Kim Jong Il Meets with Medvedev

Kim Jong Il steps out of his car prior to meeting Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 24 August 2011 outside of Ulan Ude in Siberia (Photo: RIA Novosti)

Kim Jong Il (Kim Cho’ng-il) met with Russian Federation President Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev on Wednesday (24 August) at a military compound outside of Ulan Ude in Siberia.  During the meeting, KJI said that he would consider suspending any additional nuclear weapons development, testing and production as part of an oft-repeated pledge for the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks.  RT reports:

North Korea is ready to return to the Six-Party negotiation table unconditionally and to do so, Kim Jong-il promised his country will impose moratorium on nuclear testing and nuclear weapons production.

Presidential Press Secretary Natalia Timakova announced these results of the meeting on Wednesday.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his North Korean counterpart have met in the secluded military compound Sosnovy Bor (Pine Wood) on the outskirts of the capital of Republic of Buryatia, Ulan-Ude. The talks lasted for two hours and ten minutes.The leaders shook hands for protocol photos in the presence of press, then proceeded to negotiate behind closed doors. Few results were announced once the negotiations were over, including little information about the topics of discussion.

Surely, tense topics have been discussed during the meeting. Most likely the talks were focused on Six-Party Talks: North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party Talks (which include North and South Koreas, Russia, China, US and Japan) and continued with its nuclear experiments, defiant in its continuation of its nuclear program, predictably causing outrage not only within the Six Parties, but the whole of the international community.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (L) meets with Kim Jong Il, the top leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), near Russia's eastern Siberian city of Ulan Ude, Aug. 24, 2011. (Xinhua/RIA NOVOSTI)

KJI and Medvedev also discussed the formation of a three-country commission to oversee the development and construction of a gas pipeline running from Russia through the DPRK to ROK.  ITAR-TASS reports:

Medvedev said, “We achieved certain results on gas cooperation. In particular, a decision has been taken to create a special commission for gas transit to the Republic of Korea via the territory of the DPRK.”

“The DPRK seeks to realise this project,” the Russian president stressed. At the same time, he pointed out that the gas pipeline of 1,100 km long was planning to be built.

“This year it will be possible to transport up to 10 billion cubic metres of gas by this pipeline. If there is demand, we are ready to increase our supplies,” Medvedev said.

“We instructed our agencies to create a special commission in order to determine concrete parameters of gas cooperation via the territory of the DPRK and involve South Korea in this project due to the fact that main consumers are deployed on its territory,” the Russian president said.

He noted, “The DPRK seeks to realise such tripartite project with the participation of Russia and South Korea. Now we are starting a technical work.” “Some time ago the Gazprom delegation led by the deputy head of the board visited the DPRK. Yesterday I instructed [the company’s head Alexei] Miller to deal with this problem. We’ll hope that there will be a good project,” Medvedev said.

A delegation from Russia’s Gazprom gas giant visited North Korea last week, for the latest in a sudden flurry of mysterious contacts between Moscow and the isolated state, the company said.

The Gazprom team was headed by deputy managing chairman Alexander Ananenkov, who met with North Korea’s oil minister to discuss “outstanding issues of cooperation in the energy sphere,” the Russian company said.

The construction of a gas pipeline between Russia and South Korea via the DPRK will guarantee the restoration and strengthening of trust between Seoul and Pyongyang, said Georgy Toloraya, director of research programmes at the Centre for Modern Korean Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Commenting on a visit to Russia by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, Toloraya said, “The upcoming talks between the Russian and North Korean leaders are important. The six-party consultations may resume. North Koreans said they were ready to resume negotiations and discus the nuclear programme. It will be more difficult to ignore a signal that Kim Jong-il will give to the international community with the aid of Dmitry Medvedev.”

“If Russia supports the initiative [on resuming the six-party talks] and guarantees that North Koreans seek to discuss this problem, it will be more difficult for Seoul and Washington to scuttle the dialogue,” the Russian expert said.

Economic projects, such as the construction of a gas pipeline between Russia and South Korea via the DPRK, the linking up of the Trans-Korean railway with the Trans-Siberian mainline and the construction of a power transmission line from the Far East to the Republic of Korea, can be very significant in relations between the two countries. “This issue is being actively finalised. Gazprom’ s project has been approved by North Korea. Pyongyang is also ready to take part in the project jointly with South Koreans despite difficult relations. Now Gazprom intends to inform Seoul about this. South Koreans agree in word although they voice concerns over North Korea’s possible dependence, including illegal gas extraction and blackmail,” he said.

At the same time, he said, “The pipeline will guarantee the restoration and strengthening of trust between the North and the South. The economic development of North Korea will become one more argument for stopping the nuclear programme.”

Kim Jong Il meets with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 24 August 2011 outside of Ulan Ude in Siberia (Photo: Kremlin)

Kim Jong Il and Dmitry Medvedev sit for a media availability on 24 August 2011 (Photo: Kremlin)

The meeting’s agenda also included a bit of old business, including the DPRK’s formal recognition of the Russian Federation succeeding the Soviet Union and the DPRK’s repayment of foreign debts to the former USSR.  RIA Novosti reports:

Medvedev and Kim met in Ulan-Ude, in East Siberia’s Buryatia Region earlier in the day.

“The leaders agreed on an approach toward solving this issue,” the source said.

Renewed talks on the issue had been going on for around six weeks, the source added.

“The Russian delegation thinks that the fact that these talks have been renewed is a significant breakthrough toward solving this issue.”

The talks involve North Korea’s $11 billion debt to Russia from the Soviet era, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said on Wednesday.

He also said that North Korea should first recognize Russia as a successor state of the Soviet Union. Then the two states need to recalculate the sum of the loan, which was issued in Soviet rubles at the exchange rate of 0.6 rubles per $1.

Only then the two countries may launch negotiations “on how to repay the resulting sum.”

Moscow sees the loan as one of the factors that hinder trade and economic cooperation between the two states.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev talks with Kim Jong Il during a photo op on 24 August (Photo: Xinhua)

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (L) and Kim Jong Il (R) on 24 August 2011 in Ulan Ude in Siberia (Photo: Xinhua)

KJI Concerned About “Unrest” in Early February Over Money Crunch (revised 18 April)

Choson Ilbo, citing a story from Open Radio for NK, reports that Kim Jong Il was worried about public discontent at a meeting in early February.

At a meeting on Feb. 2 in which he received a briefing on the progress in the North’s project to earn dollars, Kim said, “If the most important thing is single-minded unity under current circumstances, public sentiment is the very basis of such a unity,” the radio quoted a high-level North Korean source as saying. “If this problem is solved, it will not be as difficult to earn foreign exchange as now,” he reportedly added.

His remarks suggested he, in fact, admitted that he has difficulty raising his own funds and that the North Korean people are agitated.

In early February, officials previously known to earn foreign currency for the regime in the Third Floor, took on a greater prominence in the country’s economic activities.  If this report on KJI’s state of mind is accurate, it may explain reports of the execution or incarceration of Pak Nam Gi, and one of the vice chairmen of the State Planning Commission.

KJI’s concerns about security were likely assuaged.  The Ministry of Public Security was upgraded, and directly subordinated to the National Defense Commission.  The chief of the State Security Department was given a military promotion.  While MPS was already on the fast track for the Supreme Commander’s affections, and U Tong Chuk’s promotion was not entirely unexpected, the lack of any major, and embarrassing, popular revolts may have facilitated, if not ensured, these institutional and career advancements.

KJI’s concerns about earning foreign currency may take more time.  Yonhap, citing sources in Beijing, reports that Office #39 (3rd Floor) deputy director (and KJI high school buddy) Jon Il Chun had traveled to China around 9 April.  He is also, concurrently, President of the State Development Bank and chief executive of DPRK Taephung International Investment Group, acting on behalf of the National Defense Commission.

Jon Il Chun was reportedly leading a delegation to Beijing to negotiate and attract investments in the country.  Mr. Jon was one of the foreign currency-earning technocrats KJI promoted to handle the economic fallout from the 2009 currency redenomination.

Meanwhile, Kyodo reports that the public face of the DPRK Taephung International Investment Group Pak Chol Su (whom one recent report noted does not sport a KJI badge) is talking up Rason, the country’s other ports and other infrastructure repair:

North Korea has launched a five-year, $120 billion infrastructure-building project in eight cities as part of a 10-year plan to rebuild the economy, a manager of a state-run investment group said Friday.

Pak Chol Su, chairman of the Korea Taepung International Investment Group, expressed hope companies from Japan, South Korea and other neighboring countries will invest in the development plan that began this year.

”We believe the plan will lead to the establishment of a Northeast Asian economic community” involving the two Koreas, China, Japan and Russia, Pak said in an interview with Kyodo News in Pyongyang.

Kim Jong Il conducts a field guidance tour of the renovated Hyangsan Hotel in North Pyongan Province in late January 2010. The official on the left is Han Kwang Sang, deputy director of the KWP Financial Planning Department. (Photo: KCNA).

Ri Chol’s Last Minute Business

Ri Chol speaking about the DPRK's human rights on at the UN on 7 December 2009 (Photo: Yonhap)

Despite reports that he is leaving his concurrent positions as DPRK Ambassador to Switzerland and the UN Mission in Geneva, Ri Chol still has official business to attend to.  Yonhap reports that Ambassador Ri appeared at another UN Human Right Commission meeting to rebut its report on human rights in the country.

Ri claimed the suggestions stem from a deeply ingrained sense of animosity toward North Korea and are aimed at pursuing goals unrelated to human rights, such as overthrowing the regime and tainting the image of the country. The envoy also said the North does not recognize the U.N. human rights envoy.

Ri gave non-specific responses to the other recommendations and stopped short of making a commitment to any of them. The 117 suggestions included improving the human rights of the socially weak, joining international human rights pacts and allowing reunions of families separated by the Korean War.

Yonhap’s Kim Young-gyo reports on a commentary in a Hong Kong newspaper about Ri Chol’s possible return to Pyongyang and how it may indicate Kim Jong-un’s succession:

The Chinese-language Takungpao said in a commentary that Ambassador Ri Chol, who has served as a diplomat to Switzerland for 30 years, went back to the North in late March in order to help with the succession of Kim Jong-un, the youngest of Kim’s three sons.

“To the author’s view, the most important reason for Ri’s return may be related to making smooth arrangements for Kim Jong-il’s successor,” wrote Li Youqi, a senior commentator at the newspaper.

Money, it’s a Gas

Daily NK reports that the currency change under way in the DPRK was announced at 14:00 by the radio broadcasts directly piped into the homes of North Korean citizens.  Street markets have remained shuttered since 11:00 as of Monday, 30 November.  Daily NK also reports that on 1 December the currency decision was announced in special call meetings of county and town KWP and People’s Committees and that county branches of the DPRK Central Bank had commenced the new currency exchange of old Won for new.  In the closest we may get to an official announcement, Xinhua reported the DPRK’s currency revaluation.

Daily NK recalls the previous revaluation of North Korean currency in 1992 with some fascinating analysis and anecdotes contrasting the currency switch in 1992 to the one that occurred this week.  DNK suspects the DPRK Leadership is turning tricks in revaluing the won.  The ROK press has begun editorializing about the revaluation in different degrees.  Dong-A Ilbo, while making amends to Daily NK, concludes that “the strong resistance against the revaluation by the North Korean people might have put the Communist regime in a fix.”  Korea Times opines that the DPRK “seems to be gambling economically and politically with the redenomination.”  Korea Herald concludes “the currency redenomination rather looks like a move back to tighter control.”  Chosun Ilbo brings up the DPRK’s upcoming possible return to the Six-Party Talks: “there is a strong possibility that North Korea will take a more accommodating stance in talks with Seoul and Washington.”

Chosun Ilbo also carried a report containing excellent analysis combining the economics of the revaluation with the brutal power play at work here.   To parallel its labor mobilization campaigns, the DPRK Leadership has engaged in a battle campaign of its own against the public markets over which it previously had a kind of gedogen.  In July of this year the SPA Presidium set up a Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessity, perhaps a harbinger of the current realities in the DPRK and an indication of North Korean tightening its belt.

All the while, the North Korean press remains mute about the currency revaluation.  But KCNA’s bulletin about the 100 Day Battle Campaign can’t be an accident.

MPS on Alert after DPRK Changes Currency

Daily NK reports that the DPRK “has revalued and replaced its national currency.”  Northeast Asia Matters carries the complete English variant of the article, as well as the Korean version of the article.  Northeast Asia Matters notes “One thing the Korean version mentions that the English version above does not is that the Ministry of People’s Security is on full alert to watch the people’s reactions and control any “problems” associated with the issuance of new money.”

That MPS may be on “full alert” may have been a policy Kim Jong-il brought with his guidance when he inspected the MPS headquarters last week.  General-Secretary Kim may have also provided Minister of Public Security, Gen. Ju Sang-song, a gentle reminder about the new North Korean currency policy during his inspection tour of the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm over the weekend.  The Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm was constructed and under the direction of the Ministry of Public Security.

Kim Wan-su Demoted, but Not Gone

Kim Wan-su (photo: Yonhap News Agency)

Kim Wan-su was not entirely removed from DPRK public life and has retained his Vice Chair of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  He greeted Sergei Mironov, chairman of the upper house of Russia’s Parliament (the Federation Council of Russia),  when Mr. Mironov arrived with his delegation at Sunan Airport.  In the KCNA report of Mr. Mironov’s arrival Kim Wan-su was identified as “Vice Chairman of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly.”  Mr. Kim was removed as Minister of Finance by the SPA in September of this year, about five (5) months after he was appointed to the Cabinet position.  Previous to his appointment, Kim Wan-su was President of the DPRK Central Bank.

Foreign Visits and an Under the Radar Cabinet Appointment

Senior Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju (far left), Dai Bingguo and Kim Jong-il. Photo: Korea Central News Agency

On 18 September, the North Korean press reported a meeting between Kim Jong-il and PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo, a surrogate for Chinese President Hu Jintao.  From photographs of the event, the meeting appeared to take place at the Paekhwawon Guest House located here (http://wikimapia.org/#lat=39.0457485&lon=125.81168&z=17&l=0&m=b&search=Paekhwawon%20guest%20house) in east Pyongyang.  This was Mr. Dai’s sixth official visit to the DPRK, and the sixth time Mr Dai has met or participated in meetings with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang or Beijing.

The DPRK gave Mr. Dai the treatment of a visiting head of state when he arrived in Pyongyang on (or around) September 15.   Mr. Dai attended an opera with nominal head of state Kim Yong-nam and placed a wreath at the DPRK-PRC Friendship Tower.   He also watched a performance of Arirang (the mass games).   The most notable member of Dai Bingguo’s travel party was Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei.  Vice Minister Wu was China’s representative at the defunct Six Party Talks.

Dai Bingguo’s visit culminated in his meeting with Kim Jong-il.  Present at the meeting was the DPRK’s senior Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (and KJI’s  cousin) Kang Sok-ju.  Also present at the meeting, but not mentioned in the North Korean press accounts was Kim Yang-gon, department director of the CCKWP United Front Department and possibly a Councilor on the National Defense Commission (a position in which he served prior to his March 2007 appointment to the United Front Department).   It does not require any fantastic exercise of the imagination to infer the central topic of the day.  After Dai’s departure, word came that Kim Jong-il was willing to discuss the DPRK nuclear program in either a bi-lateral or multi-lateral context.

Dai Bingguo and his delegation were not the only “fraternal” group in Pyongyang last week.  Concurrent to Mr. Dai’s visit, a delegation from the Laos People’s Revolution Party arrived in Pyongyang.   The DPRK hosts and announces these meetings all of the time, but one of the North Korean participants was rather unique because of his affiliation.  Ru Tuk-nam is chair of the KWP Central Control (Auditing) Committee.  The Central Control Committee seldom appears in the North Korean press.  It is a Soviet-import (like a Politburo) tasked with regulation and discipline of members of the KWP.  Its last mention in available North Korean media was in 2007 when its chair, Pak Yong-sok passed away.  One can only assume Ru Tuk-nam (and the Central Control Commission was mentioned) participated in these events because the LPRP sent Asang Laoly who holds, among his many positions, the Chair of the CCLPRP Control Commission.

Perhaps,  the North Korean press thought with the news of these foreign visits, a a major Cabinet change would sail under the proverbial radar.  With news of Dai Bingguo’s meeting with Kim Jong-il came a brief announcement that Kim Wan-su was removed from his post as Minister of Finance.  Previous to his April 2009 appointment as Finance Minister, Kim Wan-su was President of the DPRK Central Bank.   The report in DailyNK cited the failure of the 150 Day Battle Campaign as the reason for Kim Wan-su’s removal from office.  Kim Wan-su’s replacement is Pak Su-gil, Chair of the North Hamgyong People’s Provinicial Committee.  Mr. Pak was also appointed as a Vice Premiere of the DPRK Cabinet.  No word on the fate of Kim Wan-su.  Although, it should be noted due to North Hamgyong Province’s geographic proximity, Pak Su-gil has many connections with China.

Dai Bingguo and PRC Delegation Visit

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news18/20090918-07ee.html

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news16/20090916-21ee.html

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news17/20090917-17ee.html

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news18/20090918-06ee.html

Laos People’s Revolutionary Party Visit

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news16/20090916-14ee.html

Kim Wan-su Fired

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=5432

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200909/news18/20090918-14ee.html