Choe Ryong Hae Arrives in Beijing for 3 Day Visit

VMar Choe Ryong, Director of the KPA General Political Department and Member of the KWP Political Bureau Presidium, poses for a commemorative photograph at Pyongyang Airport on 22 May 2013, prior to his departure to Beijing as a “special envoy” of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Members of Choe’s delegation to China are: Kim Hyong Jun (2) of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (3) of the KPA General Staff, Kim Song Nam (4) of the KWP International Affairs Department and Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil of the KPA (Photo: KCNA).

DPRK state media reported that a senior delegation led by VMar Choe Ryong Hae, Director of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Political Department,  departed Pyongyang and arrived in Beijing on 22 May (Wednesday).  VMar Choe, acting as a “special envoy for Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n),” was joined on the trip by Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau), Kim Song Nam (Deputy Director of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] International Affairs Department with the portfolio for Chinese relations), Kim Hyong Jun (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) and  Lt. Gen. Kim Su Gil (KPA/Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces).  Citing unnamed diplomatic sources in Beijing, Yonhap News Agency reported that after arriving in Beijing at around 10:30 AM, Choe and the delegation were driven to Diaoyutai Guest House.  At the airport the DPRK delegation was received by DPRK Ambassador to the PRC Ji Jae Ryong and Deputy Director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China [CPC] Central Committee.

VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) shakes hands with Liu Jieyi (2), deputy director of the Communist Party of China Central Committee International Liaison Department, after arriving in Beijing on 22 May 2013. Also seen in attendance are Kim Song Nam (3) and Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil (4) (Photo: KCNA).

Wang Jiarui (R), vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Choe Ryong Hae, special envoy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) top leader Kim Jong Un, and a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, in Beijing, capital of China, May 22, 2013. (Xinhua/Ding Lin)

Shortly after his arrival in Beijing, Choe Ryong Hae  met with Wang Jiarui, head of the CPC Central Committee International Liaison Department.  Details of the meeting were not disclosed in Chinese media.

During his visit, VMar Choe will most likely meet with senior Chinese officials including PRC President Xi Jinping.  This is the first reported visit by a senior DPRK official acting as a representative for Kim Jong Un, since KJU formally became supreme leader in January 2012.  Choe Ryong Hae and the members of the delegation are the most high level DPRK officials to publicly visit China since August 2012 when Jang Song Taek (Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and Director of the KWP Administration Department) led a large delegation on a weeklong visit in his capacity as the DPRK’s Chairman of the DPRK-China Joint Guidance Committee.  Choe’s arrival in Beijing was the first publicized visit by the head of the KPA General Political Department since November 2009, when then-Gen. Kim Jong Gak led a KPA delegation on a visit to Beijing and to Jilin Province.

The visit to China by Choe Ryong Hae and the senior delegation occurred after a close adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the DPRK.  Isao Ijima, an adviser to Abe with ties to the DPRK leadership, visited Pyongyang during 14 to 17 May.  Ijima was unofficially accompanied on his DPRK visit by members of Chosen Soren (Chongryon), the pro-DPRK association of Korean residents in Japan.  During his stay, Ijima met with KWP Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Il, Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium President Kim Yong Nam (the DPRK’s nominal head of state and #2 leading official) and DPRK Ambassador-at-Large (with the portfolio for DPRK-Japan interactions) Song Il Ho.  Ijima’s visit to Pyongyang was criticized as “unhelpful” by the South Korean government and viewed with some ambivalence by the United States, however Ijima’s trip was supported by China with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei saying, “We hope tensions on the Korean Peninsula will be eased, and regional peace and stability will be secured through the contact (between Iijima and North Korea)We hope (the latest visit) will be beneficial for resolving problems, including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Choe and the delegation also arrived in Beijing one day after the DPRK released a Chinese fishing trawler and its 16 crew members.  The Dalian-based trawler “Liaoning Generic Fishing No. 2522″ and the crew members were captured in Chinese waters by an unknown group of DPRK pirates on 5 May 2013 and held until 21 May 2013.  The captured fisherman were held for a $75,000 ransom that was not paid   The Chinese Foreign Ministry and Chinese border security forces informed the DPRK about the trawler’s capture and demanded that DPRK authorities investigate the ship’s seizure.  The incident was not publicized until the fishing boat’s owner wrote about it on his microblog.  After the incident was publicized, the Chinese government requested that the DPRK release the trawler and its crew.

Choe Ryong Hae and the delegation’s visit to Beijing also occurs one month before Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to hold a meeting with US President Barack Obama and a possible summit in Beijing in June with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.  The Xi-Obama meeting has been scheduled for 7 June and 8 June at the former estate of Walter and Lee Annenberg, Sunnylands, in Rancho Mirage, California.  The South Korean government has yet to finalize a date and itinerary for Park Geun-hye’s visit to China in June.  Park initially wanted a visit to China to be her first trip as ROK President, but instead she traveled to the United States on a six-day working visit in early May.

Choe Ryong Hae’s arrival in Beijing incited a round of speculation by Pyongyang watchers.  Professor Lee Nam-joo told Yonhap “It may be the start of policies that can ease tensions and lead to dialogue.  The envoy should be able to help reduce tensions which have reached unprecedented levels recently”  and Professor Yang Moo-jin said that “Pyongyang may seek to highlight the close ‘blood alliance’ that existed between the two countries and seek an outlet for inter-Korea talks as well as dialogue with the United States.”  Professor Yang also said that  ”with Washington and Beijing expected to touch on North Korea at an upcoming summit meeting, the envoy can explain to China the North’s position, which may open new dialogue channels not only between Pyongyang and Washington but between South and North Korea.”

Talks between the DPRK delegation and senior Chinese officials will likely touch on strategic issues including the DPRK’s launch of a rocket/ballistic missile on 12 December 2013 and the 12 February 2013 test of a nuclear device.  If China was hoping that a senior-level interaction would cause the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks on denuclearization they are likely to find that Choe Ryong Hae’s visit may not bear the fruit that they seek.  DPRK Ambassador to the Russian Federation Kim Yong Jae gave an interview with Russia’s Interfax news service, published on 21 May, in which he said, “The army and the people of North Korea, who are living in the conditions of permanent nuclear threats, sanctions and a blockade, will in every possible way reinforce nuclear deterrence forces that are destined to protect the sovereignty of the country and a right for the nation to exist, safeguard peace and promote stability in the region.”

Kim Yong Jae also said “The essence of the US strategy in Korea is to strangle North Korea. It is North Korea that is the first object in implementation of the [USA's] strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.  The US global strategy is a strategy of domination of the whole planet and to implement it, a strategy of reorienting [the USA] to the Asia-Pacific region has been launched. In accordance with it, pressure is also being built up on China and Russia in the Northeast Asia and a special geopolitical role is assigned to the Korean peninsula” and that ”the people of this region, like other world peaceloving forces, not only failed to exert pressure on the USA to disrupt its large-scale military exercises, but also succumbed to the influence of a sophisticated information war to dishonour North Korea on the part of the USA and South Korea.”

DPRK Ambassador Presents Credentials to Heir Apparent of Qatar

Qatar’s Heir Apparent and Deputy Emir, HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani (L) accepts a letter of credence from DPRK Ambassador So Chang Sik (R) at his Emiri Diwan office on 22 April 2013 (Photo: Emiri Diwan of HH Deputy Emir and Heir Apparent and Gulf Times)

DPRK state media reported on 4 May (Saturday) that DPRK Ambassador So Chang Sik presented his diplomatic letter of credence (credentials) to the heir apparent of Qatar and deputy emir, Crown Prince Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani.  Ambassador So, who is is resident ambassador to Kuwait, was one of ten foreign ambassadors to present his letter of credence at the Emiri Diwan office on 22 April 2013.  According KCNA, the Crown Prince told So “I wish HE (His Excellency) Kim Jong Un, supreme leader of the DPRK, good health and big success in his work.”  The Crown Prince also remarked that “I am very pleased to see the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries developing on good terms, the heir apparent said, hoping that the relations would grow stronger in the future” and he “expressed belief that the DPRK would demonstrate its might as a stronger country, beating back all challenges against it despite the extremely acute situation on the Korean Peninsula.”

DPRK Ambassador Presents Letter of Credence to Mongolian President

DPRK Ambassador to Mongolia, Hong Gyu (L), shakes hands with Mongolian President Taskhiagiin Elbegdorj (R) in Ulan Bator on 16 April 2013 (Photo: Info Mongolia/Government of Mongolia)

DPRK state media reported on 19 April (Friday) that newly appointed ambassador Hong Gyu presented his letter of credence to Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj on 16 April.  According to KCNA, President Elbegdorj told Hong “Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who paid deep attention to the development of the Mongolia- DPRK friendly relations at all times,” “expressed conviction that the bilateral friendly relations would grow stronger under the care of the dear respected Kim Jong Un in the future” and said “It is the consistent stand of the Mongolian government to boost the Mongolia-DPRK friendly relations.”  President Elbegdorj also “supported the DPRK’s policy to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.”

Hong Gyu and a DPRK diplomat (L) meet with Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj (C) and Mongolian government officials in Ulan Bator on 16 April 2013 (Photo: Info Mongolia/Government of Mongolia)

According to Mongolian media, during the meeting with Hong Gyu, President Elbegdorj “noted that that the 65th year anniversary of diplomatic relations established between Mongolia and North Korea marks in 2013 and emphasized that the bilateral relationship between the two countries would further boost.”  Hong Gyu extended the greetings of “young Supreme Leader of North Korea” Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) and reiterated KJU’s invitation for President Elbegdorj to visit the DPRK.  Mongolian media also reported that Hong Gyu “pledged to accelerate its (DPRK) economic reform.”  President Elbegdorj “expressed Mongolia’s readiness of contribution to solve this (inter-Korean) dispute peacefully” and “appealed for multi-lateral talks to be held in Ulaanbatar on security of North-East Asia countries” and said that he would welcome “bilateral or multilateral talks to organize in Ulaanbatar.”  Hong Gyu and President Elbegdorj agreed to expand cultural and sports exchanges.  According to Mongolia media reporting, at the end of the meeting, Hong Gyu said that the DPRK “may face severe food shortages.  Therefore, we ask Mongolia to seek possibilities of delivering food aid.”

DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement Protesting UNSCR 2094 (2013)

Senior officials of the DPRK Foreign Ministry: DPRK Cabinet Vice Premier Kang Sok Ju (L), Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun (C) and 1st Vice Minister Kim Kye Kwan (R) (Photos: KCNA, Russian Federation Council and Kyodo)

DPRK Foreign Ministry Building near Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang (Photo: Google image)

DPRK state media reported on 9 March (Saturday) that the country’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement denouncing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013) as “clear proof that the UNSC was abused for the implementation of the hostile policy of the U.S. to bring down the ideology and system chosen by the people of the DPRK by disarming and suffocating it economically.”  The DPRK Foreign Ministry’s English-language statement is as follows:

The UN Security Council on Thursday cooked up another “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK over its third nuclear test with the U.S. as a main player.

The “resolution” is a clear proof that the UNSC was abused for the implementation of the hostile policy of the U.S. to bring down the ideology and system chosen by the people of the DPRK by disarming and suffocating it economically.

The U.S. wantonly violated a sovereign state’s legitimate right to launch a satellite and has escalated the moves to stifle the DPRK. It is, therefore, the arch criminal which compelled the DPRK to conduct an underground nuclear test for self-defence.

Had the UNSC been impartial even a bit, it should have taken issue with the high-handed hostile acts of the U.S. against the DPRK, to begin with, as it pushed the DPRK, which had planned to focus its efforts on economic construction and improvement of people’s living standard, to a nuclear test.

However, from the beginning the UNSC has taken a wrong way of creating a vicious cycle of tension, paying heed to the unilateral demand and assertion of the U.S. only in disregard of the root cause of the hostility between the DPRK and the U.S. and the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula.

The UNSC has cooked up five “resolutions on sanctions” against the DPRK at the instigation of the U.S. for the last eight years but they only resulted in the DPRK’s bolstering of its nuclear deterrent qualitatively and quantitatively quite contrary to what they expected.

The DPRK’s nuclear deterrent has provided a firm guarantee for defending the country’s sovereignty and vital rights and served as an all-powerful treasured sword for shattering the U.S. moves to ignite a nuclear war and bringing earlier the historic cause of national reunification.

The DPRK, as it did in the past, vehemently denounces and totally rejects the “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK, a product of the U.S. hostile policy toward it.

The U.S. and its allies’ adoption of the base “resolution on sanctions” aimed to bar the DPRK from conquering space and weaken its nuclear deterrent would only result in increasing the capability of Songun Korea a thousand times.

The UNSC committed such crime as encouraging the U.S. in its shameless attempt to unleash a nuclear war under the pretext of “nuclear nonproliferation”, creating a touch-and-go situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK has already clarified its firm stand that it would take stronger countermeasures in succession and lead them to a great war for national reunification in case the U.S. opts for conflict finally.

The DPRK will fight it out and win a final victory without fail by its own efforts and its own way.

The world will clearly see what permanent position the DPRK will reinforce as a nuclear weapons state and satellite launcher as a result of the U.S. attitude of prodding the UNSC into cooking up the “resolution.”

UNSC Approves New Sanctions for DPRK’s 3rd Nuclear Test (updated 8 March)

An animation of an experimental nuclear detonation included in a short video released by Urminzokkiri, a DPRK state media outlet, on 17 February 2013 (Photos: Urminzokkiri screengrabs)

The United Nations Security Council [UNSC] unanimously approved UNSCR # 2094 (2013 during a meeting  on 7 March (Thursday), in response to the DPRK’s third detonation of a nuclear device on 12 February 2013.  The text of the preamble and sanctions of UNSC #2094 (2013) is as follows [PDF available here]:

The Security Council today passed unanimously a resolution strengthening and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships, in response to that country’s third nuclear test on 12 February.

Acting under the Charter’s Chapter VII, through resolution 2094 (2013), the Council strongly condemned the test and maintained the sanctions it first imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006 under resolution 1718, deciding that some of those, along with additional restrictions, would apply to the individuals and entities listed in two annexes of today’s text.

In that connection, a travel ban and asset freeze were imposed on the Chief and Deputy Chief of a mining trading company it deemed “the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons”, as well as on an official of a company designated by the Sanctions Committee to be the main financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to assembly and manufacture.

The Council also froze the assets of a national-level organization responsible for the research and development of advanced weapons systems, and a conglomerate, designated by the Sanctions Committee in 2009, to be specializing in acquisition for the country’s defence industries and support to related sales.  Further, it added to the list of prohibited equipment and technologies, and included a list of luxury goods that cannot be imported.

States are directed under the resolution to enhance their vigilance over the diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in a provision aimed at halting any activities that could contribute to the country’s weapons programme, or which would violate any prohibited activities.

More specifically, States are directed to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of any financial or other assets or resources, including “bulk cash”, which might be used to evade the sanctions.  They are also called on to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches or offices of “DPRK” banks and to prohibit such banks from establishing new joint ventures.

Moreover, in the effort to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the Democratic People’s Republic or Korea or its nationals of any banned items, States are authorized to inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or that is destined for that country.  They are to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have reasonable grounds to believe the aircraft contains prohibited items.

States were also asked to supply any information on non-compliance and to report to the Council within 90 days, and thereafter, at the Committee’s request, on measures they have taken to implement the text.  The Sanctions Committee is directed to respond to violations and is authorized to add to the list.  The expert panel, under the Committee’s auspices, was extended until 7 April 2014.

The Council promised to keep the situation under continuous review and stated it was “prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’scompliance”, or to “take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test”.

The meeting began at 10:11 a.m. and ended at 10:14 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

“Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

“Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

“Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

“Concerned that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

“Welcoming the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) new Recommendation 7 on targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation, and urging Member States to apply FATF’s Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7 and related guidance papers for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation,

“Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile­related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

“1.   Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions;

“2.   Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;

“3.   Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

“4.   Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

“5.   Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013),reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);

“6.   Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

“7.   Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;

“8.   Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

“9.   Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

“10.  Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of an individual is required for fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business;

“11.  Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

“12.  Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“13.  Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;

“14.  Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, andclarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to the transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of bulk cash do not contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“15.  Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“16.  Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

“17.  Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;

“18.  Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;

“19.  Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

“20.  Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

“21.  Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than 12 months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional 30 days;

“22.  Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, anddirects the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;

“23.  Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;

“24.  Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“25.  Calls upon all States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, and requests the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

“26.  Calls upon all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“27.  Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, directs the Committee to designate additional individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and decides that the Committee may designate any individuals for measures under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and entities for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) that have contributed to theDPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“28.  Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009) and this resolution;

“29.  Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph,decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate, as renewed by resolution 2050 (2012), decides further that this mandate shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution,expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to create a group of up to eight experts and to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect, and requests the Committee, in consultation with the Panel, to adjust the Panel’s schedule of reporting;

“30.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

“31.  Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

“32.  Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

“33.  Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

“34.  Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

“35.  Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large;

“36.  Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’scompliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

“37.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Annex I

Travel ban/asset freeze

1.    YO’N CHO’NG NAM

(a)   Description: Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).  The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

2.    KO CH’O’L-CHAE

(a)   Description: Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).  The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’sprimary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

3.    MUN CHO’NG-CH’O’L

(a)   Description: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l is a TCB official.  In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB.  Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

Annex II

Asset freeze

1.    SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES

(a)   Description: The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons.  The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programmes.  Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.

(b)   AKA:  2ND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHE 2 CHAYON KWAHAKWON; ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY; KUKPANG KWAHAK-WON; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE; SANSRI

(c)   Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

2.    KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION

(a)   Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation.  Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.

(b)   Location: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Annex III

Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology

Nuclear items

1.    Perfluorinated Lubricants

They can be used for lubricating vacuum pump and compressor bearings. They have a low vapour pressure, are resistant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, and are used for pumping fluorine.

2.    UF6 Corrosion Resistant Bellow-sealed Valves

They can be used in uranium enrichment facilities (such as gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion plants), in facilities that produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, in fuel fabrication facilities and in facilities handling tritium.

Missile items

1.    Special corrosion resistant steels — limited to steels resistant to Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) or nitric acid, such as nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS).

2.    Ultra high-temperature ceramic composite materials in solid form (i.e. blocks, cylinders, tubes or ingots) in any of the following form factors:

(a)   Cylinders having a diameter of 120 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater;

(b)   Tubes having an inner diameter of 65 mm or greater and a wall thickness of 25 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater; or

(c)   Blocks having a size of 120 mm x 120 mm x 50 mm or greater.

3.    Pyrotechnically Actuated Valves.

4.    Measurement and control equipment usable for wind tunnels (balance, thermal stream measurement, flow control).

5.    Sodium Perchlorate.

Chemical weapons list

1.    Vacuum pumps with a manufacturer’s specified maximum flow-rate greater than 1 m3/h (under standard temperature and pressure conditions), casings (pump bodies), preformed casing-liners, impellers, rotors, and jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the chemicals being processed are made from controlled materials.

Annex IV

Luxury goods

1.    Jewelry:

(a)   Jewelry with pearls;

(b)   Gems;

(c)   Precious and semi-precious stones (including diamonds, sapphires, rubies, and emeralds);

(d)   Jewelry of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal.

2.    Transportation items, as follows:

(a)   Yachts;

(b)   Luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles): automobiles and other motor vehicles to transport people (other than public transport), including station wagons;

(c)   Racing cars.

The United States [US] Mission to the UN Mission in New York provided a gist of the UNSCR #2094.  According to a news release from the United Nations:

Following its strong condemnation of the nuclear test conducted last month by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United Nations Security Council today tightened sanctions on the country’s trade and banking, as well as travel by targeted officials.

Detailing the new sanctions through a resolution adopted unanimously by the 15-member body, the Council demanded that the country retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and reaffirmed its decision that “the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”

Toward that goal, an existing ban on DPRK trade in items related to the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and officials involved in it was specified as applying to a raft of items detailed in the resolution’s annexes, ranging from “pyrotechnically actuated valves,” to luxury goods such as jewelry with pearls and race cars.

The travel ban and asset freeze was extended to additional individuals and companies, including those involved in the trade of arms-related material and to the Second Academy of Natural Sciences in Pyongyang.

Welcoming the adoption of the resolution, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called its measures “effective and credible,” adding that “the Security Council has sent an unequivocal message to the DPRK that the international community will not tolerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons and related acts,” according to a statement released by his spokesperson.

Mr. Ban called on DPRK and all other Member States to fully comply with the resolution, reaffirming his commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through dialogue.

The statement noted the Secretary-General’s deep concern over heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, and urged DPRK to refrain from any further destabilizing steps or “bellicose rhetoric.”

“At a time of new political leadership throughout the region, the Secretary-General urges Pyongyang to reverse course and build confidence with the country’s neighbours,” it stated.

Sanctions were first imposed on DPRK by the Council following nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, including a ban on the import of nuclear and missile technology. The sanctions were further tightened in January 2013 after the country reportedly launched a long-range Unha-3 rocket from its west coast.

Views of an army-people solidarity rally in Kim Il Sung Square on 7 March 2013 (Photos: KCNA)

In advance of the sanctions passage, the DPRK staged a mass Army-People solidarity rally in Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang on 7 March, ostensibly to support a recent statement of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Supreme Command.  On the platform (reviewing stand) for the rally were a number of DPRK senior officials including Kim Yong Nam (President of the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium), Choe Yong Rim (DPRK Cabinet Premier), VMar Kim Yong Chun (Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission), Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Secretary Pak To Chun, KWP Secretary Choe Tae Bok, KWP Secretary and Director of the United Front Department Kim Yang Gon, Director of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department Ju Kyu Chang and DPRK Cabinet Vice Premier and State Planning Commission (Gosplan) Chairman Ro Tu Chol along with “other senor party and state, officials of the party, armed forces and power organs, working people’s organizations, ministries, national institutions and scientific, educational, literary and art, public health and media fields, service persons of the KPA and the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces and officials and working people of institutions, industrial establishments and farms at all levels and teachers and students of universities and colleges here, more than 100 000 in all.”

Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Gen. Kang Pyo Yong, read the rally’s keynote statement.  The statement and the rally’s speakers “amounts to a declaration of the will of all service personnel and people to win a sure victory by ending at an early date the final decisive battle with the brigandish U.S. imperialists who are working hard to usurp the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK,” “warned that the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean warmongers should clearly understand who is their rival and what miserable fate awaits them and be fully aware that the right to preemptive nuclear attack is not their monopoly” and that “if the U.S. and puppet war-like forces bring the dark clouds of a nuclear war to hang over this land, the army and people of the DPRK will never miss the opportunity but sweep away the aggressors from the earth and glorify this year which marks the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War as a historic year of national reunification.”

On 6 March (Wednesday) Rodong Sinmun published an editorial for internal dissemination, of the conventional, official political mood in the DPRK:

Respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un stated the following. “Our cause is just, and the final victory is ours.”

The invincible mettle of our entire army and people, who have heard the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Supreme Command spokesman’s statement, awesomely shakes this land and this sky. The unchanging faith and unyielding position of military-first Korea is that it absolutely cannot miss a precious opportunity to clearly show before history and the world what kind of power the great Mt Paektu state has, which the world does not yet know nor imagine.

This is how KPA General Jong Hyon Il expresses his soaring anger at the brigandish US imperialists and lackey forces such as the South Korean puppets.

“Clearly know that the US imperialists and lackey forces such as the South Korean puppets.”

The Worker-Peasant Red Guards [WPRG] and Young Red Guards [YRG], as well as all the services and branches of the KPA beginning with our front-line army groups, are in the status of having entered a war of all-out confrontation in accordance with the operations plan finally signed by the respected and beloved comrade Supreme Commander.  Our army never makes empty talk.  It is the mettle of the revolutionary strong army of Mt Paektu to mean what it says.

If the US imperialists brandish nuclear weapons, we — in complete contrast to former times — will by means of diversified, precision nuclear strike in our own style turn not just Seoul, but even Washington, into a sea of fire.

We are fully prepared to strike at will any target, at any time, with no limitation.

The unchanging position of our army and the Mt Paektu-style of response is that if the enemies pull out a knife, we knock it away with a long sword; if they show a gun, we shatter it with a missile; and if they threaten us with nuclear weapons, we meet them with a means of precision nuclear strike in our style, which is yet unknown to the world.

All of our people’s army officers and men regard the KPA Supreme Command spokesman’s statement as the cannon-roar of victory, and they wait only for the comrade Supreme Commander’s order.

Metals Industry Minister Han Hyo Yon said that the serious measures that were made clear to everyone through the KPA Supreme Command spokesman’s statement are the will of our people and a declaration of annihilation, and he spoke out as follows.

“For nearly 60 years, from the time the armistice agreement was signed until today, we have lived preparing for the final decisive battle with the US imperialists.

Every portion of metal our working class put in during that time was turned straightway into tanks and rocket launchers, and into strategic rockets and nuclear weapons.

We have everything for completely eliminating the sworn enemies from the face of the earth.”  The “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” combined military exercises the US imperialists and South Korean puppets are conducting now are clearly offensive exercises for northward aggression and a nuclear test war against our Republic.

It seems that the enemies still do not understand very well how powerful our war deterrent and nuclear deterrent is.  Our people will embrace the spirit of annihilating the enemy and completely wipe out the US imperialist aggressors and the South Korean puppet warmongers through a war of all-out decisive confrontation and struggle by all the people.

With the US imperialists, who regard the law of the jungle as the law of survival, one has to resolve things only through the gun barrel, not by words.

We do not make empty talk. Beginning from the forthcoming day of 11 March, there is no such thing as an armistice agreement.

There can be no such thing as a second armistice agreement, either; there can only be a document of surrender from the US imperialists.

Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League Central Committee Chairman Jon Yong Nam remarked that he is boiling over with conviction of victory and the will to annihilate the enemy after hearing about the KPA Supreme Command spokesman’s statement, and he and stated the following.

“Today’s grave situation, in which the anti-Republic ‘sanctions’ maneuver of the US imperialists and South Korean puppets is proceeding toward military provocation, calls our youth to a patriotic holy war of justice.”

The national defense spirit of the 1950s’ young heroes who entered on the path of decisive war knowing that, although it is a single life for the only fatherland one has, there is no valuable life, no beautiful hope, and no great joy like that of sacrificing youthful days is beating powerfully in the heart of each of our youth.

The KPA Supreme Command spokesman’s statement saying that [the DPRK] will smash the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers, who dare to come at us wielding the nuclear club and saying they will harm us, with means of a diversified precision nuclear strike in our own style, has put all of our youth, waiting only for the order, into the highest state of excitement.

Our youth, who have a never-changing faith that we will win without fail if only the respected and beloved Marshal Kim Jong Un is there, solemnly pledge that they will become 5 million gun barrels and 10 million bombs for the party, leader, fatherland, and people, fill the first-line trenches and be the first to dash forward to annihilate and wipe out the enemies, and fly the Supreme Commander’s flag that shines the marshal’s starlight and the flag of the Republic high on the ridge of Jeju Island’s Mt Hanna.

Kang Ji Yong, director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, noted that the Supreme Command spokesman’s statement is a firm statement of the revolutionary strong army of Mt Paektu for the final victory in the great DPRK-US confrontation that has continued across a century.

The reckless behavior of the puppet army warmongers, who are unchangingly rushing about now saying they will join in with their US master’s plot for a war of northward aggression and make a “first strike” on us, is truly absurd.

The unlimited, powerful strength of our revolutionary armed force, which has entered on an all- war of confrontation according to the operations plan finally signed by the respected and beloved comrade Supreme Commander, is exploding awesomely.

The South Korean puppets, who are utterly destroying North-South relations as the colonial lackeys of the US imperialists and even bringing the calamity of nuclear war to this land without hesitation, will come to clearly know how bitter is the price for being the puppet of outside forces and betraying the nation.

For the diabolical anti-reunification traitors who cruelly mutilated the brethrens’ earnest yearning for reunification, there can be not a shred of mercy.

Get ready, puppet Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Jeong Seung-jo , the traitors who are desperately running about to harm fellow countrymen with the backing of outside forces.

The traitors will have to pay a hundred-fold and thousand-fold price for viciously opposing the nation’s reconciliation, unity, and reunification up to now and engaging in confrontation racket.

DPRK Conducts Third Nuclear Test

A United States Geological Survey poster showing the 12 February 2013 seismic event near the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility in North Hamgyo’ng Province (Photo: USGS)

The DPRK conducted its third nuclear test in the late morning of 12 February (Tuesday).  The first indication of the third experimental detonation was a seismic event  with its epicenter on the premises of the DPRK’s nuclear test facility near P’unggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province.  The seismic event was later identified in South Korea media reporting as a “man-made earthquake” and had an estimate magnitude between 4.7 and. 5.2.  According to a preliminary analysis by the South Korean [ROK] government the nuclear test of between six (6) and seven (7) kilotons.  According to a public health official in Primorsky Krai, the Russian administrative district that borders the DPRK, there were no increased raditation levels and “everything is normal and (the levels) correspond to the natural background.”  It remains to be seen whether the DPRK tested a plutonium or uranium device.

Hours after media reports on the seismic event in North Hamgyo’ng Province, DPRK state media released a report in which it said “the scientific field for national defense of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.”  According to KCNA’s report on the nuclear test:

The scientific field for national defence of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.

The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK’s legitimate right to launch satellite for peaceful purposes.

The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power. It was confirmed that the test did not give any adverse effect to the surrounding ecological environment.

The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.

The nuclear test will greatly encourage the army and people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation with the same spirit and mettle as displayed in conquering space, and offer an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region.

DPRK state media also released a statement from the country’s Foreign Ministry which described the test as “a resolute step for self-defense taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it” and said that the “main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last”:

The DPRK’s third nuclear test is a resolute step for self-defence taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it.

Its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year was a peaceful one from A to Z which was conducted according to its plan for scientific and technological development for economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living.

The world including hostile countries recognized its application satellite’s entry into orbit and greatly admired its development of space technology.

The U.S., however, again prodded the UN Security Council into cooking up a new “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK, terming its satellite launch a violation of the UNSC’s “resolution”.

Encroaching upon the right to satellite launch is an unpardonable grave hostile act as it is an infringement on the DPRK’s sovereignty.

By origin, the DPRK had neither need nor plan to conduct a nuclear test.

The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has already acquired the trustworthy capability strong enough to make a precision strike at bases for aggression and blow them up at a single blow no matter where they are on the earth.

It was the DPRK’s goal to focus efforts on economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living by dint of nuclear deterrence for self-defence provided by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il all their lives.

The DPRK exercised its maximum self-restraint when the U.S. fabricated the “presidential statement” over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes by abusing the UNSC in April last year.

But the DPRK’s patience reached its limit as the U.S. intensified such hostile act as implementing before anyone else the UNSC’s “resolution on sanctions”, far from apologizing for its renewed wanton violation of the DPRK’s right to satellite launch.

The main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last.

The DPRK’s nuclear test is a just step for self-defence not contradictory to any international law.

The U.S. has long put the DPRK on the list of preemptive nuclear strike.

It is quite natural just measure for self-defence to react to the U.S. ever-increasing nuclear threat with nuclear deterrence.

The DPRK withdrew from the NPT after going through legitimate procedures and chose the way of having access to nuclear deterrence for self-defence to protect the supreme interests of the country.

There have been on the earth more than 2 000 nuclear tests and at least 9 000 satellite launches in the UN history spanning over 60 years but there has never been a UNSC resolution on banning any nuclear test or satellite launch.

It is the U.S. that has conducted more nuclear tests and launched more satellites than any others. It, however, cooked up the UNSC’s “resolution” banning only the DPRK’s nuclear test and satellite launch. This is the breach of international law and the height of double standards.

Had the UNSC been impartial even a bit, it would not have taken issue with a sovereign state’s exercise of the right to self-defence and its scientific and technological activities for peaceful purposes but with the U.S. policy for preemptive nuclear strike, a threat to global peace and security, to begin with.

The current nuclear test is the primary countermeasure taken by the DPRK in which it exercised its maximum self-restraint.

If the U.S. takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession.

The inspection of ships and maritime blockade touted by the hostile forces will be regarded as war actions and will invite the DPRK’s merciless retaliatory strikes at their strongholds.

The U.S., though belatedly, should choose between the two options: To respect the DPRK’s right to satellite launch and open a phase of detente and stability or to keep to its wrong road leading to the explosive situation by persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK.

In case the U.S. chooses the road of conflict finally, the world will clearly see the army and people of the DPRK defend its dignity and sovereignty to the end through a do-or-die battle between justice and injustice, greet a great revolutionary event for national reunification and win a final victory.

The KCNA report and DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement were echoed in remarks made by the 1st Secretary of the DPRK Mission to the UN Geneva, Jon Yong Ryong said “The US and their followers are sadly mistaken if they miscalculate the DPRK (North Korea) would accept the entirely unreasonable resolutions against it.  The DPRK will never be bound to any resolutions.  Jon also said the nuclear test will “greatly encourage the army and the people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation… and offers an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region.”  Jon also said “”the prospect for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula has become gloomier due to the US hostile policies to the DPRK that have become ever more pronounced” and that if the “EU truly wants peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, it should urge the US first to terminate its hostile policy towards the DPRK on an impartial basis.”

In Beijing the PRC Foreign Ministry released a statement which said the Chinese government was ”strongly dissatisfied with” and “firmly opposed to” the DPRK’s third nuclear test.  The statement also urged “the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization and refrain from any move that may further worsen the situation. To safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves the common interests of all parties.”  The PRC Foreign Ministry also announced that it summoned DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong to “lodge a solemn representation.”

The Japanese Government convened an emergency meeting and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the test “is a grave threat to our nation’s safety and cannot be tolerated as it will significantly damage international society’s peace and safety.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which “we insist that North Korea should stop illegal actions, strictly fulfil all requirements of the UN Security Council, fully abandon missile and nuclear programs, return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA comprehensive guarantees” and “calls on all interested parties to show restraint and plans together with other six-party negotiators not to ease up in efforts towards normalization of the situation on the peninsula through political and diplomatic means.”  The statement also said, “Only so and no other way North Korea will be able to pull out from effective international isolation, which will open the door to international cooperation in different directions without exclusion of peaceful atom and space.  We are confident that this path meets interests, first of all, of North Korea itself.”

On 6 February Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexandr Timonin told Interfax, “As before, our country advocates the continuation of the search for political and diplomatic ways to stabilize the situation in the Northeast Asia and will do its best to facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for resuming the six-party talks on the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula.  In this respect, it is extremely important that all interested parties do not commit actions capable to aggravate the situation in the Korean peninsula and lead to a new arms race.”

The United Nations Security Council [UNSC], of which South Korea holds the monthly rotating presidency, held an emergency meeting on 12 February which “strongly condemned” the third test.  According to the UNSC’s statement:

The members of the Security Council held urgent consultations to address the serious situation arising from the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The members of the Security Council strongly condemned this test, which is a grave violation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and therefore there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security.

The members of the Security Council recalled that in January, they unanimously adopted resolution 2087 (2013), which expressed the Council’s determination to take “significant action” in the event of a further Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear test.

In line with this commitment and the gravity of this violation, the members of the Security Council will begin work immediately on appropriate measures in a Security Council resolution.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon “strongly” condemned the 12 February nuclear test and described it as “ clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions” and  said that Ban is “gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation”:

The Secretary-General condemns the underground nuclear weapon test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) today. It is a clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It is deplorable that Pyongyang defied the strong and unequivocal call from the international community to refrain from any further provocative measures. The Secretary-General had repeatedly called on the new leadership in Pyongyang to address international concerns and start building confidence with neighbouring countries and the international community.

The Secretary-General is gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. He once again urges the DPRK to reverse course and work towards de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The Secretary-General is confident that the Security Council will remain united and take appropriate action. In the meantime, the Secretary-General remains in close contact with all concerned parties and stands ready to assist their efforts.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, “expressed deep regret” about the nuclear test and “strongly urged the DPRK to fully implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and all relevant IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.”   According to a brief statement Amano said, “I understand that the DPRK announced it had carried out a third test of a nuclear weapon, despite calls from the international community not to do so. This is deeply regrettable and is in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions.  The IAEA remains ready to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue by resuming its nuclear verification activities in the country as soon as the political agreement is reached among countries concerned.”

Institutions and power organizations involved in the 12 February 2013 (abridged edition)

The 12 February 2013 nuclear test was the culmination of activity within departments, offices, sections and units of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP], the DPRK Government and the Korean People’s Army [KPA].  The third nuclear test was authorized through government channels by the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] and through party channels during an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission [CMC] on 3 February 2013.  Kim Jong Un’s last reported public appearance was at the expanded CMC meeting.  Like the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, the experimental detonation was a combined effort of scientists and technicians (who typically work for party and government agencies) and elements of the KPA.  Personnel involved in each phase of the nuclear test would interface with Kim Jong Un and other core leadership through the KWP Machine Building Industry Department’s deputy (vice) director Hong Sung Mu and the KWP Organization Guidance Department [OGD].  When Kim Jong Il was alive, the nuclear weapons program was commanded directly by KJI through a former Kim Il Sung University professor So Sang Kuk, who held the position of OGD deputy (vice) director and worked in KJI’s office.

Information about the DPRK’s strategic weapons program in general, and its testing of nuclear weapons in particular, is speculative and contradictory.  However, there are some key organizations that would have been involved in the actual nuclear test.  The nuclear test was conducted by elements of the KPA General Staff’s Nuclear-Chemical, Ordnance and Communications Bureaus working in cooperation with personnel from the 5th Bureau of the Second Economy Commission [SEC], the 2nd National Academy of Sciences [SANS] and the Nuclear Bureau.  According to some researchers, the Nuclear Bureau is part of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department (formerly known as the KWP Munitions Industry Department), however other sources says that the Nuclear Bureau was subordinated directly to the NDC, after it was bureaucratically migrated from the KWP along with SANS.  SANS personnel would have been involved in the nuclear physics, engineering and other technical aspects of the test, while the 5th Bureau of the SEC would have been involved in production of the nuclear device (as well as preliminary high explosive testing).  The construction of the detonation area and tunnels may have been conducted by a Ministry of People’s Security [MPS] engineering unit or a specialized construction unit of the KPA.  Support roles would have been played by the KPA General Logistics Department (subordinate to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces [MPAF]) and for mission security by elements of the Military Security Command [MSC] and the Ministry of State Security’s Defense Industry Security Bureau, possibly augmented by personnel of the Guard Command.

Leadership Activities Prior to 12 February 2013 nuclear test

On 12 February, DPRK state media reported that a meeting of the KWP Political Bureau convened on 11 February (Monday).  Kim Jong Un was not reported to have attended.  The Political Bureau meeting passed a lengthy decision to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of active hostilities of the Fatherland Liberation (Korean) War and the 65th anniversary of the DPRK’s foundation.  However, the Political Bureau meeting was most likely the forum at which the central leadership was formally notified of an impending third nuclear test.

Kim Jong Un’s last public appearance was reported on 3 February 2012 and was his chairing and attending the expanded CMC meeting.  Prior to the CMC meeting, KJU attended a commemorative photo-op with participants of the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries.  Notable members of his entourage at the photo-op were VMar Kim Yong Chun and Gen. O Kuk Ryol, two of the KPA’s key senior officials tied to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.  Interestingly, VMar Kim and Gen. O were part of a personnel shake-up of the KPA’s high command in February 2009, three months prior to the May 2009 nuclear test.  At that time, Gen. O was appointed Vice Chairman of the NDC and VMar Kim was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces.  VMar Kim was later replaced as minister and appointed director of the KWP Civil Defense Department, which has a major public safety function during a nuclear test.  Also in February 2009, Kim Kyok Sik was replaced as Chief of the KPA General Staff by Ri Yong Ho.  Ri was later famously dismissed in July 2012, but Kim Kyok Sik resurfaced in a senior position when he was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in November 2012, approximately three months ahead of the 12 February 2013 nuclear test.

Late DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il tours revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province in his last reported public appearance before the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test on 25 May 2009. Yo’nsa County is only 65 km (40 miles) from the Punggye-ri nuclear testing area (Photos: KCNA)

KJU’s lack of public activity contrasts with Kim Jong Il’s (his father) public appearances prior to the second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.  On 23 May 2009, DPRK state media reported that the late KJI inspected revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, located 65 km  (40 miles) from the P’unggye-ri test site.  On the day of the test, KJI was reported to have attended a concert given by the Persimmon Tree (kamnamu) Company of the KPA.  State media did not disclose where the concert took place, making it likely that KJI watched the concert in Pyongyang or at the Persimmon Tree Company’s headquarters in Kangwo’n Province.

DPRK Newspaper Says Nuclear Test is “people’s demand” as Construction Progresses in Kilchu County

Images of a tunnel entrance (top) and tunnel leading to the nuclear detonation site. These images appeared in episode 4 of the 2009 Korea Film Studios’ feature The Country I Saw, which included a depiction of the 25 May 2009 nuclear test (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Yonhap News Agency reported on 26 January (Saturday) that an editorial in Rodong Sinmun, the daily newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, said that  ”A nuclear test is the demand of the people and no other choice can be made” and “It is the people’s demand that there should be something even greater than a nuclear test.”  The 26 January 2013 editorial was published three days after the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] passed resolution #2087 (2013) which “condemns” the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket and “demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation.”  The 26 January Rodong editorial said that that UNSC “gave us no other choice . . .but to go to the very end.”  It is not clear if going “to the very end” is part of an “upcoming all-out action” which announced in a 24 January (Thursday) statement by the DPRK’s supreme power organization the National Defense Commission.  

The Rodong editorial was published the same day as DPRK state media reported that the country’s 23 January Foreign Ministry statement “as regards the fabrication of the ‘resolution’ by the U.S. and its allies at the U.N. Security Council in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK was distributed as an official document S/2013/50 at the UNSC on Jan. 25 (Friday).”  On 26 January (Saturday) DPRK state media conducted a few “man on the street” interviews about the UNSC resolution.  According to KCNA the slogan (likely authored by Korean Workers’ Party Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Kim Ki Nam, the country’s slogan master) “‘Death to the U.S. imperialists, sworn enemy of the Korean people” can be heard everywhere in the country.”  KCNA reported that “Many young people are volunteering for military services, out of their will to annihilate the enemies while other people visit military posts with aid materials.”  In one interview elderly Moranbong District resident Kim Tok Jong said, “A nation’s sovereignty is more precious than one’s life” and that he ”lived for nearly 70 years. The past years clearly shows that words do not go on the U.S. and only force is needed to settle accounts with it.  If a war breaks out, I will take arms in my hand to fight against the U.S. scoundrels.   I will also do my utmost to wipe out the group of evils running amuck to trample down the nation’s right to existence and development.”

(Photo: KCTV screengrab from The Country That I Saw,)

Meanwhile, in Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, “satellite imagery from January 23, 2013 and previous images dating back a month reveal that the site appears to be at a continued state of readiness that would allow the North to move forward with a test in a few weeks or less once the leadership in Pyongyang gives the order,” according to an analysis by Jack Liu for 38 North.

Liu’s analysis shows that imagery “reveals continued activity at the area near the possible test tunnel entrance through the appearance of bare ground and open roads. There was significant snowfall in November 2012, and the area has been cleared in the dead of winter, indicating the intent to maintain site readiness.”  Another image reveals “a close-up of a December 24 GeoEye satellite image shows an apparent pile of material in the yard of the main administrative buildings near the entrance to the possible command bunker.  (The presence of a bus, probably used to transport personnel working at the site, is another indicator of continued activity.) The purpose of that material remains unclear. One possible explanation is that it is intended for ‘stemming’ or sealing the tunnel in.”  An image captured in early January shows a significant personnel presence “ another indicator of continued activity and readiness at the site. Thirty or more personnel, possibly soldiers or security guards, can be seen in formation in the same area. They may be there for special duty, for example to greet visiting officials, or for some other more routine purpose.”  Finally, an image taken three days ago, as the NDC warned of “all-out action” finds that “that the pile of material in the yard of the administrative area has shrunk. If this material is intended for stemming, one possible explanation is that operations have begun to seal the test tunnel. This image also provides the clearest view of the tunnel entrance to date. Roads to the entrance continue to remain clear.”

Even if a third experimental detonation (HEU, thermonuclear or otherwise), there remains the matter of a delivery system.  The Japanese Defense Minister, Itsunori Onodera said at a meeting attended by new PM Shinzo Abe that DPRK missile research capability had “entered into a new stage.”  According to Xinhua English (note the media source), ” Onodera said that “the missile, which the DPRK called as a rocket to send a satellite into orbit, could reach U.S. western coast more accurately with a range of more than 10,000 km (6,213 miles)” and “that the capability of the DPRK’s short-or-middle-range missiles has also been improved, posing more threats to Japan’s security.”  Onodera’s remarks were based on an analysis of the 12 December 2012 U’nha-3 launch.

On 25 January (Friday) UNSC Resolution #2087 (2013) and the DPRK’s reactions to the resolution was a hot topic at the US State Department’s daily briefing (during the course of Victoria Nuland’s briefing it seems a group of people got lost in the building).  Still on North Korea? Yes, indeedy.  The relevant sections excerpted (for Empsonian close reading and interpretation) below:

QUESTION:North Korea threatening to go to war with the South?

MS. NULAND: As you know, my colleague Jay Carney spoke to these issues yesterday. These statements coming out in North Korea are needlessly provocative. Any kind of further test would be another significant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and only will serve to further Pyongyang’s isolation. As you all know, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 earlier in the week in response to the December missile launch, and that resolution tightens the sanctions on North Korea and works hard to ensure that it cannot succeed as a proliferator of missile technology, et cetera.

And it’s just – it’s really a pretty sad story because the new North Korean leader has a choice to make, as the Secretary has said so many times. He can serve to focus on the needs of his people, to bring his country out of isolation and back into compliance with international obligations, open it back up to the world, or he can continue to waste what little money the country has on missile technologies and things while his people go hungry. So –

QUESTION: I have a question on that. The new leader is not all that new. I mean, you have a pattern of events that you can look at – the original failed test, the subsequent missile test that was successful, and now the threat to conduct a third nuclear test. Does it seem to you all now that he has made his choice and how – what kind of a strategy, a diplomatic strategy, can you pursue if he is not interested in serious talks about his nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

MS. NULAND: Well, you’re not wrong that the pattern of choices is concerning, which is why we felt very strongly that the international community – oh, we seem to have some guests. Hi, guys. Not sure who they were, but I think they were lost.

So again, the pattern of choices appears to be quite concerning. That’s why it’s been so important to keep the international community united in response to these negative choices, why we took the time we did to get it right with Resolution 2087, to make clear to North Korea that particularly the Six-Party states, including all of North Korea’s neighbors, are united in ensuring that there is a price to say, that there will be increasing sanctions, that we are going to be vigilant about their proliferation activity, the activities of their banks, and that it’s going to take the country in the wrong direction.

I think you know that Ambassador Glyn Davies is out in the region now. He is in Beijing today, had very productive and useful meetings with counterparts there, including Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, his counterpart Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei, and others. He was in Seoul yesterday and he’s going on to Tokyo tomorrow. So very much a project to stay coordinated with our Six-Party counterparts in watching this and in ensuring that North Korea gets the message that nothing good is going to come from this.

QUESTION: And turn back to the China issue in this whole mix. Today, the Chinese press seemed to be suggesting that they’ve told North Korea that if it goes ahead with its nuclear test that they will actually – Beijing could cut its aid to Pyongyang. That seems to be an interesting move on the part of the Chinese. What would you have to say on that?

MS. NULAND: Well, I didn’t see those particular comments. But we have, as you know, regularly encouraged Beijing to use the significant influence that it has with Pyongyang. They have, at various times, been able to make clear that the continued support of Beijing in terms of trade, aid, the energy relationship, et cetera, depends on North Korea making the right choices. Again, China joins strongly with us in Resolution 2087, which was important, and we, as Glyn Davies said – he had a very good visit to Beijing in terms of plotting the course forward together.

QUESTION: How important – if they go ahead and do something like that – how important could such a cut in Chinese aid to North Korea be in changing the calculations of the North Korean leadership?

MS. NULAND: Well, I don’t want to speculate on scenarios to be determined. But obviously, North Korea remains quite dependent on its aid and trade relationship with Beijing.

Jill, still on this?

QUESTION: Toria, are the Six-Party Talks off, as they seem to be indicating in the North Korean statement?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve made clear for more than a year now that the Six-Party Talks couldn’t go forward to a new round unless we saw real evidence that the DPRK was prepared to meet its obligations. So we’re still in the state that we’ve been for more than a year in terms of not having the kind of intent that we need to go forward.

QUESTION: New topic?

MS. NULAND: Still on North Korea?

QUESTION: Still on North Korea.

MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please, here.

QUESTION: Do you – this time around, do you have any reason to believe the North Koreans will get that message and actually take astep on – well, make the – what you would call the right choice and actually open up to dialogue, or perhaps discontinue their programs or even do anything in the right direction?

MS. NULAND: Well, anybody who endeavored to be predictive about North Korean behavior is probably foolish. But what’s been important to us is strong unity among the Six-Party Talks countries, strong unity in the region about a positive course forward, and the fact that there will be consequences if they keep making bad choices.

QUESTION: One more?

MS. NULAND: Yeah.

QUESTION: What types of consequences?

MS. NULAND: Well, I think –

QUESTION: Because there’s been few besides UN resolutions that haven’t changed their behavior. There hasn’t really been any significant consequences otherwise.

MS. NULAND: I would reject that, Brad. If you look at UN Security Council that was just passed, 2087, and go through it, and I would commend to you the fact sheet that USUN put out on this, it imposes new sanctions on North Korean companies and government agencies, including a broad range of sanctions against their space agency, which was responsible for the launch, as well as the Bank of East Land and several individuals in the North Korean system who had previously not been sanctioned. Six entities and four individuals will have their assets frozen and will be prohibited from engaging in financial transactions. This is UN sanctions, not just U.S. sanctions. There’s an updated list of nuclear and ballistic missile technology that’s going to be banned from transfer to or from the DPRK. I could continue. But –

QUESTION: Do you think there’s space to squeeze them further on the sanctions route, that this country which is perhaps the most heavily sanctioned in the world can still be – there’s still consequences along this sanctions route left?

MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, and we wouldn’t have put new sanctions on them if we didn’t think that they would be effective.

Please.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up quickly as far as North Korea’s missile technology or missiles are concerned. Despite UN Security Council resolutions or UN sanctions, international sanctions, still North Korea is continuing and not listening to the international community. So if China is with you, Madam, since China was always helping North Korea. But who else is behind this technology or behind North Korea?

MS. NULAND: Well, again, I think what we just have been through here is the fact that the international community now with this new resolution has spoken with one voice in putting on increasingly tough sanctions on the DPRK, including getting at the space agency, getting at the banks, naming individuals who had not previously been named, as contributing to taking the country in the wrong direction. And we will continue to look for further opportunities to make our views clear in this kind of a way if the DPRK doesn’t change course.

QUESTION: And when this new leader came in North Korea, everybody hoped that things will change to the right direction for the people of North Korea, but still they are going in the worst direction as far as the people are concerned.

MS. NULAND: Well, again, we would certainly agree with that. I mean, as you know, we were a year ago engaged in trying to work out some kind of a food assistance deal, but we didn’t get the kind of assurance that we needed from the government that it was going to go to the right place. So it’s very disappointing.

Please.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Does the United States have any separate plan for additional sanctions toward North Korea for the third nuclear test?

MS. NULAND: In response to the December test, what you will see and what you’ve seen in the last couple of days are U.S. decisions that implement the larger UN Security Council decisions in 2087. So you’re starting to see us put out our own sanctioning information to ensure that we are complying now in our own law with 2087.

DPRK TV News Reports on Richardson-Schmidt Visit to Grand People’s Study House and KIS University

Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt (L) takes a photograph of the Chuch’e Tower (R) from the balcony of the Grand People’s Study House in Pyongyang (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

DPRK state media aired a brief story (33 seconds) at the end of its 9 January (Wednesday) television newscast which showed former Governor Bill Richardson, Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, Google Ideas Director Jared Cohen and members of their delegation touring the Grand People’s Study House in central Pyongyang.  The television news story showed Richardson and members of the delegation visiting a circulation desk at the DPRK’s national library, using the library’s computer terminals and taking souvenir photographs of the Chuch’e Tower from the study house’s balcony.

Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt (2nd L) and former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (3rd L) begin a tour of the Grand People’s Study House in central Pyongyang on 9 January 2013 (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

The Richardson-Schmidt delegation visit an information desk at the Grand People’s Study House (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Google Ideas Director Jared Cohen uses a computer workstation during a tour of the Grand People’s Study House, the DPRK’s national library, on 9 January 2013 (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

DPRK state media also aired a brief story (32 seconds) on Gov. Richardson, Mr. Schmidt and the delegation touring the E-Library at Kim Il Sung University toward the end of the 8 January (Tuesday) newscast.

Eric Schmidt (2nd L) talks with Bill Richardson (3rd L) during a tour of the E-Library at Kim Il Sung University. Also in attendance is Korea expert Dr. Tony Namkung (L) (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Bill Richardson, Eric Schmidt and members of their delegation tour a classroom at the E-Library at Kim Il Sung University (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Bill Richardson and Eric Schmidt (C) tour a lecture hall at Kim Il Sung University’s E-Library (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

During its stay in the DPRK, the delegation met with several groups of DPRK officials, including a vice minister of foreign affairs, and visited the Korea Computer Center and the Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun.  With the exception of these two brief stories on Korean Central Television [KCTV] news and several short news items in DPRK print media, the delegation’s visit was a low-visibility event in DPRK state media reporting.

The delegation departed Pyongyang on 10 January (Thursday) and arrived in Beijing.  Richardson said that DPRK officials assured him at one meeting that a 44-year old Korean American who was arrested and detained since early November 2012 was in good health and would soon be put on trial.  Richardson also said that during an interaction with DPRK officials he asked the country to stop nuclear and missile testing.  At a media availability in Beijing, Richardson and Schmidt said that they encouraged DPRK officials to expand access to the internet and cell ‘phones.  According to The Guardian Richardson said that “The internet is important for the welfare of the North Korean people, to expand mobile technology, to expand cell phone use” and Schmidt remarked that “As the world becomes increasingly connected, their decision to be virtually isolated is very much going to affect their physical world, their economic growth and so forth, and it will make it harder for them to catch up economically.”

Kim Jong Un Attends Moranbong Band Concert and Fireworks Display

An overview of the Moranbong Band’s New Year’s concert (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported on 1 January (Tuesday) that Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) and his wife Ri Sol Ju (Ri So’l-chu) attended a New Year’s concert titled Following the Party to the End by the Moranbong Band.  KJU’s last reported public appearance was his attendance at a banquet for personnel involved in the 12 December 2012 U’nha-3 rocket launch hosted by the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee.  Attending the concert with KJU and RSJ were Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Gen. Choe Ryong Hae,  ”senior party, state and army officials and officials of party, armed forces and power organs, working people’s organizations, ministries and national institutions, officials, scientists, researchers, teachers and students in the fields of science and education and scientists, technicians, workers and officials who contributed to the successful launch of Kwangmyongsong 3-2″ and “the chief of the Pyongyang mission of the Anti-Imperialist National Democratic Front and overseas compatriots, diplomatic envoys, representatives of international organizations and military attaches and their wives and staff members of foreign embassies here and other foreign guests.”

After arriving at the concert, Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju and greeted and talked with diplomats, military attaches and officials of foreign organizations.  At midnight on 1 January 2013, a fireworks displays began in different areas around Pyongyang.  According to KCNA, KJU “drank toast with senior officials of the party, state and army and foreign guests, watching the fireworks.”  Following the fireworks, KJU and RSJ attended the Moranbong Band concert and “acknowledged the enthusiastic cheers of the participants, congratulating all the service personnel and people on the New Year.”  The concert  included “female trio ‘The Nodul Riverside’, light music and serial songs and ‘Collection of World Famous Songs.’”  According to KCNA, “the performers sang high praises of the undying feats President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il performed by building an invincible power on this land and laying a firm foundation for the independent reunification of the country and its peace and prosperity and the prosperity of Military-First (so’ngun) Korea, taking the road of independence, Military-First and socialism all their lives” and the performance was “pervaded with the ardent reverence for Kim Jong Un who is ushering in the era of great prosperity in which he is taking warm care of the people and enabling all of them to enjoy wealth and prosperity under socialism.”

Pyongyang citizens watch a fireworks displays over the skies of the DPRK capital on 1 January 2013. (KCNA)

 

A New Year’s Day fireworks display over the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium on 1 January 2013 (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

A fireworks display illuminates the Tower of the Chuch’e Idea and the skies over Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on 1 January 2013 (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)