministry official told reporters on the condition of anonymity.

Conditions inside the DPRK are ideal for mosquito breeding, JoongAng Ilbo reports that mosquitoes carrying malaria have been found near the DMZ:

Mosquitoes from the demilitarized zone are crossing into South Korea and spreading malaria to populations on the southern side. The reason: due to the chill in inter-Korean relations, yearly spraying on the Northern side has been halted.

According to the 2nd Provincial Office of Gyeonggi Province and the Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention yesterday, there have been a total of 286 malaria patients in the province this year as of yesterday, a 27.7 percent increase compared to last year.

Most patients were found in Paju, Yeoncheon and Goyang, all near the demilitarized zone.

The government explained that the rise is due to poor preventive measures against disease-carrying mosquitoes on the northern side. In years past, the South and North agreed to spray insecticides during the summer season.

But because of tense relations between the two countries after the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, the North hasn’t been doing its part.

As the number of malaria patients started to increase in May, the provincial office requested to the North in early July to participate in joint spraying. There was no response.

Jung Kwon Ho, writing for Daily NK writes on flooding conditions near the DPRK-PRC border, and local memories of a flood 15 years ago:

One of the municipal government officials in charge of flood prevention in Dandong met with reporters on August 4th, saying, “The water level of the Yulu River is rising rapidly and the Supung dam also exceeds danger levels. Any additional rains will increase the water level of the river by more than 4 meters and the river will flood. We have issued a warning on television and radio and sent a written warning to stores along the riverside.”

Sinuiju has also made an effort to prevent the flood by building up the embankment, but it is not enough to stop flood damage; especially, the topography of the industrial north of Sinuiju is low, which increases the risk of damage. In addition, it has been suggested that the building of flood defenses in Dandong might incite greater damage in Sinuiju.

One resident of Sinuiju commented during a phone interview with The Daily NK, “We experienced massive flood damage in 1995. The People’s Committee is just telling us to maintain the river and repair houses. So, there seem to be no clear preparations.”

The resident said, “There is a lot of farmland in South Sinuiju and Ryucho-ri; floods will cause great damage to it.”

This is of particular concern since one of the triggers of the famine that gripped North Korea in the late 1990s was the 1995 floods.

Xinhua reports on flooding in Jilin Province that has killed 85:

Floods have left 85 people dead and 66 missing in northeast China’s Jilin Province over the past two months, local authorities said Saturday. More than 5 million people have been affected since the flood season began in June and some 1.5 million people have been evacuated, the Jilin Provincial Civil Affairs Department said in a statement.

Additionally, almost 82,000 houses have collapsed and 198,000 others have been damaged, the statement said.

Direct economic losses were estimated at more than 45 billion yuan (6.6 billion U.S. dollars), it added.

In the hardest-hit areas, flash floods have cut roads, isolated villages and disrupted communications and water supplies.

Soldiers pack stones to reinforce a bank in Yongji County, northeast China's Jilin Province, Aug. 4, 2010. Floods hit dozens of counties in Jilin, causing more than 300,000 houses collaped and over 70 people died since this July. (Xinhua/Xu Jiajun)

NK War Strategy Focuses on Seoul

JoongAng Daily citing an anonymous “military source” reports that the country revised its contingency planning on an invasion of Seoul or moving further South, and wait to negotiate.

“North Korea would try to occupy Seoul early,” the source said. “And from there, it could either try to go farther south, or try to negotiate [for a cease-fire] from an advantageous position.”

A military expert who requested anonymity said the North took cues from the Gulf War in 1991 and Iraq War in 2003. Iraqi forces had armored vehicles similar to the North’s, but they were destroyed by the U.S. military’s precision strike weapons. North Korea, in other words, has concluded that if its mechanized units engaged in old-fashioned combat without extra help, they would be no match for the more sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.

As part of the change, North Korea has bolstered its frontline mechanized corps with extra mechanized divisions, the military source said. Also, the frontline corps have each received an extra light infantry division, and light infantry battalions on the front have been expanded to regiments.

The South Korean military also believes the North has bolstered its torpedo and sea mine capabilities against a possible U.S.-South Korea joint rear landing and has traded submarines with Iran for the latest torpedoes.

The Megaphone War and Light Water Reactors

In a 29 March editorial Korean Central News Agency hits back at external observation and reporting about KJI’s health, its internal economic situation and recent contingency planning around the country:

Pyongyang – There is now a deluge of “news” about the internal situation in the DPRK from the US, Japan and South Korea.

Various kinds of “reports” are pouring in to give impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK and wild rumors about even the health of the supreme leader are afloat. There are “analysis and comment” that shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the “failure of monetary reform”.

There is also misinformation that the DPRK continues missile and other arms smuggling, its nuclear capacity is being steadily bolstered up, there is concern about its possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is opening Rajin Port and sending workers to foreign countries en masse in a bid to earn foreign currency due to financial difficulties. The scenario for vituperation seems to know no bound.

The campaign to mislead the public opinion by concentrically and malignantly tarnishing the image of the other party by such specialized methods and means of psychological warfare has been called a black propaganda campaign. This campaign naturally seeks an aim. Behind this despicable propaganda are forces displeased with any investment in the DPRK. It is aimed at holding in check investment in the DPRK in a bid to hamstring its efforts to improve the people’s standard of living by focusing efforts on economic construction.

The DPRK uses the editorial to announce that will build a light water reactor:

They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of the independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside.

The DPRK will witness the appearance of a light water reactor power plant relying on its own nuclear fuel in the near future in the 2010s in the wake of mass-production of juche iron and Juche-based vinalon cotton, its reply to them.

While Kyodo focuses on the megaphone war, Xinhua’s report emphasizes the construction of the light water reactor:

Media reports from the United States, South Korea and Japan are pointing to an economic crisis in the DPRK, which is not true, according to the KCNA.

These reports are giving impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK as shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the failure of monetary reform, it said.

There are even rumors about the health of DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il, it added.

“They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of an independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside,” said the KCNA.

The DPRK announced it would “develop a light water reactor actively” last April. In September last year, the DPRK’s representative to the United Nations told the Security Council that the country had succeeded in experimental uranium enrichment.

The editorial seems to be a continuation of one from last week which named several defector-staffed, ROK-based media outfits as participating in “smear campaigns.”  It also seems to be a response to reports* about testimony to US Congressional committees by General Walter Sharp and Admiral Robert Willard, a portion of which addressed contingencies on the Peninsula.

The announcement of the construction of the light water reactor may well set the table for the 2nd session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly on 9 April.  In terms of succession;  the light water reactor may also be another propaganda accomplishment the Party History Institute will add to the Morningstar General’s resume.

*I need to underscore that this editorial seems a response to the media coverage and reporting (which focused on contingency planning) on General Sharp’s and Admiral Willard’s testimony to US House and US Senate (sub-) committees, and not the testimony itself.

ICG Study on NK Under UN Sanctions

The International Crisis Group has published a study as an Update Briefing under the title North Korea Under Tightening Sanctions.  The study suggests that the recent UN sanctions, currency redenomination and the unfolding succession campaign have created cleavages among North Korean elites. From the report’s overview:

Outwardly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) appears stable. However, the country has been shaken by constricting international sanctions, extremely poor policy choices, and several internal challenges that have the potential to trigger instability. International sanctions have reduced foreign exchange earnings, while humanitarian assistance, which feeds millions of North Koreans, has declined due to political factors and donor fatigue. In addition to sanctions, Pyongyang has been dealing with the internal pressures of a disastrous currency reform as well as a chronic and deteriorating food security problem. The aggregate pressure is already taking a toll on North Korea’s human security and could have a number of unanticipated consequences for regional and international security.

Some analysts and policymakers believe international sanctions have pressured North Korea to seek a face-saving return to the Six-Party Talks and better inter-Korean ties. Although Pyongyang’s opaque policymaking process makes it nearly impossible to understand regime motivations, the pressures of cascading and overlapping “mini crises” are unmistakable just as the country has had to face difficult succession issues. However, the DPRK has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to survive under pressure. Any of the current challenges – as singular problems – should be manageable. The state security apparatus and the barriers to collective action make a “revolution from below” virtually impossible. But despite the loyalty of elites in the party and the military, a sudden split in the leadership, although unlikely, is not out of the question. Signs of any fissures would not be observable from the outside until a power struggle, a coup d’état, collapse or similar crisis was already unfolding.

Yonhap has a story about the report’s release.  You can read the report’s overview/executive summary here.  You can also download a PDF copy of the full report here.

Possible New Third Floor Director

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun is first from left in this image from the 3 February KCTV broadcast on Kim Jong-il's tour of a fish factoryin Kumya County, South Hamgyong (Photo: KCNA/KCTV).

Here may a confirmable personnel change within the Central Party.  Korea Times reports that Kim Tong-un, chief executive of Office #39 (also known as the Third Floor), was replaced by by Jon Il-chun.  Kim Tong-un, 73 and a geologist by training, had

The man belived to be new Third Floor Director Jon Il-chun is third from left in this photo of Kim Jong-il's tour in Kumya County, South Hamgyong (Photo: KCNA/KCTV).

been director of the Third Floor since April 1994.  KT cites Mr. Kim’s recent appearance on an EU travel ban as the reason for his removal from the post.  The new Third Floor director, Mr. Jon, was reported as escorting Kim Jong-il a day or two ago at the Wonphyong Taehung Fishery Station, Kumya County, South Hamgyong.

North Korea has recently named Chon Il-chun, vice chief in charge of managing the safe of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his family, to head the office of the ruling Workers’ Party, Yonhap News reported Thursday.

Chon replaced Kim Dong-un who was put on a “blacklist” by the European Union last December, the report said, quoting sources in Seoul.

North Korea’s media reported Wednesday that Chon, a ranking official of the Workers’ Party, was among those who accompanied Kim Jong-il on his trip to a fishery office in South Hamgyeong Province.

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun had a seat at the main table during the first meeting of the new North Korean development bank on 20 January of this year.

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun is first from right in this image from a KCTV story annoucning the formation of a North Korean investment bank (Photo: KCTV)

As with Pak Nam-gi, the possible retirement/dismissal of Kim Tong-un seems more a matter of pretext (in this case, the EU travel ban) as against job performance.  These high level personnel movements are merely administrative planning to prepare for the post-KJI era in North Korea.

Personnel reassignments such as this (as well as last year’s Cabinet attrition) are one significant political indicator of crisis/contingency in North Korea.  However, in that regard, it seems that at present the Central Party is manuevering to prevent a devestating internal situation where they would have to mobilize large numbers of internal security units or, as the most desperate measure, making an emergency call to Beijing.

Will KJI Fade Away after 2012?

KINU (Korean Institute for National Unification) released a report entitled “Study on Unification” that prognosticates Kim Jong-il more or less disappearing from the Pyongyang scene  after 2012.  KINU pronounces, “The possibility of North Korean leader Kim’s absence in the North after 2012 is high.”   The report predicts that General-Secretary Kim will pass away or experience health complications that would prohibit his running the DPRK.

KINU envisions three (3) scenarios that may result from General-Secretary Kim’s “absence”: hereditary succession by Kim Jong-il’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un; a collective administration by current commanders of the KPA, and; the accession of a KPA strongman.  The latter scenario–the strongman moving to the center of power in North Korea–is predicated on a power struggle.  KINU expects that post-KJI North Korea will “likely undergo upheavals which may include regime change, like a military coup, riot, mass massacre or mass defections.”

This KINU report represents another first for Pyongyang watchers in the last week.  The National Defense Commission waded into the brackish inter-Korean water.   General-Secretary Kim observed drill of North Korea’s three military branches since assuming the Supreme Command of the KPA in December 1991.  And, according to Yonhap (and other observation), this is the first occasion when an ROK  “government think tank mentioned the possibility of upheavals in North Korea.”

I will note that earlier news reports out of The Peninsula had given General-Secretary Kim about five (5) years before health and general fatigue among North Korean elites might set in.