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Chinese Vice President Attends Anniversary Reception at DPRK Embassy in Beijing

14 Jun
DPRK Embassy in Beijing (Photo: Google image)

DPRK Embassy in Beijing (Photo: Google image)

DPRK state media reported that the DPRK Embassy in Beijing hosted a reception commemorating the 30th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s “maiden visit” to China in 1983.  Attending the reception from the Chinese government were Vice President Li Yuanchao, Deputy Director of the Communist Party of China’s International Liaison Department Liu Jieyi and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin.  DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong and embassy personnel attended on behalf of the DPRK.  In his anniversary speech, according to KCNA, Ji Jae Ryong remarked “that the maiden visit to China by Kim Jong Il was a historic event which greatly contributed to putting on a new high stage the traditional DPRK-China friendship which was provided and cultivated by President Kim Il Sung together with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and other leaders of the elder generation of China and stood all tests of history and to ensuring the peace and security in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world and advancing the human cause of independence against imperialism” and that “Kim Jong Un is paying deep attention to boosting the DPRK-China friendly relations true to the noble intention of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.”  Ji also said “we will as ever make joint efforts with Chinese comrades to steadily boost the traditional DPRK-China friendship.”

Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao (L) and DPRK Ambassador to the PRC Ji Jae Ryong (R) spoke at an anniversary reception commemorating Kim Jong Il's 1983 visit to China held at the DPRK Embassy to China on 13 June 2013 (Photos: Xinhua and Yonhap)

Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao (L) and DPRK Ambassador to the PRC Ji Jae Ryong (R) spoke at an anniversary reception commemorating Kim Jong Il’s 1983 visit to China held at the DPRK Embassy to China on 13 June 2013 (Photos: Xinhua and Yonhap)

According to KCNA, Li Yuanchao said in his speech that “Kim Jong Il worked heart and soul to develop the Korean revolution and construction and the traditional Sino-DPRK friendly relations and made important contributions” and “First Secretary Kim Jong Un in his recent personal letter sent to General Secretary Xi Jinping underlined the need to carry forward and develop the traditional Sino-DPRK friendly relations.”  Li also said “the Chinese party and government set great store by the Sino-DPRK friendly relations and the new collective leadership of the Communist Party of China will together with the party and government of the DPRK respect and trust each other and conduct friendly exchange and cooperation in the spirit of inheriting the tradition, facing up to the future, building good-neighborly friendship and strengthening cooperation and thus promote the development of the Sino-DPRK friendly relations and defend the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”

The reception in Beijing followed a similar anniversary event hosted by the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 4 June.  The Pyongyang reception commemorating the 30th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s visit to China was attended by PRC Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai, PRC Embassy personnel and Chinese nationals and students working in the DPRK.  KWP Secretary and Director of the International Affairs Department [IAD] Kim Yong Il attended the reception on behalf of the DPRK, and was joined by officials from the IAD, the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the National Defense Commission.

Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai (L) and KWP International Affairs Secretary Kim Yong Il (R) spoke at an anniversary event commemorating Kim Jong Il's 1983 visit to China, held at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 4 June 2013 (Photos: PRC Embassy in the DPRK, NKLW file photo).

Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai (L) and KWP International Affairs Secretary Kim Yong Il (R) spoke at an anniversary event commemorating Kim Jong Il’s 1983 visit to China, held at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 4 June 2013 (Photos: PRC Embassy in the DPRK, NKLW file photo).

In his speech Kim Yong Il said “Kim Jong Il’s visit to China in June 1983 marked a historic event of weighty significance in boosting the traditional DPRK-China friendship generation after generation” and “recalled that senior officials of the party and state of China enthusiastically welcomed Kim Jong Il, who paid a maiden visit to their country as most important state guest and accorded him cordial hospitality with all sincerity.”  Kim Yong Il also remarked that “Kim Jong Il, setting greatest store by the DPRK-China friendship provided by President Kim Il Sung, exerted great efforts to make the deeply rooted friendship flourish and develop.  It is the noble duty and obligation of the present generation to steadily boost the precious DPRK-China friendship associated with great efforts of the leaders of the elder generation of the two parties and countries.  The recent visit paid by a special envoy of Comrade Kim Jong Un to China marked an important occasion in steadily boosting the DPRK-China friendly relations, wealth common to the peoples of the two countries, as required by the new times.”  According to KCNA, Kim also said that “tt is the unshakable political stand of the WPK and the government of the DPRK to steadily develop the DPRK-China friendship, he said, stressing that the WPK would in the future, too, to boost with vitality and dynamism the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.”

Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai, according to KCNA, said “General Secretary Kim Jong Il visited China several times to forge close relations with Chinese party and state leaders and worked heart and soul to boost the Sino-DPRK friendly and cooperative relations” and that “China and the DPRK are the friendly neighbors linked by the same mountain and rivers, he said, stressing that it is the consistent stand of the Chinese party and government to steadily develop the Sino-DPRK friendly relations.”  Liu also said “the Chinese side deems it important to invariably develop the Sino-DPRK friendly relations on a strategic height and from a long-term viewpoint” and Liu “underscored the need to further value the Sino-DPRK friendship, the precious common treasure of the two peoples, and carry forward and develop it generation after generation.”  Liu “recalled that the special envoy of First Secretary of Kim Jong Un visited China and met with General Secretary Xi Jinping and other leading officials of China and had an in-depth and candid exchange of views on issues of common concern” and said “the relations between the two countries at present have entered a new historic phase. . .underlining the need to promote common development on the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit and co-prosperity and thus bring welfare to the two peoples.”

The two events commemorating the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s visit to China in 1983 appear to be part of a reconciliation process between the DPRK and China.  The Beijing reception was attended by PRC Vice President Li Yuanchao, who visited the DPRK Embassy on a condolence call after Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011 and who lead a CPC delegation on an official visit to the DPRK in June 2011, during which he met with the late DPRK leader.  Also attending the Beijing anniversary event were Liu Jieyi, who escorted VMar Choe Ryong Hae during his visit to Beijing in May 2013, and Liu Zhenmin, who had previously participated in several senior DPRK-PRC interactions.

Kim Jong Un Visits International Children’s Camp and Outdoor Theater in Wo’nsan

31 May
Kim Jong Un (1) tours Songdowon International Children's Camp in Wo'nsan, Kangwo'n Province (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Kim Jong Un (1) tours Songdowon International Children’s Camp in Wo’nsan, Kangwo’n Province (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported on 30 May (Thursday) that Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) visited the Songdowon International Children’s Camp and the Songdowon Youth Open-Air Theater in Kangwo’n, capital city of Kangwo’n Province.  His last observed public appearance was his visit to the 25 August Fishery Station of Korean People’s Army [KPA] Unit #313.  Attending Kim Jong Un’s visits to the children’s camp and outdoor theater in Wo’nsan were Senior Deputy [1st vice] Director of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Propaganda and Agitation Department Choe Hwi, Deputy KWP Department Director (for construction and design) Ma Won Chun and Deputy KWP Department Director Pak Tae Song.

Kim Jong Un’s first stop was a tour of the Songdowon International Children’s Camp.  After arriving at the camp, Kim Jong Un examined a statue of his grandfather, late DPRK President and founder, Kim Il Sung.  He said that the camp is “a historic place” and whilst “recollecting that Kim Il Sung personally chose the site of the camp in 1959, the postwar period, and made sure that it was built, he added that in the subsequent period leader Kim Jong Il saw to it that it was reconstructed as the Songdowon International Children’s Camp and visited it in March, 1993 when the country was in a grave situation.”  Kim Jong Un also remarked that “it is the firm determination of the WPK to successfully remodel the camp closely associated with the leadership exploits of the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as required by the new century,” “proposed erecting statues of the Generalissimos among children while undertaking the project in order to convey their noble love for future and posterity down through generations” and “specified instructions for remodeling the camp, going round the camp building, the International Friendship Children’s Hall and other places of the camp visited by Kim Jong Il on March 30, 1993,” according to KCNA.

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Songdowon International Children’s Camp in Wo’nsan, Kangwo’n Province (Photos: Google image, KCNA/FLPH file photo)

Kim Jong Un (1) tours the Songdowon International Children's Camp (Photo: Rodong Sinmun).

Kim Jong Un (1) tours the Songdowon International Children’s Camp (Photo: Rodong Sinmun).

Kim Jong Un (1) issues instructions while touring a beach at Songdowon International Children's Camp in Wo'nsan, Kangwo'n Province on the DPRK's east coast (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Kim Jong Un (1) issues instructions while touring a beach at Songdowon International Children’s Camp in Wo’nsan, Kangwo’n Province on the DPRK’s east coast (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Kim Jong Un toured one of the camp’s dormitories and “told officials to provide them with better furniture and TV sets.” He also “underscored the need to decorate walls of rooms with wallpapers beautiful in color and pattern to suit children’s minds and take thorough measures for heating and electricity so that they may not feel any inconvenience in their camping.”  In a visit to a building lobby he “said that it is 20 years old but it still looks impeccable in architectural beauty as Kim Jong Il led the designing and construction of the camp with loving care.”  He also toured a friendship exhibition and “stressed the need to set up a guide board written in foreign languages so that it may be convenient to children from various countries of the world” and visited a classroom for marine biology lessons and “gave an instruction to provide it with varieties of specimen so that campers may acquire not only knowledge about seas but that about animals and plants.”

According to KCNA, Kim Jong Un said “that the camp should be operated in winter, too, in the future so that children may enjoy skiing at the Masik Pass Skiing Ground now under construction.”  During a tour of the camp’s wading pool, he said “he would send modern wading equipment and told officials to spruce them up as well as they please.”  On a tour of a playground, he “called for building a running track and covering the football field with artificial turf and providing new facilities for sports events such as volleyball and basketball.” Kim Jong Un also asked the camp change its ideological slogan to “We Are the Happiest in the World!” and “General Goes to Front While Children Go to Camp!”  During a tour of the camp’s beach Kim Jong Un “underscored the need to build dressing rooms and diving towers, provide modern shower equipment and take necessary measures for preventing sand from piling up there.”  According to KCNA he also “took measures for building a new ground for education at the camp and paving its sidewalks again, adding that he would send vehicles needed for its management and operation.”

Kim Jong Un (1) tours Songdowon Youth Open Air Theater in Wo'nsan Kangwo'n Province (Photo: Rodong Sinmun).

Kim Jong Un (1) tours Songdowon Youth Open Air Theater in Wo’nsan Kangwo’n Province (Photo: Rodong Sinmun).

Songdowon Youth Open Air Theater in Wo'nsan, Kangwo'n Province (Photos: Google image, Rodong Sinmun).

Songdowon Youth Open Air Theater in Wo’nsan, Kangwo’n Province (Photos: Google image, Rodong Sinmun).

Kim Jong Un’s next visit was to the Songdowon Youth Open-Air Theater.  He first visited an exhibition on the theater’s history and “recalled the words of leader Kim Jong Il that he would watch a performance of the State Merited Chorus with citizens of Wonsan City there if the seating capacity of the theatre would be increased to 5 000, adding that he could not keep the promise.”  He also “underscored the need to manage the theatre better and put its operation on a regular basis so as to eternally glorify their exploits.”  According to KCNA, Kim Jong Un said “as the room dedicated to the history of the theatre is the place for educating visitors, it should be arranged and furnished well so that many working people, youth and students may visit it.”  Kim Jong Un toured the theater.  He “told officials to readjust the chairs in such a way as to make them convenient to the audience” and whilst looking at the renovated stage said “the stage was roofless in the past but it was newly built well as instructed by Kim Jong Il. The stage looks nice after its remodeling.”  He also learned about the performances offered at the theater and ”underlined the need to ensure that songs and dances and exciting agitation are always presented there.” Kim Jong Un also said he “would spare time to watch an art performance at the theatre together with Wo’nsan citizens” and he “instructed the Kangwo’n Provincial Committee of the WPK and working people’s organizations in the province including the provincial committee of the youth league to pay deep attention to the management and operation of the open-air theatre so that it may creditably discharge its mission.”

Kim Jong Un called “for successfully remodeling the open-air theatre as a fashionable one which will well match its environment and remain impeccable in the distant future” and “indicated the tasks and ways to do so.”  After touring the Songdowon Youth Open-Air Theater, Kim Jong Un posed for commemorative photographs with theater employees.

KWP Deputy Department Director Ma Won Chun (annotated) attends a tour by Kim Jong Il in Wo'nsan Province in August 2009 (L) and attends Kim Jong Un's visit to Songdowon International Children's Camp in May 2013 (Photos: KCNA-Yonhap, Rodong Sinmun).

KWP Deputy Department Director Ma Won Chun (annotated) attends a tour by Kim Jong Il in Wo’nsan Province in August 2009 (L) and attends Kim Jong Un’s visit to Songdowon International Children’s Camp in May 2013 (Photos: KCNA-Yonhap, Rodong Sinmun).

Overview of Kim family residential compound in the city of Wo'nsan and two locales in the city was reported on 30 May 2013 as having visited (Photo: Google image)

Overview of Kim family residential compound in the city of Wo’nsan and two locales in the city was reported on 30 May 2013 as having visited (Photo: Google image)

View of the main residential and recreational area of the Kim Family's residential compound in Wo'nsan, Kangwo'n Province (Photo: Google image)

View of the main residential and recreational area of the Kim Family’s residential compound in Wo’nsan, Kangwo’n Province (Photo: Google image)

The last #1 visit to the Songdowon Youth Open Air Theater was in August 2009 when late leader Kim Jong Il dropped by for a tour of the theater, accompanied by a formidable retinue of close aides and powerholders.  During that visit, KJI said the theater was “a historic place where an art performance celebrating the 20th anniversary of Korea’s liberation was given in August of 1965 in the presence of President Kim Il Sung” and he “recollected with deep emotion those unforgettable historic days.”  KJI also remarked during his visit that “the slogan ‘We Serve the People!’ clearly reflects the unshakable will and determination of the WPK to devote everything to the happiness of the people, placing their interests above all.”

Kim Jong Un has spent the last week in and around Wo’nsan.  It is likely he has been operating out of the Kim Family compound in northern Wo’nsan.  The residential complex is located across a river from the Songdowon International Children’s Camp.

 

Choe Ryong Hae Returns to DPRK

26 May
VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) shakes hands with Kim Yong Il (2), Korean Workers' Party Secretary and Director of the International Affairs Department, after arriving at Pyongyang Airport on 24 May 2013 from a three day visit to China (Photo: KCNA).

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) shakes hands with Kim Yong Il (2), Korean Workers’ Party Secretary and Director of the International Affairs Department, after arriving at Pyongyang Airport on 24 May 2013 from a three day visit to China (Photo: KCNA).

DPRK state media reported on 24 May (Friday) that VMar Choe Ryong Hae, Director of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Political Department and Member of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Political Bureau Presidium, returned to the DPRK from a three-day visit to China as a “special envoy” of supreme leader Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n).  VMar Choe and a senior-level delegation which included Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau), Kim Song Nam (Deputy Director of the KWP International Affairs Department), Kim Hyong Jun (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil (Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces) landed in Pyongyang on Friday night.  At the airport they were greeted by Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (Chief of the KPA General Staff), Col. Gen. Son Chol Ju (KPA General Political Department), Ri Yong Chol (Deputy Director of the KWP International Affairs Department), Pak Kil Yon (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and DPRK Ambassador-at-Large), Liu Hongcai (Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK) and other DPRK and Chinese officials.

Choe Ryong Hae (1) tours the Beijing Economic and Technological Development Park.  Also in attendance is Kim Song Nam (2), Deputy Director of the KWP International Affairs Department (Photo: KCNA).

Choe Ryong Hae (1) tours the Beijing Economic and Technological Development Park. Also in attendance is Kim Song Nam (2), Deputy Director of the KWP International Affairs Department (Photo: KCNA).

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1), special envoy of Kim Jong Un, views a scale model of Beijing Economic and Technological Development Park.  Also in attendance is Col. Gen. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (2), chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau (Photo: KCNA).

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1), special envoy of Kim Jong Un, views a scale model of Beijing Economic and Technological Development Park. Also in attendance is Col. Gen. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (2), chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau (Photo: KCNA).

After arriving in Beijing on 22 May (Wednesday), Choe Ryong Hae met with Wang Jiarui, head of the Communist Party of China [CPC] Central Committee International Liaison Department.  On 23 May (Thursday), VMar Choe and the DPRK delegation, accompanied by Liu Jieyi, toured the Beijing Economic and Technological Development District.  According to KCNA, Choe and the delegation were “greeted by a leading official of the district on the spot” and were “briefed on the history of the district and its management and operation.”  Later on Thursday, VMar Choe and the delegation met with Liu Yunshan, the CPC’s propaganda [publicity] secretary and a member of the CPC Political Bureau Standing Committee (presidium).  Liu “warmly welcomed the China visit by the special envoy of First Secretary Kim Jong Un, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee.”

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (L), a special envoy of DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Un, shakes hands with CPC Secretary Liu Yunshan (R) in Beijing on 23 May 2013 (Photo: Xinhua)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (L), a special envoy of DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Un, shakes hands with CPC Secretary Liu Yunshan (R) in Beijing on 23 May 2013 (Photo: Xinhua)

According to KCNA, during the meeting Choe Ryong Hae told Liu that “he came to China as a special envoy of the dear respected Kim Jong Un, adding that it is the invariable stand of the WPK to consolidate and develop generation after generation the DPRK-China friendship associated with the devoted efforts made by the leaders of the elder generation of the two parties and countries” and that the “DPRK will always advance hand in hand with the Chinese comrades to defend the socialist cause in the two countries and boost the friendship and solidarity between the two peoples, he noted, expressing hope that the CPC and the Chinese people would register greater successes in socialist construction with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the CPC with Xi Jinping as its general secretary.”  Liu Yunshan, according to KCNA, said that “the Chinese party and government deem it very important to steadily develop the China-DPRK friendly relations on a strategic level and from a long-term viewpoint,” that “the China visit by the special envoy is of weighty significance as it is taking place at a time when the Sino-DPRK relations have entered a new era of carrying forward the tradition and future, Liu said, stressing the need to boost the bilateral relations of friendship, a precious treasure common to the peoples of the two countries, down through generations” and that “the Chinese side hopes that the Sino-DPRK relations of friendship and cooperation will comprehensively grow stronger in political, economic, cultural and other fields as required by the new era.”  KCNA also reported that ”both sides exchanged views on the situation of the Korean Peninsula and issues of mutual concern.”

VMar Choe Ryong Hae and a senior-level DPRK delegation (R) meet with Liu Yunshan and senior CPC officials in Beijing on 23 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae and a senior-level DPRK delegation (R) meet with Liu Yunshan and senior CPC officials in Beijing on 23 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

According to Xinhua, Liu Yunshan “pointed out that peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula conform with the common interests of all countries in the region,” “expressed hope that all relevant parties should stick to the goal of denuclearization, persist on maintaining peace and stability of the peninsula and resolve problems through dialogue and consultation,” “called for the parties to adopt substantial actions to ease tensions, actively embark on dialogue and restart the six-party talks as soon as possible” and “urged the relevant parties to make unremitting effort to realize denuclearization of the peninsula and persistent peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region.”  Choe Ryong Hae, according to Xinhua, said “the DPRK highly appreciated the effort that the Chinese side has made in maintaining peace and stability of the peninsula and on pushing the Korean Peninsula issue back on the track of dialogue and consultation,” ”the DPRK hopes to concentrate its energy on developing its economy and improving people’s livelihood and is ready to create a peaceful external environment for this” and that “the DPRK side is willing to accept advice from the Chinese side and carry out dialogue with relevant parties.”  Liu Yunshan said “it is the consistent stance of the CPC and Chinese government to continuingly consolidate and develop friendly relations between the two countries” and “expressed the readiness to work with the DPRK side to enhance communication, increase common ground and advance China-DPRK relations in a healthy, stable way.”  Choe remarked that “his visit as the special envoy of Kim is aimed to improve, consolidate and develop DPRK-China relations. He said the DPRK side is ready to work with the Chinese side to continuously push forward the development of bilateral relations.”  After meeting with Choe Ryong Hae, Liu Yunshan hosted a reception for VMar Choe and the DPRK delegation.

Choe Ryong Hae’s meeting with Liu Yunshan was a topic of conversation at the daily news conference at the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 24 May.  Asked about the Choe-Liu meeting, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said “through the current visit, we hope to consolidate and develop China-DPRK relations, ease the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula, push for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and promote the resolution of related issues through dialogue and consultations.”  Hong also expanded on Liu Yunshan’s remarks during his meeting with Choe saying that Liu “pointed out: eace and stability on the Korean Peninsula serve the common interests of countries in the region.  It is hoped that the parties concerned will stick to the goal of denuclearizing the peninsula, remain committed to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and solving problems through dialogue and consultations, take concrete action to ease tensions, actively pursue dialogue and consultations, restart the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible, and make unremitting efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the peninsula as well as lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (L), Director of the  KPA General Political Department and Vice Chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission, shakes hands with Gen. Fan Changlong (R), Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: PRC MOD)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (L), Director of the KPA General Political Department and Vice Chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission, shakes hands with Gen. Fan Changlong (R), Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: PRC MOD)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1), a special envoy of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un, talks with Gen. Fan Changlong (2), Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission during a meeting in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1), a special envoy of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un, talks with Gen. Fan Changlong (2), Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission during a meeting in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1)  and a senior DPRK delegation pose for a commemorative photograph with CPC Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Gen. Fan Changlong (2) and senior PLA officials in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) and a senior DPRK delegation pose for a commemorative photograph with CPC Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Gen. Fan Changlong (2) and senior PLA officials in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

On 24 May (Friday), Choe Ryong Hae and the DPRK delegation met with Gen. Fan Changlong, Member of the CPC Political Bureau and Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.  Gen. Fan “warmly welcomed the special envoy’s visit to China” and “noted that the two armies and peoples forged the militant friendship, fighting shoulder to shoulder in the same trench,” according to KCNA.  Fan also said Choe’s visit “to China is of great significance in the development of the bilateral ties, he expressed the belief that the friendly and cooperative relations between the two parties, the two countries and the two armies would grow stronger on a new high stage.”  VMar Choe told Gen. Fan “that the friendship between the DPRK and China was sealed in blood in the hard-fought battlefields including the anti-Japanese war, the war for liberating Northeast China and the Fatherland Liberation War, adding that it is an issue of particular importance in defending socialism in the two countries to boost the exchange and cooperation between the two armies” and “expressed the expectation that the two armies would play the role of a pioneer and vanguard in the development of the DPRK-China friendly ties in the future.”  KCNA reported that “both sides exchanged views on the matters of boosting the friendly ties between the two armies.”

According to Xinhua, during the meeting, Gen. Fan Changlong told Choe Ryong Hae “China always holds the view that the peace and stability of the peninsula serves the common interests of all involved parties” and “expressed hope that the parties involved could stick to the denuclearization, safeguard peninsular peace and stability, resolve disputes and conflicts through dialogues and consultations, and make unremitting efforts for the realization of lasting peace and stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia.”  VMar Choe, according to Xinhua, “highlighted the complicated the situation and lack of safety assurances on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia,” said that “ the DPRK people needs a stable and peaceful environment for the development of their country” and pledged that “the DPRK is willing to work with parties concerned to find ways to resolve the current conflicts via dialogues.”

Chines President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with VMar Choe Ryong Hae, special envoy of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: Xinhua)

Chines President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with VMar Choe Ryong Hae, special envoy of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: Xinhua)

Later in the day on Friday, Choe Ryong Hae changed out of his KPA dress uniform into the black gakuran suit of senior party official to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People.  At the beginning of the meeting VMar Choe and President Xi exchanged civilities.  Choe sent along Kim Jong Un’s greetings to Xi who “expressed deep thanks for this and asked Choe Ryong Hae to convey his cordial greetings to Kim Jong Un.”  VMar Choe then passed along a private letter from Kim Jong Un to President Xi.  According to KCNA, President Xi “expressed deep thanks once again to Kim Jong Un for dispatching Choe Ryong Hae as his special envoy and conveying his personal letter.”  KCNA reported that in Kim Jong Un’s letter to Xi, KJU “underlined the need to carry forward and consolidate the traditional DPRK-China friendship provided and cultivated by the revolutionaries of the elder generation of the two countries, Xi Jinping said, noting that the Chinese party and government deem it very important to develop the Sino-DPRK friendly relations on a strategic level and from a long-term viewpoint and that it is the consistent policy of the Chinese party and government to inherit the tradition, face up to the future and strengthen cooperation.”

According to KCNA, Xi noted that “Chinese party and government hope for expanding the friendly exchange and cooperation with the party and government of the DPRK.”  Xi also said “the Chinese party and government have consistently supported the building of a thriving socialist nation of Korean style. . .wishing the DPRK success in developing the economy and improving the standard of people’s living.”  Choe Ryong Hae said “the DPRK and the PRC are friendly neighbors linked by the same mountain and rivers and their friendship has a long history and tradition. It is the invariable stand of the party and government of the DPRK to boost the long-standing traditional friendship between the DPRK and China.”  VMar Choe also remarked that “the armies and peoples of the two countries know well that the DPRK-China friendship associated with the devoted efforts of the revolutionaries of the elder generation of the two countries is a precious one which cannot be exchanged for anything. . . expressing the belief that the traditional friendship would further flourish in the future under the particular care of the top leaders of the two parties and two countries” and “expressed hope that the Chinese people would realize ‘the dream of China’ and achieve bigger successes in accomplishing the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the CPC with Xi Jinping as its general secretary.”

Choe Ryong Hae (1) and a senior DPRK delegation meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (2) and senior Chinese officials at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

Choe Ryong Hae (1) and a senior DPRK delegation meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (2) and senior Chinese officials at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 24 May 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping told Choe that “China has a very clear position concerning the issue that all the parties involved should stick to the objective of denuclearization, safeguard the peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation” and President Xi “called on all parties concerned to remain calm and with restraint, ease the situation and restart the process of the six-party talks, in a bid to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”  According to Xinhua Choe Ryong Hae said “it is the sincere wish of the DPRK to create a peaceful external environment to develop its economy and improve people’s livelihood” and that “the DPRK is ready to work with parties concerned to properly solve relevant issues through multiform dialogue and consultation, including the six-party talks” and “willing to adopt active moves to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”  Xi also noted to Choe that “bilateral friendship conforms to the common interests of the two countries as well as their people,” and that “the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government will make joint efforts with the DPRK to promote the sound and stable development of bilateral relations.” Choe told Xi that the “DPRK values its traditional friendship with China, said Choe, adding that the DPRK will work with China to beef up high-level exchanges and in-depth communication, so as to constantly consolidate and develop their friendship.”

 

Choe Ryong Hae Arrives in Beijing for 3 Day Visit

22 May
VMar Choe Ryong, Director of the KPA General Political Department and Member of the KWP Political Bureau Presidium, poses for a commemorative photograph at Pyongyang Airport on 22 May 2013, prior to his departure to Beijing as a "special envoy" of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un.  Members of Choe's delegation to China are: Kim Hyong Jun (2) of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (3) of the KPA General Staff, Kim Song Nam (4) of the KWP International Affairs Department and Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil of the KPA (Photo: KCNA).

VMar Choe Ryong, Director of the KPA General Political Department and Member of the KWP Political Bureau Presidium, poses for a commemorative photograph at Pyongyang Airport on 22 May 2013, prior to his departure to Beijing as a “special envoy” of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Members of Choe’s delegation to China are: Kim Hyong Jun (2) of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (3) of the KPA General Staff, Kim Song Nam (4) of the KWP International Affairs Department and Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil of the KPA (Photo: KCNA).

DPRK state media reported that a senior delegation led by VMar Choe Ryong Hae, Director of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Political Department,  departed Pyongyang and arrived in Beijing on 22 May (Wednesday).  VMar Choe, acting as a “special envoy for Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n),” was joined on the trip by Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau), Kim Song Nam (Deputy Director of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] International Affairs Department with the portfolio for Chinese relations), Kim Hyong Jun (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) and  Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil (KPA/Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces).  Citing unnamed diplomatic sources in Beijing, Yonhap News Agency reported that after arriving in Beijing at around 10:30 AM, Choe and the delegation were driven to Diaoyutai Guest House.  At the airport the DPRK delegation was received by DPRK Ambassador to the PRC Ji Jae Ryong and Deputy Director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China [CPC] Central Committee.

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) shakes hands with Liu Jieyi (2), deputy director of the Communist Party of China Central Committee International Liaison Department, after arriving in Beijing on 22 May 2013.  Also seen in attendance are Kim Song Nam (3) and Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (4) (Photo: KCNA).

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) shakes hands with Liu Jieyi (2), deputy director of the Communist Party of China Central Committee International Liaison Department, after arriving in Beijing on 22 May 2013. Also seen in attendance are Kim Song Nam (3) and Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (4) (Photo: KCNA).

Wang Jiarui (R), vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Choe Ryong Hae, special envoy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) top leader Kim Jong Un, and a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, in Beijing, capital of China, May 22, 2013. (Xinhua/Ding Lin)

Wang Jiarui (R), vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Choe Ryong Hae, special envoy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) top leader Kim Jong Un, and a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, in Beijing, capital of China, May 22, 2013. (Xinhua/Ding Lin)

Shortly after his arrival in Beijing, Choe Ryong Hae  met with Wang Jiarui, head of the CPC Central Committee International Liaison Department.  Details of the meeting were not disclosed in Chinese media.

During his visit, VMar Choe will most likely meet with senior Chinese officials including PRC President Xi Jinping.  This is the first reported visit by a senior DPRK official acting as a representative for Kim Jong Un, since KJU formally became supreme leader in January 2012.  Choe Ryong Hae and the members of the delegation are the most high level DPRK officials to publicly visit China since August 2012 when Jang Song Taek (Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and Director of the KWP Administration Department) led a large delegation on a weeklong visit in his capacity as the DPRK’s Chairman of the DPRK-China Joint Guidance Committee.  Choe’s arrival in Beijing was the first publicized visit by the head of the KPA General Political Department since November 2009, when then-Gen. Kim Jong Gak led a KPA delegation on a visit to Beijing and to Jilin Province.

The visit to China by Choe Ryong Hae and the senior delegation occurred after a close adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the DPRK.  Isao Ijima, an adviser to Abe with ties to the DPRK leadership, visited Pyongyang during 14 to 17 May.  Ijima was unofficially accompanied on his DPRK visit by members of Chosen Soren (Chongryon), the pro-DPRK association of Korean residents in Japan.  During his stay, Ijima met with KWP Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Il, Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium President Kim Yong Nam (the DPRK’s nominal head of state and #2 leading official) and DPRK Ambassador-at-Large (with the portfolio for DPRK-Japan interactions) Song Il Ho.  Ijima’s visit to Pyongyang was criticized as “unhelpful” by the South Korean government and viewed with some ambivalence by the United States, however Ijima’s trip was supported by China with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei saying, “We hope tensions on the Korean Peninsula will be eased, and regional peace and stability will be secured through the contact (between Iijima and North Korea)We hope (the latest visit) will be beneficial for resolving problems, including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Choe and the delegation also arrived in Beijing one day after the DPRK released a Chinese fishing trawler and its 16 crew members.  The Dalian-based trawler “Liaoning Generic Fishing No. 2522″ and the crew members were captured in Chinese waters by an unknown group of DPRK pirates on 5 May 2013 and held until 21 May 2013.  The captured fisherman were held for a $75,000 ransom that was not paid   The Chinese Foreign Ministry and Chinese border security forces informed the DPRK about the trawler’s capture and demanded that DPRK authorities investigate the ship’s seizure.  The incident was not publicized until the fishing boat’s owner wrote about it on his microblog.  After the incident was publicized, the Chinese government requested that the DPRK release the trawler and its crew.

Choe Ryong Hae and the delegation’s visit to Beijing also occurs one month before Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to hold a meeting with US President Barack Obama and a possible summit in Beijing in June with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.  The Xi-Obama meeting has been scheduled for 7 June and 8 June at the former estate of Walter and Lee Annenberg, Sunnylands, in Rancho Mirage, California.  The South Korean government has yet to finalize a date and itinerary for Park Geun-hye’s visit to China in June.  Park initially wanted a visit to China to be her first trip as ROK President, but instead she traveled to the United States on a six-day working visit in early May.

Choe Ryong Hae’s arrival in Beijing incited a round of speculation by Pyongyang watchers.  Professor Lee Nam-joo told Yonhap “It may be the start of policies that can ease tensions and lead to dialogue.  The envoy should be able to help reduce tensions which have reached unprecedented levels recently”  and Professor Yang Moo-jin said that “Pyongyang may seek to highlight the close ‘blood alliance’ that existed between the two countries and seek an outlet for inter-Korea talks as well as dialogue with the United States.”  Professor Yang also said that  ”with Washington and Beijing expected to touch on North Korea at an upcoming summit meeting, the envoy can explain to China the North’s position, which may open new dialogue channels not only between Pyongyang and Washington but between South and North Korea.”

Talks between the DPRK delegation and senior Chinese officials will likely touch on strategic issues including the DPRK’s launch of a rocket/ballistic missile on 12 December 2013 and the 12 February 2013 test of a nuclear device.  If China was hoping that a senior-level interaction would cause the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks on denuclearization they are likely to find that Choe Ryong Hae’s visit may not bear the fruit that they seek.  DPRK Ambassador to the Russian Federation Kim Yong Jae gave an interview with Russia’s Interfax news service, published on 21 May, in which he said, “The army and the people of North Korea, who are living in the conditions of permanent nuclear threats, sanctions and a blockade, will in every possible way reinforce nuclear deterrence forces that are destined to protect the sovereignty of the country and a right for the nation to exist, safeguard peace and promote stability in the region.”

Kim Yong Jae also said “The essence of the US strategy in Korea is to strangle North Korea. It is North Korea that is the first object in implementation of the [USA's] strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.  The US global strategy is a strategy of domination of the whole planet and to implement it, a strategy of reorienting [the USA] to the Asia-Pacific region has been launched. In accordance with it, pressure is also being built up on China and Russia in the Northeast Asia and a special geopolitical role is assigned to the Korean peninsula” and that ”the people of this region, like other world peaceloving forces, not only failed to exert pressure on the USA to disrupt its large-scale military exercises, but also succumbed to the influence of a sophisticated information war to dishonour North Korea on the part of the USA and South Korea.”

New 1st Vice Defense Minister Appointed

17 May
Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok (annotated) poses for a commemorative photograph with Kim Jong Un after a visit to the 20 February Factory of the KPA.  DPRK state media's report on this KJU visit revealed that Col. Gen. Jon had been appointed 1st Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok (annotated) poses for a commemorative photograph with Kim Jong Un after a visit to the 20 February Factory of the KPA. DPRK state media’s report on this KJU visit revealed that Col. Gen. Jon had been appointed 1st Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

“Despite the fact that after I am gone, it will still not be too late to use your people, why are you in such a rush to try to handle things your way?”–Kim Jong Il, December 2011

Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok has been appointed as the DPRK’s senior vice minister of defense.  Col. Gen. Jon, the former director of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Logistics Department, was identified as 1st Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces when he attended Kim Jong Un’s (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) visit to the 20 February Foodstuffs Factory of the KPA.  Jon Chang Bok is a member of the Party Central Committee and was a member of the National Funeral Committee for Kim Jong Il.  His last observed public appearance was his attendance with KJU at a May Day-themed concert by the U’nhasu Orchestra in early May 2013.  Jon also visited Ku’msusan Memorial Palace with KJU and other members of the central leadership on the anniversary of late leader Kim Jong Il’s birth in February 2013.  In March 2013, Jon delivered the keynote speech at the opening of the Taeso’ngsan General Hospital in Pyongyang.  He also joined members of the core leadership when they escorted the Moranbong Band on a visit and performance at KPA Large Combined Unit (taeyonhap pudae) #630.  In August 2011, Col. Gen. Jon led a KPA delegation on an official visit to China.

Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok (L) shakes hands with former Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (R) in Beijing on 26 August 2011.  At the time Col. Jon was leading a KPA logistics delegation on a visit to China.  Jon was appointed 1st Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces in May 2013. (Photo: Xinhua/Xie Huanchi)

Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok (L) shakes hands with former Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (R) in Beijing on 26 August 2011. At the time Col. Jon was leading a KPA logistics delegation on a visit to China. Jon was appointed 1st Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in May 2013. (Photo: Xinhua/Xie Huanchi)

A graphic illustrating key departments within the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

A graphic illustrating key departments within the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

Hyon Chol Hae visits the Taedonggang Tile Factory with late leader Kim Jong Il in July 2009 (Photo: KCNA)

Hyon Chol Hae visits the Taedonggang Tile Factory with late leader Kim Jong Il in July 2009 (Photo: KCNA)

VMar Hyon Chol Hae talks with a Changjon Street resident while visiting the man's apartment on 6 July 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

VMar Hyon Chol Hae talks with a Changjon Street resident while visiting the man’s apartment on 6 July 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

Jon replaces VMar Hyon Chol Hae, a former close military aide to Kim Jong Il.  VMar Hyon was appointed 1st Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in April 2012 and was also elected a full member of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Political Bureau and a member of the Party Central Military Commission.  From 2007 to 2012, VMar Hyon was director of the National Defense Commission [NDC] Standing Bureau, which was responsible for logistical and security arrangements for Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un field inspections of KPA units.  During the 3rd Party Conference in September 2010, Hyon sat in the gallery to Kim Jong Un’s left.  From 1995 to 2007 VMar Hyon was a deputy director of the KPA General Political Department, with responsibility for organization.  From 1986 to 1995, Hyon served as Director of the KPA General Logistics Department (under the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces).  He was reappointed Director of the GLD in April 2012, replacing Jon Chang Bok.  It is not clear if Hyon has been removed from his GLD position, which may have been reclaimed by Jon Chang Bok.  It is not clear if Hyon’s removal from office is an actual “purge” or if it is tied to the last week’s dismissal of Gen. Kim Kyok Sik as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces.

Hyon is the latest DPRK elite affected by a series of personnel changes in the party, the government and security organizations.  In February 2013, Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il replaced Gen. Ri Myong Su as Minister of the People’s Security.  Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil replace Choe Pu Il as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau  In March 2013, Paek Kye Ryong replaced Pak Pong Ju as Director of the KWP Light Industry Department and Yun U Chol replaced Kim Ki Ryong as editor of the KWP’s daily newspaper Rodong Sinmun.  In April 2013, Pak Pong Ju was re-appointed DPRK Cabinet Premier, replacing Choe Yong Rim, who was elected Honorary Vice President of the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA].  Former President of the State Academy of Social Sciences Tae Hyong Chol was appointed President of Kim Il Sung University, replace Song Ja Rip.  Tae vacated his position as SPA Secetary-General and was replaced by Hong Son Ok.   April 2013 also found Ri Yong Yong appointed Minister of Coal Industry, replacing Kim Hyong Sik.  In May 2013 Choe Hwi appere to have replaced Ri Jae Il as the Senior Deputy of the KWP Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Department.

KJU Sends Congratulatory Note to Xi Jinping After Election as Chinese President

14 Mar
Kim Jong Un (2nd L) sent a message congratulating Xi Jinping (R) on his election as Chinese President on 14 March 2013.  Xi is seen shaking hands with his predecessor Hu Jintao (2nd R) at the National People's Congres in Beijing)  (Photos: KCNA file photo, Xinhua News Agency)

Kim Jong Un (2nd L) sent a message congratulating Xi Jinping (R) on his election as Chinese President on 14 March 2013. Xi is seen shaking hands with his predecessor Hu Jintao (2nd R) at the National People’s Congres in Beijing) (Photos: KCNA file photo, Xinhua News Agency)

DPRK state media reported on 14 March (Thursday) that Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) sent a congratulatory message to Xi Jinping, following Xi’s election as Chinese President after the PRC held its National People’s Congress.  According to KCNA the message from KJU to Xi said:

I would like to send warm congratulations to you on your election as president of the People’s Republic of China and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress of the PRC.

Your assumption of the heavy responsibility as the state leader is an expression of the Chinese people and army’s deep respect and trust in you.

It is my hope that the Chinese people will register greater successes in building a comprehensively well-off socialist society in all fields under the leadership of the CPC with you as general secretary.

It is the consistent stand of our party and the DPRK government to value and consolidate and develop the DPRK-China friendship.

I wish you success in your responsible work in the belief that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the DPRK and China will grow strong steadily and successfully thanks to the common efforts of the two sides.

The message was the first reported public communication between DPRK and Chinese officials since mid-December.  Some analysts have misinterpreted Chinese support for United Nations Security Council responses to the DPRK’s 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket and 12 February 2013 nuclear, along with the cranky cries of various Chinese academics, as an insurmountable cleavage between the DPRK and China.  These analyses conveniently ignore that senior officials in Pyongyang and Beijing routinely communicate with one another sans public activity or media reporting.  When Xi Jinping was elected PRC Vice President in 2008 and designated successor to outgoing PRC President Hu Jintao in 2008, the DPRK was the first stop on Xi’s five-nation goodwill tour.  Xi met late leader Kim Jong Il, in a rather sunny mood that day, on 18 June 2008

DPRK Conducts Third Nuclear Test

12 Feb
A United States Geological Survey poster showing the 12 February 2013 seismic event near the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility in North Hamgyo'ng Province (Photo: USGS)

A United States Geological Survey poster showing the 12 February 2013 seismic event near the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility in North Hamgyo’ng Province (Photo: USGS)

The DPRK conducted its third nuclear test in the late morning of 12 February (Tuesday).  The first indication of the third experimental detonation was a seismic event  with its epicenter on the premises of the DPRK’s nuclear test facility near P’unggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province.  The seismic event was later identified in South Korea media reporting as a “man-made earthquake” and had an estimate magnitude between 4.7 and. 5.2.  According to a preliminary analysis by the South Korean [ROK] government the nuclear test of between six (6) and seven (7) kilotons.  According to a public health official in Primorsky Krai, the Russian administrative district that borders the DPRK, there were no increased raditation levels and “everything is normal and (the levels) correspond to the natural background.”  It remains to be seen whether the DPRK tested a plutonium or uranium device.

Hours after media reports on the seismic event in North Hamgyo’ng Province, DPRK state media released a report in which it said “the scientific field for national defense of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.”  According to KCNA’s report on the nuclear test:

The scientific field for national defence of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.

The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK’s legitimate right to launch satellite for peaceful purposes.

The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power. It was confirmed that the test did not give any adverse effect to the surrounding ecological environment.

The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.

The nuclear test will greatly encourage the army and people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation with the same spirit and mettle as displayed in conquering space, and offer an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region.

DPRK state media also released a statement from the country’s Foreign Ministry which described the test as “a resolute step for self-defense taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it” and said that the “main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last”:

The DPRK’s third nuclear test is a resolute step for self-defence taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it.

Its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year was a peaceful one from A to Z which was conducted according to its plan for scientific and technological development for economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living.

The world including hostile countries recognized its application satellite’s entry into orbit and greatly admired its development of space technology.

The U.S., however, again prodded the UN Security Council into cooking up a new “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK, terming its satellite launch a violation of the UNSC’s “resolution”.

Encroaching upon the right to satellite launch is an unpardonable grave hostile act as it is an infringement on the DPRK’s sovereignty.

By origin, the DPRK had neither need nor plan to conduct a nuclear test.

The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has already acquired the trustworthy capability strong enough to make a precision strike at bases for aggression and blow them up at a single blow no matter where they are on the earth.

It was the DPRK’s goal to focus efforts on economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living by dint of nuclear deterrence for self-defence provided by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il all their lives.

The DPRK exercised its maximum self-restraint when the U.S. fabricated the “presidential statement” over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes by abusing the UNSC in April last year.

But the DPRK’s patience reached its limit as the U.S. intensified such hostile act as implementing before anyone else the UNSC’s “resolution on sanctions”, far from apologizing for its renewed wanton violation of the DPRK’s right to satellite launch.

The main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last.

The DPRK’s nuclear test is a just step for self-defence not contradictory to any international law.

The U.S. has long put the DPRK on the list of preemptive nuclear strike.

It is quite natural just measure for self-defence to react to the U.S. ever-increasing nuclear threat with nuclear deterrence.

The DPRK withdrew from the NPT after going through legitimate procedures and chose the way of having access to nuclear deterrence for self-defence to protect the supreme interests of the country.

There have been on the earth more than 2 000 nuclear tests and at least 9 000 satellite launches in the UN history spanning over 60 years but there has never been a UNSC resolution on banning any nuclear test or satellite launch.

It is the U.S. that has conducted more nuclear tests and launched more satellites than any others. It, however, cooked up the UNSC’s “resolution” banning only the DPRK’s nuclear test and satellite launch. This is the breach of international law and the height of double standards.

Had the UNSC been impartial even a bit, it would not have taken issue with a sovereign state’s exercise of the right to self-defence and its scientific and technological activities for peaceful purposes but with the U.S. policy for preemptive nuclear strike, a threat to global peace and security, to begin with.

The current nuclear test is the primary countermeasure taken by the DPRK in which it exercised its maximum self-restraint.

If the U.S. takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession.

The inspection of ships and maritime blockade touted by the hostile forces will be regarded as war actions and will invite the DPRK’s merciless retaliatory strikes at their strongholds.

The U.S., though belatedly, should choose between the two options: To respect the DPRK’s right to satellite launch and open a phase of detente and stability or to keep to its wrong road leading to the explosive situation by persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK.

In case the U.S. chooses the road of conflict finally, the world will clearly see the army and people of the DPRK defend its dignity and sovereignty to the end through a do-or-die battle between justice and injustice, greet a great revolutionary event for national reunification and win a final victory.

The KCNA report and DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement were echoed in remarks made by the 1st Secretary of the DPRK Mission to the UN Geneva, Jon Yong Ryong said “The US and their followers are sadly mistaken if they miscalculate the DPRK (North Korea) would accept the entirely unreasonable resolutions against it.  The DPRK will never be bound to any resolutions.  Jon also said the nuclear test will “greatly encourage the army and the people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation… and offers an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region.”  Jon also said “”the prospect for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula has become gloomier due to the US hostile policies to the DPRK that have become ever more pronounced” and that if the “EU truly wants peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, it should urge the US first to terminate its hostile policy towards the DPRK on an impartial basis.”

In Beijing the PRC Foreign Ministry released a statement which said the Chinese government was ”strongly dissatisfied with” and “firmly opposed to” the DPRK’s third nuclear test.  The statement also urged “the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization and refrain from any move that may further worsen the situation. To safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves the common interests of all parties.”  The PRC Foreign Ministry also announced that it summoned DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong to “lodge a solemn representation.”

The Japanese Government convened an emergency meeting and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the test “is a grave threat to our nation’s safety and cannot be tolerated as it will significantly damage international society’s peace and safety.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which “we insist that North Korea should stop illegal actions, strictly fulfil all requirements of the UN Security Council, fully abandon missile and nuclear programs, return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA comprehensive guarantees” and “calls on all interested parties to show restraint and plans together with other six-party negotiators not to ease up in efforts towards normalization of the situation on the peninsula through political and diplomatic means.”  The statement also said, “Only so and no other way North Korea will be able to pull out from effective international isolation, which will open the door to international cooperation in different directions without exclusion of peaceful atom and space.  We are confident that this path meets interests, first of all, of North Korea itself.”

On 6 February Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexandr Timonin told Interfax, “As before, our country advocates the continuation of the search for political and diplomatic ways to stabilize the situation in the Northeast Asia and will do its best to facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for resuming the six-party talks on the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula.  In this respect, it is extremely important that all interested parties do not commit actions capable to aggravate the situation in the Korean peninsula and lead to a new arms race.”

The United Nations Security Council [UNSC], of which South Korea holds the monthly rotating presidency, held an emergency meeting on 12 February which “strongly condemned” the third test.  According to the UNSC’s statement:

The members of the Security Council held urgent consultations to address the serious situation arising from the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The members of the Security Council strongly condemned this test, which is a grave violation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and therefore there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security.

The members of the Security Council recalled that in January, they unanimously adopted resolution 2087 (2013), which expressed the Council’s determination to take “significant action” in the event of a further Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear test.

In line with this commitment and the gravity of this violation, the members of the Security Council will begin work immediately on appropriate measures in a Security Council resolution.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon “strongly” condemned the 12 February nuclear test and described it as “ clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions” and  said that Ban is “gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation”:

The Secretary-General condemns the underground nuclear weapon test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) today. It is a clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It is deplorable that Pyongyang defied the strong and unequivocal call from the international community to refrain from any further provocative measures. The Secretary-General had repeatedly called on the new leadership in Pyongyang to address international concerns and start building confidence with neighbouring countries and the international community.

The Secretary-General is gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. He once again urges the DPRK to reverse course and work towards de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The Secretary-General is confident that the Security Council will remain united and take appropriate action. In the meantime, the Secretary-General remains in close contact with all concerned parties and stands ready to assist their efforts.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, “expressed deep regret” about the nuclear test and “strongly urged the DPRK to fully implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and all relevant IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.”   According to a brief statement Amano said, “I understand that the DPRK announced it had carried out a third test of a nuclear weapon, despite calls from the international community not to do so. This is deeply regrettable and is in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions.  The IAEA remains ready to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue by resuming its nuclear verification activities in the country as soon as the political agreement is reached among countries concerned.”

Institutions and power organizations involved in the 12 February 2013 (abridged edition)

The 12 February 2013 nuclear test was the culmination of activity within departments, offices, sections and units of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP], the DPRK Government and the Korean People’s Army [KPA].  The third nuclear test was authorized through government channels by the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] and through party channels during an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission [CMC] on 3 February 2013.  Kim Jong Un’s last reported public appearance was at the expanded CMC meeting.  Like the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, the experimental detonation was a combined effort of scientists and technicians (who typically work for party and government agencies) and elements of the KPA.  Personnel involved in each phase of the nuclear test would interface with Kim Jong Un and other core leadership through the KWP Machine Building Industry Department’s deputy (vice) director Hong Sung Mu and the KWP Organization Guidance Department [OGD].  When Kim Jong Il was alive, the nuclear weapons program was commanded directly by KJI through a former Kim Il Sung University professor So Sang Kuk, who held the position of OGD deputy (vice) director and worked in KJI’s office.

Information about the DPRK’s strategic weapons program in general, and its testing of nuclear weapons in particular, is speculative and contradictory.  However, there are some key organizations that would have been involved in the actual nuclear test.  The nuclear test was conducted by elements of the KPA General Staff’s Nuclear-Chemical, Ordnance and Communications Bureaus working in cooperation with personnel from the 5th Bureau of the Second Economy Commission [SEC], the 2nd National Academy of Sciences [SANS] and the Nuclear Bureau.  According to some researchers, the Nuclear Bureau is part of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department (formerly known as the KWP Munitions Industry Department), however other sources says that the Nuclear Bureau was subordinated directly to the NDC, after it was bureaucratically migrated from the KWP along with SANS.  SANS personnel would have been involved in the nuclear physics, engineering and other technical aspects of the test, while the 5th Bureau of the SEC would have been involved in production of the nuclear device (as well as preliminary high explosive testing).  The construction of the detonation area and tunnels may have been conducted by a Ministry of People’s Security [MPS] engineering unit or a specialized construction unit of the KPA.  Support roles would have been played by the KPA General Logistics Department (subordinate to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces [MPAF]) and for mission security by elements of the Military Security Command [MSC] and the Ministry of State Security’s Defense Industry Security Bureau, possibly augmented by personnel of the Guard Command.

Leadership Activities Prior to 12 February 2013 nuclear test

On 12 February, DPRK state media reported that a meeting of the KWP Political Bureau convened on 11 February (Monday).  Kim Jong Un was not reported to have attended.  The Political Bureau meeting passed a lengthy decision to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of active hostilities of the Fatherland Liberation (Korean) War and the 65th anniversary of the DPRK’s foundation.  However, the Political Bureau meeting was most likely the forum at which the central leadership was formally notified of an impending third nuclear test.

Kim Jong Un’s last public appearance was reported on 3 February 2012 and was his chairing and attending the expanded CMC meeting.  Prior to the CMC meeting, KJU attended a commemorative photo-op with participants of the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries.  Notable members of his entourage at the photo-op were VMar Kim Yong Chun and Gen. O Kuk Ryol, two of the KPA’s key senior officials tied to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.  Interestingly, VMar Kim and Gen. O were part of a personnel shake-up of the KPA’s high command in February 2009, three months prior to the May 2009 nuclear test.  At that time, Gen. O was appointed Vice Chairman of the NDC and VMar Kim was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces.  VMar Kim was later replaced as minister and appointed director of the KWP Civil Defense Department, which has a major public safety function during a nuclear test.  Also in February 2009, Kim Kyok Sik was replaced as Chief of the KPA General Staff by Ri Yong Ho.  Ri was later famously dismissed in July 2012, but Kim Kyok Sik resurfaced in a senior position when he was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in November 2012, approximately three months ahead of the 12 February 2013 nuclear test.

Late DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il tours revolutionary historical sites in Yo'nsa County, North Hamgyo'ng Province in his last reported public appearance before the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test on 25 May 2009.

Late DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il tours revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province in his last reported public appearance before the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test on 25 May 2009. Yo’nsa County is only 65 km (40 miles) from the Punggye-ri nuclear testing area (Photos: KCNA)

KJU’s lack of public activity contrasts with Kim Jong Il’s (his father) public appearances prior to the second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.  On 23 May 2009, DPRK state media reported that the late KJI inspected revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, located 65 km  (40 miles) from the P’unggye-ri test site.  On the day of the test, KJI was reported to have attended a concert given by the Persimmon Tree (kamnamu) Company of the KPA.  State media did not disclose where the concert took place, making it likely that KJI watched the concert in Pyongyang or at the Persimmon Tree Company’s headquarters in Kangwo’n Province.

Taep’ung Investment Group Formally Dissolved

1 Feb
A 2010 meeting of borad members of the DPRK State Development Bank, linked to the Taep'ung Internati

A 2010 meeting of borad members of the DPRK State Development Bank, linked to the Taep’ung International Investment Group. In this image are Jon Il Chun (R) and Ro Tu Chol (2nd R) (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Yonhap News Agency reported and confirmed on 1 February (Friday) that the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group has dissolved.  Taep’ung began as an energy provider selling oil and gas (via Sinu’iju) to the Korean People’s Army [KPA] and Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee.  Its leading executive was Pak Chol Su, a Korean resident in China.  Through his sales of energy supplies to the party and army, Pak became part of the Pyongyang social scene and eventually developed close ties with senior KPA and KWP officials.  In 2006 Taep’ung was formally organized as one of the country’s direct foreign investment entities.  Until 2010 there was little reported about Taep’ung’s activities in the country.

In early 2010, Taep’ung was designated as a key investment entity of the DPRK through authorization by Kim Jong Il and the National Defense Commission.  On 20 January 2010, the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group was formally incorporated and held a meeting of its 7 member board of directors in Pyongyang.  KWP Secretary and United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon was appointed director-general of the board in his capacity as Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee with Pak Chol Su appointed a deputy director-general of the board.  According to DPRK state media Taepu’ng was organized under the auspices of the DPRK National Defense Commission, the DPRK Cabinet and Ministry of Finance and the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee.  Incorporated and organized alongside Taepu’ng’s expansion was the State Development Bank, which would be led by Jon Il Chun, a proxy for the National Defense Commission and a close aide to the late leader Kim Jong Il.  Jon, also (and currently) a deputy director of the KWP Finance and Accounting Department, was elevated to head the State Development Bank at the same time he was appointed to manage the powerful DPRK conglomerate Taeso’ng Group and as the key head of Office #39, lucrative entities earning foreign currency for the DPRK.  Taep’ung had attained such a flavor-of-the-week status  that one of its key KPA contacts appeared on an April 2010 military promotions list.

Despite several attempts, including the internal transfer of several state-owned enterprises, and a high profile trip by Jon Il Chun at the head of a large delegation of executives under the auspices of Taepu’ng, the company attained little to no foreign direct investment.  There were also unconfirmed  (and likely erroneous) rumors Taepu’ng became the business rival to another DPRK entity, reportedly  established as a competing venture by Gen. O Kuk Ryol.  According to Yonhap, Taep’ung “oversaw the now-suspended joint tourist program in Mount Kumgang on the eastern coast of North Korea” and  was dissolved along with “another extra-governmental organization in charge of trade promotion and foreign investment with its work believed to have been reassigned to the government’s Commission for Joint Venture and Investment.”  It appears that a lot of direct foreign investment has now been consolidated under the Joint Venture and Investment Commission [JVIC], which is under the direction of Ri Ryong Nam and Ri Chol, along with the heavy hand of the Ryo’ngdoja, Jang Song Taek.  There also became problems with Taepu’ng’s Chinese backer Pak Chol Su and it did not help Taepu’ng’s external activities to have the imprimatur of the National Defense Commission, which is subjected to numerous United Nations and unilateral sanctions.

Similarly Taepu’ng’s existence may have presented a fundamental obstacle, or proven the wrong entity, for progress in the development of Special Economic Trade Zones in Rajin-So’nbong (Raso’n) and Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng/Wihwa Islands.  Of course, one corporation is but a small obstruction to howeverUnited Nations Security Council reacts to the potential nuclear test.   And yet, development in Raso’n (despite what one might read in the general lit.) seems to making some progress, likely in anticipation of the thaw of Unggi Bay.  It remains to be seen if the upcoming nuclear detonation and its UNSC blowback will affect the activities and formation of various PRC-DPRK development working groups (anchored in China) in late December 2012, and the signing of additional and explicit agreements on infrastructure and design using both DPRK and Chinese entities (no one will use the term iron-clad, just yet).

On 23 January, Chinese media reported that the DPRK Government approved the opening of a Chinese commercial bank primarily to settle transactions in Raso’n.  The bank was founded and a ribbon cutting ceremony held on 18 January.  According to Hunchun Rexian “Chinese Commercial Bank was put together and founded by China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Company Ltd. The bank’s primary business is renminbi settlement, handling letter of credit, bill of exchange, letter of guarantee, and guaranty for cross-border renminbi transactions, and offering savings, loans, banking, and other financial services. Chinese Commercial Bank was founded to conform with the needs of massive development of Sino- DPRK economic and trade at present as well as the needs of the “Outline of General Program for Joint Development and Joint Management of Naso’n Economic and Trade Zone As Well As Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng Economic Zone,” which was signed by China and the DPRK; it will act as a bridge and a bond in promoting and safeguarding Sino-DPRK economic and trade development.”   Hunchun (PRC) Vice Mayor Ren Puyu said that, ”Agreement on Joint Development and Joint Management of Raso’n Economic and Trade Zone” between the Chinese and the DPRK governments, and is the bridge and bond for serving Sino-DPRK financial cooperation and trade interactions; it will definitely play a positive role in promoting Sino-DPRK economic and trade interactions as well as economic prosperity in the future.”

DPRK Newspaper Says Nuclear Test is “people’s demand” as Construction Progresses in Kilchu County

26 Jan
Images of a tunnel entrance (top) and tunnel leading to the nuclear detonation site.  These images appeared in episode 4 of the 2009 Korea Film Studios' feature The Country I Saw, which included a depiction of the 25 May 2009 nuclear test

Images of a tunnel entrance (top) and tunnel leading to the nuclear detonation site. These images appeared in episode 4 of the 2009 Korea Film Studios’ feature The Country I Saw, which included a depiction of the 25 May 2009 nuclear test (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Yonhap News Agency reported on 26 January (Saturday) that an editorial in Rodong Sinmun, the daily newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, said that  ”A nuclear test is the demand of the people and no other choice can be made” and “It is the people’s demand that there should be something even greater than a nuclear test.”  The 26 January 2013 editorial was published three days after the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] passed resolution #2087 (2013) which “condemns” the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket and “demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation.”  The 26 January Rodong editorial said that that UNSC “gave us no other choice . . .but to go to the very end.”  It is not clear if going “to the very end” is part of an “upcoming all-out action” which announced in a 24 January (Thursday) statement by the DPRK’s supreme power organization the National Defense Commission.  

The Rodong editorial was published the same day as DPRK state media reported that the country’s 23 January Foreign Ministry statement “as regards the fabrication of the ‘resolution’ by the U.S. and its allies at the U.N. Security Council in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK was distributed as an official document S/2013/50 at the UNSC on Jan. 25 (Friday).”  On 26 January (Saturday) DPRK state media conducted a few “man on the street” interviews about the UNSC resolution.  According to KCNA the slogan (likely authored by Korean Workers’ Party Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Kim Ki Nam, the country’s slogan master) “‘Death to the U.S. imperialists, sworn enemy of the Korean people” can be heard everywhere in the country.”  KCNA reported that “Many young people are volunteering for military services, out of their will to annihilate the enemies while other people visit military posts with aid materials.”  In one interview elderly Moranbong District resident Kim Tok Jong said, “A nation’s sovereignty is more precious than one’s life” and that he ”lived for nearly 70 years. The past years clearly shows that words do not go on the U.S. and only force is needed to settle accounts with it.  If a war breaks out, I will take arms in my hand to fight against the U.S. scoundrels.   I will also do my utmost to wipe out the group of evils running amuck to trample down the nation’s right to existence and development.”

(Photo: KCTV screengrab from The Country That I Saw,)

(Photo: KCTV screengrab from The Country That I Saw,)

Meanwhile, in Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, “satellite imagery from January 23, 2013 and previous images dating back a month reveal that the site appears to be at a continued state of readiness that would allow the North to move forward with a test in a few weeks or less once the leadership in Pyongyang gives the order,” according to an analysis by Jack Liu for 38 North.

Liu’s analysis shows that imagery “reveals continued activity at the area near the possible test tunnel entrance through the appearance of bare ground and open roads. There was significant snowfall in November 2012, and the area has been cleared in the dead of winter, indicating the intent to maintain site readiness.”  Another image reveals “a close-up of a December 24 GeoEye satellite image shows an apparent pile of material in the yard of the main administrative buildings near the entrance to the possible command bunker.  (The presence of a bus, probably used to transport personnel working at the site, is another indicator of continued activity.) The purpose of that material remains unclear. One possible explanation is that it is intended for ‘stemming’ or sealing the tunnel in.”  An image captured in early January shows a significant personnel presence “ another indicator of continued activity and readiness at the site. Thirty or more personnel, possibly soldiers or security guards, can be seen in formation in the same area. They may be there for special duty, for example to greet visiting officials, or for some other more routine purpose.”  Finally, an image taken three days ago, as the NDC warned of “all-out action” finds that “that the pile of material in the yard of the administrative area has shrunk. If this material is intended for stemming, one possible explanation is that operations have begun to seal the test tunnel. This image also provides the clearest view of the tunnel entrance to date. Roads to the entrance continue to remain clear.”

Even if a third experimental detonation (HEU, thermonuclear or otherwise), there remains the matter of a delivery system.  The Japanese Defense Minister, Itsunori Onodera said at a meeting attended by new PM Shinzo Abe that DPRK missile research capability had “entered into a new stage.”  According to Xinhua English (note the media source), ” Onodera said that “the missile, which the DPRK called as a rocket to send a satellite into orbit, could reach U.S. western coast more accurately with a range of more than 10,000 km (6,213 miles)” and “that the capability of the DPRK’s short-or-middle-range missiles has also been improved, posing more threats to Japan’s security.”  Onodera’s remarks were based on an analysis of the 12 December 2012 U’nha-3 launch.

On 25 January (Friday) UNSC Resolution #2087 (2013) and the DPRK’s reactions to the resolution was a hot topic at the US State Department’s daily briefing (during the course of Victoria Nuland’s briefing it seems a group of people got lost in the building).  Still on North Korea? Yes, indeedy.  The relevant sections excerpted (for Empsonian close reading and interpretation) below:

QUESTION:North Korea threatening to go to war with the South?

MS. NULAND: As you know, my colleague Jay Carney spoke to these issues yesterday. These statements coming out in North Korea are needlessly provocative. Any kind of further test would be another significant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and only will serve to further Pyongyang’s isolation. As you all know, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 earlier in the week in response to the December missile launch, and that resolution tightens the sanctions on North Korea and works hard to ensure that it cannot succeed as a proliferator of missile technology, et cetera.

And it’s just – it’s really a pretty sad story because the new North Korean leader has a choice to make, as the Secretary has said so many times. He can serve to focus on the needs of his people, to bring his country out of isolation and back into compliance with international obligations, open it back up to the world, or he can continue to waste what little money the country has on missile technologies and things while his people go hungry. So –

QUESTION: I have a question on that. The new leader is not all that new. I mean, you have a pattern of events that you can look at – the original failed test, the subsequent missile test that was successful, and now the threat to conduct a third nuclear test. Does it seem to you all now that he has made his choice and how – what kind of a strategy, a diplomatic strategy, can you pursue if he is not interested in serious talks about his nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

MS. NULAND: Well, you’re not wrong that the pattern of choices is concerning, which is why we felt very strongly that the international community – oh, we seem to have some guests. Hi, guys. Not sure who they were, but I think they were lost.

So again, the pattern of choices appears to be quite concerning. That’s why it’s been so important to keep the international community united in response to these negative choices, why we took the time we did to get it right with Resolution 2087, to make clear to North Korea that particularly the Six-Party states, including all of North Korea’s neighbors, are united in ensuring that there is a price to say, that there will be increasing sanctions, that we are going to be vigilant about their proliferation activity, the activities of their banks, and that it’s going to take the country in the wrong direction.

I think you know that Ambassador Glyn Davies is out in the region now. He is in Beijing today, had very productive and useful meetings with counterparts there, including Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, his counterpart Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei, and others. He was in Seoul yesterday and he’s going on to Tokyo tomorrow. So very much a project to stay coordinated with our Six-Party counterparts in watching this and in ensuring that North Korea gets the message that nothing good is going to come from this.

QUESTION: And turn back to the China issue in this whole mix. Today, the Chinese press seemed to be suggesting that they’ve told North Korea that if it goes ahead with its nuclear test that they will actually – Beijing could cut its aid to Pyongyang. That seems to be an interesting move on the part of the Chinese. What would you have to say on that?

MS. NULAND: Well, I didn’t see those particular comments. But we have, as you know, regularly encouraged Beijing to use the significant influence that it has with Pyongyang. They have, at various times, been able to make clear that the continued support of Beijing in terms of trade, aid, the energy relationship, et cetera, depends on North Korea making the right choices. Again, China joins strongly with us in Resolution 2087, which was important, and we, as Glyn Davies said – he had a very good visit to Beijing in terms of plotting the course forward together.

QUESTION: How important – if they go ahead and do something like that – how important could such a cut in Chinese aid to North Korea be in changing the calculations of the North Korean leadership?

MS. NULAND: Well, I don’t want to speculate on scenarios to be determined. But obviously, North Korea remains quite dependent on its aid and trade relationship with Beijing.

Jill, still on this?

QUESTION: Toria, are the Six-Party Talks off, as they seem to be indicating in the North Korean statement?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve made clear for more than a year now that the Six-Party Talks couldn’t go forward to a new round unless we saw real evidence that the DPRK was prepared to meet its obligations. So we’re still in the state that we’ve been for more than a year in terms of not having the kind of intent that we need to go forward.

QUESTION: New topic?

MS. NULAND: Still on North Korea?

QUESTION: Still on North Korea.

MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please, here.

QUESTION: Do you – this time around, do you have any reason to believe the North Koreans will get that message and actually take astep on – well, make the – what you would call the right choice and actually open up to dialogue, or perhaps discontinue their programs or even do anything in the right direction?

MS. NULAND: Well, anybody who endeavored to be predictive about North Korean behavior is probably foolish. But what’s been important to us is strong unity among the Six-Party Talks countries, strong unity in the region about a positive course forward, and the fact that there will be consequences if they keep making bad choices.

QUESTION: One more?

MS. NULAND: Yeah.

QUESTION: What types of consequences?

MS. NULAND: Well, I think –

QUESTION: Because there’s been few besides UN resolutions that haven’t changed their behavior. There hasn’t really been any significant consequences otherwise.

MS. NULAND: I would reject that, Brad. If you look at UN Security Council that was just passed, 2087, and go through it, and I would commend to you the fact sheet that USUN put out on this, it imposes new sanctions on North Korean companies and government agencies, including a broad range of sanctions against their space agency, which was responsible for the launch, as well as the Bank of East Land and several individuals in the North Korean system who had previously not been sanctioned. Six entities and four individuals will have their assets frozen and will be prohibited from engaging in financial transactions. This is UN sanctions, not just U.S. sanctions. There’s an updated list of nuclear and ballistic missile technology that’s going to be banned from transfer to or from the DPRK. I could continue. But –

QUESTION: Do you think there’s space to squeeze them further on the sanctions route, that this country which is perhaps the most heavily sanctioned in the world can still be – there’s still consequences along this sanctions route left?

MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, and we wouldn’t have put new sanctions on them if we didn’t think that they would be effective.

Please.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up quickly as far as North Korea’s missile technology or missiles are concerned. Despite UN Security Council resolutions or UN sanctions, international sanctions, still North Korea is continuing and not listening to the international community. So if China is with you, Madam, since China was always helping North Korea. But who else is behind this technology or behind North Korea?

MS. NULAND: Well, again, I think what we just have been through here is the fact that the international community now with this new resolution has spoken with one voice in putting on increasingly tough sanctions on the DPRK, including getting at the space agency, getting at the banks, naming individuals who had not previously been named, as contributing to taking the country in the wrong direction. And we will continue to look for further opportunities to make our views clear in this kind of a way if the DPRK doesn’t change course.

QUESTION: And when this new leader came in North Korea, everybody hoped that things will change to the right direction for the people of North Korea, but still they are going in the worst direction as far as the people are concerned.

MS. NULAND: Well, again, we would certainly agree with that. I mean, as you know, we were a year ago engaged in trying to work out some kind of a food assistance deal, but we didn’t get the kind of assurance that we needed from the government that it was going to go to the right place. So it’s very disappointing.

Please.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Does the United States have any separate plan for additional sanctions toward North Korea for the third nuclear test?

MS. NULAND: In response to the December test, what you will see and what you’ve seen in the last couple of days are U.S. decisions that implement the larger UN Security Council decisions in 2087. So you’re starting to see us put out our own sanctioning information to ensure that we are complying now in our own law with 2087.

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