NK War Strategy Focuses on Seoul

JoongAng Daily citing an anonymous “military source” reports that the country revised its contingency planning on an invasion of Seoul or moving further South, and wait to negotiate.

“North Korea would try to occupy Seoul early,” the source said. “And from there, it could either try to go farther south, or try to negotiate [for a cease-fire] from an advantageous position.”

A military expert who requested anonymity said the North took cues from the Gulf War in 1991 and Iraq War in 2003. Iraqi forces had armored vehicles similar to the North’s, but they were destroyed by the U.S. military’s precision strike weapons. North Korea, in other words, has concluded that if its mechanized units engaged in old-fashioned combat without extra help, they would be no match for the more sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.

As part of the change, North Korea has bolstered its frontline mechanized corps with extra mechanized divisions, the military source said. Also, the frontline corps have each received an extra light infantry division, and light infantry battalions on the front have been expanded to regiments.

The South Korean military also believes the North has bolstered its torpedo and sea mine capabilities against a possible U.S.-South Korea joint rear landing and has traded submarines with Iran for the latest torpedoes.

The Megaphone War and Light Water Reactors

In a 29 March editorial Korean Central News Agency hits back at external observation and reporting about KJI’s health, its internal economic situation and recent contingency planning around the country:

Pyongyang – There is now a deluge of “news” about the internal situation in the DPRK from the US, Japan and South Korea.

Various kinds of “reports” are pouring in to give impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK and wild rumors about even the health of the supreme leader are afloat. There are “analysis and comment” that shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the “failure of monetary reform”.

There is also misinformation that the DPRK continues missile and other arms smuggling, its nuclear capacity is being steadily bolstered up, there is concern about its possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is opening Rajin Port and sending workers to foreign countries en masse in a bid to earn foreign currency due to financial difficulties. The scenario for vituperation seems to know no bound.

The campaign to mislead the public opinion by concentrically and malignantly tarnishing the image of the other party by such specialized methods and means of psychological warfare has been called a black propaganda campaign. This campaign naturally seeks an aim. Behind this despicable propaganda are forces displeased with any investment in the DPRK. It is aimed at holding in check investment in the DPRK in a bid to hamstring its efforts to improve the people’s standard of living by focusing efforts on economic construction.

The DPRK uses the editorial to announce that will build a light water reactor:

They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of the independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside.

The DPRK will witness the appearance of a light water reactor power plant relying on its own nuclear fuel in the near future in the 2010s in the wake of mass-production of juche iron and Juche-based vinalon cotton, its reply to them.

While Kyodo focuses on the megaphone war, Xinhua’s report emphasizes the construction of the light water reactor:

Media reports from the United States, South Korea and Japan are pointing to an economic crisis in the DPRK, which is not true, according to the KCNA.

These reports are giving impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK as shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the failure of monetary reform, it said.

There are even rumors about the health of DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il, it added.

“They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of an independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside,” said the KCNA.

The DPRK announced it would “develop a light water reactor actively” last April. In September last year, the DPRK’s representative to the United Nations told the Security Council that the country had succeeded in experimental uranium enrichment.

The editorial seems to be a continuation of one from last week which named several defector-staffed, ROK-based media outfits as participating in “smear campaigns.”  It also seems to be a response to reports* about testimony to US Congressional committees by General Walter Sharp and Admiral Robert Willard, a portion of which addressed contingencies on the Peninsula.

The announcement of the construction of the light water reactor may well set the table for the 2nd session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly on 9 April.  In terms of succession;  the light water reactor may also be another propaganda accomplishment the Party History Institute will add to the Morningstar General’s resume.

*I need to underscore that this editorial seems a response to the media coverage and reporting (which focused on contingency planning) on General Sharp’s and Admiral Willard’s testimony to US House and US Senate (sub-) committees, and not the testimony itself.

ICG Study on NK Under UN Sanctions

The International Crisis Group has published a study as an Update Briefing under the title North Korea Under Tightening Sanctions.  The study suggests that the recent UN sanctions, currency redenomination and the unfolding succession campaign have created cleavages among North Korean elites. From the report’s overview:

Outwardly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) appears stable. However, the country has been shaken by constricting international sanctions, extremely poor policy choices, and several internal challenges that have the potential to trigger instability. International sanctions have reduced foreign exchange earnings, while humanitarian assistance, which feeds millions of North Koreans, has declined due to political factors and donor fatigue. In addition to sanctions, Pyongyang has been dealing with the internal pressures of a disastrous currency reform as well as a chronic and deteriorating food security problem. The aggregate pressure is already taking a toll on North Korea’s human security and could have a number of unanticipated consequences for regional and international security.

Some analysts and policymakers believe international sanctions have pressured North Korea to seek a face-saving return to the Six-Party Talks and better inter-Korean ties. Although Pyongyang’s opaque policymaking process makes it nearly impossible to understand regime motivations, the pressures of cascading and overlapping “mini crises” are unmistakable just as the country has had to face difficult succession issues. However, the DPRK has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to survive under pressure. Any of the current challenges – as singular problems – should be manageable. The state security apparatus and the barriers to collective action make a “revolution from below” virtually impossible. But despite the loyalty of elites in the party and the military, a sudden split in the leadership, although unlikely, is not out of the question. Signs of any fissures would not be observable from the outside until a power struggle, a coup d’état, collapse or similar crisis was already unfolding.

Yonhap has a story about the report’s release.  You can read the report’s overview/executive summary here.  You can also download a PDF copy of the full report here.

Will KJI Fade Away after 2012?

KINU (Korean Institute for National Unification) released a report entitled “Study on Unification” that prognosticates Kim Jong-il more or less disappearing from the Pyongyang scene  after 2012.  KINU pronounces, “The possibility of North Korean leader Kim’s absence in the North after 2012 is high.”   The report predicts that General-Secretary Kim will pass away or experience health complications that would prohibit his running the DPRK.

KINU envisions three (3) scenarios that may result from General-Secretary Kim’s “absence”: hereditary succession by Kim Jong-il’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un; a collective administration by current commanders of the KPA, and; the accession of a KPA strongman.  The latter scenario–the strongman moving to the center of power in North Korea–is predicated on a power struggle.  KINU expects that post-KJI North Korea will “likely undergo upheavals which may include regime change, like a military coup, riot, mass massacre or mass defections.”

This KINU report represents another first for Pyongyang watchers in the last week.  The National Defense Commission waded into the brackish inter-Korean water.   General-Secretary Kim observed drill of North Korea’s three military branches since assuming the Supreme Command of the KPA in December 1991.  And, according to Yonhap (and other observation), this is the first occasion when an ROK  “government think tank mentioned the possibility of upheavals in North Korea.”

I will note that earlier news reports out of The Peninsula had given General-Secretary Kim about five (5) years before health and general fatigue among North Korean elites might set in.