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Minister of People’s Security Reclaims 4th Star

12 Jun

Gen. Choe Pu Il, Minister of the People's Security (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Gen. Choe Pu Il, Minister of the People’s Security (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported that Choe Pu Il, Minister of the People’s Security, was restored to his previous rank of four-star General (taejang) per an order of Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n).  Choe Pu Il was first promoted to General by late leader Kim Jong Il on 28 September 2010.  Choe’s name appeared on a promotions list which also elevated Kim Jong Un, Choe Ryong Hae (current Director of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Political Department; later elevated to Vice Marshal [ch'asu]) Kim Kyong Ok (Senior Deputy (vice) Director of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Organization Guidance Department), Hyon Yong Chol (then-commander of VIII Army Corps; served as Chief of the KPA General Staff from July 2012 to May 2013 and currently commander of V Army Corps) and Kim Kyong Hui (Kim Jong Un’s aunt and a core member of the DPRK leadership).  Choe was rumored to have been reduced rank to three-star Colonel-General (sangjang) in late 2011, although it is not clear what prompted his demotion.  From about 2012 until February 2013 Choe Pu Il served as the Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau.  In February he was appointed Minister of the People’s Security, where he replaced Gen. Ri Myong Su.  On 31 March 2013, Choe was elected an alternate (candidate) member of the KWP Political Bureau and at the 7th session (plenum) of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] on 1 April 2013 Choe was elected a member of the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC].

According to KCNA, the Ministry of the People’s Security [MPS] and the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces [KPISF] “together with the Korean People’s Army constitute armed groups which play the role of two mainstays of the Korean revolution” and in issuing the promotion order Kim Jong Un “expressed belief that all service persons of the people’s security organ and the KPISF would creditably perform their honorable mission and duty as the first-line soldiers protecting the socialist system, remaining loyal to the leadership of the party.” Rodong Sinmun reported that Choe Pu Il’s rank was restored because “The organ of people’s security and the people’s internal security forces are two leading armed groups that, together with the people’s army, form twin pillars of our revolution.  In the past period, members of the public security corps and the officers and men of the people’s internal security forces performed great feats that will forever shine in the history of the fatherland by highly demonstrating boundless devotion and sacrifice in the sacred struggle to defend the party, system, and the people both in the days of glory and days of ordeals while highly upholding the banner of death-defying defense of the leader” and that “the prevailing situation urgently demands the organ of the people’s security and the people’s internal security forces, which are the revolutionary armed forces of our party, to impregnably guard the gateway of the socialist system and to reliably guarantee, with gun barrels and law, the party’s line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed forces.”

Graphic of the key bureaus of the Ministry of the People's Security (Graphic by Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch).

Graphic of the key bureaus of the Ministry of the People’s Security (Graphic by Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch).

Ministry of People's Security headquarters (Photo: Google image)

Ministry of People’s Security headquarters (Photo: Google image)

Choe Pu Il’s February 2013 appointment as Minister created a superficial gap in the power balance among the DPRK’s internal security agencies.  His counterpart at the Ministry of State Security, Kim Won Hong, was a four-star general.  The formal military rankings of these agencies’ leading officials suggest that the one led by a full-general has a more superior position, and valued more by the leader, than an agency led by a three-star general.  Based on his observed and reported public activities, Kim Jong Un appeared to be favoring the Ministry of State Security over the Ministry of the People’s Security.  Both ministries erected statues of late leader Kim Jong Il on the campuses of their respective headquarters, however Kim Jong Un visited the Ministry of State Security after it unveiled its KJI statue, but not the MPS.  The MPS, however, demonstrated its political clout in 2012 when KPISF commander, Gen. Kim In Sik, was appointed Vice Premier of the DPRK Cabinet and later appointed Chairman of the Capital City (Pyongyang) Construction Commission.  Kim Jong Un visited People’s Security headquarters and inspected a KPISF unit on May Day (1 May; International Labor Day) 2013.

The Ministry of the People’s Security is a large security organization consisting of (ca.) 200,000 employees with diverse missions.  In DPRK vernacular, the MPS is “a dinosaur” indicating the immense size and resources of the organization.  The MPS is the DPRK’s major domestic law enforcement and public safety organization.  It enforces DPRK laws and statutes (i.e. misdemeanors and felonies), discharges a number of public safety functions (fire departments, traffic control, road and railway security), administers prisons and labor detention facilities and is responsible for various registration records (the census, birth and death certificates, marriage licenses).  MPS personnel provide security to DPRK Embassies and missions located abroad, to DPRK Cabinet members and other DPRK government officials and DPRK universities and research institutions.  They also support the missions of the Guard Command, which provides close protection for Kim Jong Un and others core DPRK elites.  The MPS and the KPISF also operate several engineering and construction brigades (which some sources claim construct the tunnels used in nuclear detonations) and own several farms and other production sites, including the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm and Factory and the 927 Chicken Farm.  The MPS and KPISF are subordinate to the National Defense Commission, but they report to Jang Song Taek in his capacity as NDC Vice Chairman and Director of the KWP Administration Department.

Ministers of the People's (Public) Security from 2000 through the present (Graphic by Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch).

Ministers of the People’s (Public) Security from 2000 through the present (Graphic by Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch).

Like some other recent personnel changes at the upper tier of the DPRK’s** national security community, Choe Pu Il’s replacement of Ri Myong Su did not involve an aggressive purge of the incumbent official in favor of a Kim Jong Un loyalist.  Despite being removed from office, Gen. Ri appears to remain a member of the central leadership, albeit operating in a diminished capacity.  Like his two immediate predecessors, Choe has spent part of his career in command positions in the KPA’s conventional forces.  Both Choe Pu Il and Ri Myong Su have held the position of Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau [GSOB].  Choe was head of the operations bureau from 2012 to 2013 and Ri headed the bureau from approximately 1996 to 2007.  Like the Minister of People’s Security, the Chief of the General Staff Operations Bureau leads a diverse security organization with hundred of thousands of personnel, has direct access to the supreme leader and an intimate knowledge of the country’s various power organizations and their activities.  While not a head of the GSOB, Ri Myong Su’s predecessor, Gen. Ju Sang Song, had served as an inspector-general of the Chief KPA General Staff and was the commander of the IV Army Corps.  Since the health-related retirement of Paek Hak Rim in 2003, the MPS had only once been led by a civilian, Choe Ryong Su, who served as Minister for about a year until he was removed from office.  Since Choe’s 2004 dismissal, the DPRK leadership has seemingly earmarked the Minister’s position for the KPA.

**Rumors of purged security officials are greatly exaggerated in the Pyongyang watching community.  Gen. U Tong Chuk stood aside as Minister of State Security in 2012 and vacated his political offices, but was never purged.  Readers can do the math on Gen. U’s status, factoring in that he spent much of his career as an overseas intelligence manager and officer.  VMar Kim Jong Gak was removed as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in November 2011, but has not lost his Vice Marshal’s rank and was assigned another position.  Hyon Yong Chol, who served as Chief of the KPA General Staff from July 2012 to May 2013, was reduced in rank and assigned command of V Army Corps.  And then there’s Kim Kyok Sik, removed from office as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in May 2013 after six months in officer.  Gen. Kim, identified as the target of the biggest purge this side of ’56, ended up appointed Chief of the General Staff.

***For fans of James Church’s Inspector O series, “the Minister” in The Corpse in the Koryo and Bamboo and Blood was Paek Hak Rim and “the Minister” in Hidden Moon was Choe Ryong Su***

Gen. Kim Kyok Sik Lands at KPA General Staff

23 May
Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (annotated in a yellow box) was part of a group that saw off VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) and a senior DPRK delegation on a trip to China at Pyongyang Airport on 22 May 2013.  Also seen in attendance is PRC Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai (2) (Photo: KCNA)

Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (annotated in a yellow box) was part of a group that saw off VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1) and a senior DPRK delegation on a trip to China at Pyongyang Airport on 22 May 2013. Also seen in attendance is PRC Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai (2) (Photo: KCNA)

Two weeks after being removed from office as the DPRK’s defense minister, Gen. Kim Kyok Sik has been appointed Chief of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Staff.  Gen. Kim had been appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, the country’s equivalent to defense minister, in November 2012 and held that position until early May 2013.  On 13 May, DPRK state media identified Gen. Jang Jong Nam  as Minister of the PAF.  Gen. Kim’s removal from office, after only seven months in the position, caused a feverish amount of speculation among Pyongyang watchers some of whom interpreted his removal from office as a “purge.”  Gen. Kim replaces Gen. Hyon Yong Chol, who was appointed Chief of the KPA General Staff in July 2013 after the removal of VMar Ri Yong Ho.  There is no word as to whether Gen. Hyon was dismissed with prejudice or if he had been assigned another position in the KPA.  One of Gen. Hyon’s last observed appearances was in late April 2013 when he attended Kim Jong Un’s (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) visit to the Haedanghwa Health Complex in Pyongyang.

Gen. Kim Kyok Sik was identified as the new head of the KPA General Staff in a Korean Central Television report about VMar Choe Ryong Hae’s 22 May (Wednesday) departure from Pyongyang Airport to visit China as the “special envoy of Kim Jong Un.”  Gen. Kim previous served as Chief of the KPA General Staff from 2007 to 2009.  He is the second DPRK elite to be appointed to a senior position that he previously held; the other member of the central leadership to be reappointed to his old job was Pak Pong Ju, who was appointed DPRK Cabinet Premier on 1 April 2013, having served as DPRK Premier from 2003-2007.  2007 was the same year that Kim Jong Un became a viable candidate as the late leader Kim Jong Il’s hereditary successor.

Kim Kyok Sik’s replacing Hyon Yong Chol marks the third senior KPA personnel turnover in two weeks (with Jang Jong Nam replacing Kim at MPAF, and Col. Gen. Jon Chang Bok replacing VMar Hyon Chol Hae as 1st Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces), and the eighth observed personnel change to the KPA’s high command since Kim Jong Un formally assumed the supreme leadership in January 2012.  Pyongyang watchers might be forgiven if they find themselves reaching for the Dramamine with the latest change at the top of the KPA.  Finding an easy rationale behind these personnel changes would be, to paraphrase one of our most astute Kumsusanologists, “shallow and misleading.”

Graphic illustrating personnel changes in the senior command of the Korean People's Army [KPA] from 2007 to 2013 (Photo: M. Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

Graphic illustrating personnel changes in the senior command of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] from 2007 to 2013 (Photo: M. Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

CMC Meetings Shown in DPRK Documentary on Kim Jong Un’s Military Activities

18 Mar

On 5 March DPRK state media released a documentary film which compiled film footage of Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) inspecting Korean People’s Army [KPA] units, observing training exercises and visiting construction projects utilizing KPA personnel from his accession in January 2012 to live fire exercises in 2013.  Loosely translated as Unleashing a New Heyday of the Formidable Forces of Mt. Paektu, the 80 minute film consists mainly of footage that has previously appeared in short documentaries about KJU’s activities.  Aside from a few new, brief scenes of KJU talking with note taking senior officials, the films includes footage of the expanded meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission [CMC] meeting held late in the afternoon on 3 February 2013.  The meeting was a key event preceding the DPRK’s third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.  The CMC meeting ended with Kim Jong Un, assisted by Chief of the KPA General Staff Hyon Yong Chol, giving meeting participants handguns in presentation boxes.  

External establishing shot showing the KWP flag over the KWP #1 Office Building in Pyongyang (L);  The 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (C); Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

External establishing shot showing the KWP flag over the KWP #1 Office Building in Pyongyang (L); The 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (C); Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un chairing the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (top) and 3rd generation KPA commanders and officials (middle and bottom) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un chairing the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (top) and 3rd generation KPA commanders and officials (middle and bottom) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members attended the 3 February 2013 meeting (L-R) Jang Song Taek; Pak To Chun; VMar Kim Yong Chun; Gen. Kim Won Hong; and Gen. Ri Myong Su (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members attended the 3 February 2013 meeting (L-R) Jang Song Taek; Pak To Chun; VMar Kim Yong Chun; Gen. Kim Won Hong; and Gen. Ri Myong Su (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members and senior officials attending the 3 February 2013 meeting.  In this image are VMar Kim Jong Gak (front row, R), Ju Kyu Chang (front row, 2nd R), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (front row, 3rd R) and Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (2nd row, R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members and senior officials attending the 3 February 2013 meeting. In this image are VMar Kim Jong Gak (front row, R), Ju Kyu Chang (front row, 2nd R), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (front row, 3rd R) and Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (2nd row, R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members applaud during the meeting.  Among those in the front row in this image are Jang Song Taek (L), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (2nd L), Pak To Chun (3rd L) and VMar Kim Yong Chun (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members applaud during the meeting. Among those in the front row in this image are Jang Song Taek (L), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (2nd L), Pak To Chun (3rd L) and VMar Kim Yong Chun (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation boxes (L) containing an autographed message from Kim Jong Un (C) of handguns (R) presented to meeting participants (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation boxes (L) containing an autographed message from Kim Jong Un (C) of handguns (R) presented to meeting participants (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meetings.  Among those presented with these guns were: VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (3.), Pak To Chun (4.), VMar Kim Yong Chun (5.), VMar Hyon Chol Hae (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Kim Yong Chol (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meetings. Among those presented with these guns were: VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (3.), Pak To Chun (4.), VMar Kim Yong Chun (5.), VMar Hyon Chol Hae (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Kim Yong Chol (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Over view of presentation ceremony at the end of the expanded CMC meeting (L) Gen. Hyon Yong Chol handing a presentation box to Kim Jong Un (C) and meeting participants applauding at the conclusion of the meeting (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Over view of presentation ceremony at the end of the expanded CMC meeting (L) Gen. Hyon Yong Chol handing a presentation box to Kim Jong Un (C) and meeting participants applauding at the conclusion of the meeting (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

The film also included footage of another expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission, held between February and March 2012.  This would have been a key event preceding the 13 April 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, which crashed shortly after it was launched.  Unlike the February 2013 CMC meeting, KWP civilian officials are attired in KPA dress uniforms.  Based on the protocol from the February ’13 meeting, it is likely then-Chief of the KPA General Staff, VMar Ri Yong Ho, participated in the handgun presentation ceremony at the meeting’s conclusion, however VMar Ri is not shown in this film.

Overview of expanded CMC meeting held in February or March 2012 (L), Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (C) and a view of CMC members and meeting participants (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of expanded CMC meeting held in February or March 2012 (L), Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (C) and a view of CMC members and meeting participants (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members attending the 2012 meeting.  In the front row are Ju Kyu Chang (L), Choe Ryong Hae (2nd L) Pak To Chun (3rd L) and Kim Jong Gak (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members attending the 2012 meeting. In the front row are Ju Kyu Chang (L), Choe Ryong Hae (2nd L) Pak To Chun (3rd L) and Kim Jong Gak (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members standing at the 2012 meeting: Choe Ryong Hae (L), Pak To Chun (C) and Kim Jong Gak (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members standing at the 2012 meeting: Choe Ryong Hae (L), Pak To Chun (C) and Kim Jong Gak (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the meeting in 2012.  In the front row are: Gen. Kim Kyong Ok (L), Gen. Kim Won Hong (2nd L), Gen. Jong Myong Do (3rd L) and Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the meeting in 2012. In the front row are: Gen. Kim Kyong Ok (L), Gen. Kim Won Hong (2nd L), Gen. Jong Myong Do (3rd L) and Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the 2012 meeting.  In the front row in this image are VMar Kim Yong Chun (R), Jang Song Taek (2nd R), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3rd R), Pak To Chun (4th R), Choe Ryong Hae (5th R) and Ju Kyu Chang (6th R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the 2012 meeting. In the front row in this image are VMar Kim Yong Chun (R), Jang Song Taek (2nd R), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3rd R), Pak To Chun (4th R), Choe Ryong Hae (5th R) and Ju Kyu Chang (6th R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members and senior security officials stand during the 2012 meeting.  In this image in the front row are: Gen. Ri Myong Su (L) Hyon Chol Hae (2nd L),  Choe Kyong Song (3rd L), and Gen. Yun Jong Rin (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members and senior security officials stand during the 2012 meeting. In this image in the front row are: Gen. Ri Myong Su (L) Hyon Chol Hae (2nd L), Choe Kyong Song (3rd L), and Gen. Yun Jong Rin (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of an expanded Party Central Military Commission meeting held in February or March 2012 with images of Kim Jong Un speaking, and 3rd generation KPA commanders and security officials (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of an expanded Party Central Military Commission meeting held in February or March 2012 with images of Kim Jong Un speaking, and 3rd generation KPA commanders and security officials (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation box of a handgun (L) presented to participants at the 2012 CMC meeting.  The grip contains KJU's autograph (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation box of a handgun (L) presented to participants at the 2012 CMC meeting. The grip contains KJU’s autograph (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of an expanded CMC meeting held in early 2012.  Among those presented with handguns are: VMar Kim Yong Chun (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3.), Choe Ryong Hae (4.), Ju Kyu Chang (5.), Kim Kyong Ok (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Jong Myong Do (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of an expanded CMC meeting held in early 2012. Among those presented with handguns are: VMar Kim Yong Chun (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3.), Choe Ryong Hae (4.), Ju Kyu Chang (5.), Kim Kyong Ok (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Jong Myong Do (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presented with handguns at the conclusion of the expanded CMC meeting in early 2012 were: Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (1.), Gen. Choe Pu Il (2.), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (3.), Gen. Ri Myong Su (4.), Col. Gen. Jo Kyong Chol (5.), Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (6.), Lt. Gen. Pak Jong Chon (7.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presented with handguns at the conclusion of the expanded CMC meeting in early 2012 were: Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (1.), Gen. Choe Pu Il (2.), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (3.), Gen. Ri Myong Su (4.), Col. Gen. Jo Kyong Chol (5.), Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (6.), Lt. Gen. Pak Jong Chon (7.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un (L) concludes an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (R) held in early 2012 (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un (L) concludes an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (R) held in early 2012 (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Rumors of Dismissed People’s Security Minister Floated in ROK Media

28 Feb
Gen. Ri Myong Su (L), last known Minister of People's Security and Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il (R) whom South Korean sources claim  replaced Ri as head of People's Security (Photos: Xinhua file photo and KCTV screengrab)

Gen. Ri Myong Su (L), last known Minister of People’s Security and Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il (R) whom South Korean sources claim replaced Ri as head of People’s Security (Photos: Xinhua file photo and KCTV screengrab)

South Korean [ROK] media, citing an interview with an unnamed ROK government official, are circulating rumors that DPRK Minister of People’s Security, Gen. Ri Myong Su (Ri Myo’ng-su) has been removed from office and replaced by Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il, currently serving as Vice Chief of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Staff.  Gen. Ri was appointed Minister in April 2011 and has held the office for nearly two years. In a 26 February report  Yonhap News Agency quoted the unnamed official who said, “To my knowledge, North Korea recently appointed Choi Bu-il, deputy chief of staff at the North’s military, to the minister of people’s security” and also reported that “the source declined to give further details, including exactly when Cho was named, but the apparent replacement is believed to be linked to a ‘part of loyalty test by Kim Jong-un.’”

JoongAng Ilbo published a similar story on 27 February and reported that “Choe Pu-il, former vice chief of the general staff of the North Korean army, has been appointed to the minister of people’s security, a position similar to a national police commissioner in the South, a high-ranking South Korean official told reporters yesterday at a private meeting.” JoongAng Ilbo also reports that Gen. Ri Myong Su “hasn’t appeared in public since September 2012.”  Yonhap also reported that Gen. Ri “”has not been seen in public for months, raising speculation that he might have been purged.”

Either ROK media or their mystery man in the ROK government, are simply wrong about Gen. Ri’s public appearances.  Ri Myong Su’s last reported public appearance was on 4 January 2013 when he attended a meeting of People’s Security and Korean People’s Internal Security Forces [KPISF] personnel “to carry out the important tasks” itemized in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day Address.  Prior to that Gen. Ri visited Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun with KJU on New Year’s Day, attended a banquet given for personnel involved in the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, visited Ku’msusan on 24 December 2012, attended an unveiling ceremony of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il statues in Hamhu’ng on 20 December 2012 , attended the first central party banquet for the U’nha-3 launch personnel on 21 December 2012 and attended a national memorial service commemorating one year since Kim Jong Il’s demise.  Gen. Ri also attended a national meeting of people’s security officers and a KJU commemorative photo session in late November 2012 and attended Forestry Workers’ national meeting on or around 7 November 2012.  Gen. Ri’s public appearances have been relatively spotty, as Luke Herman wrote in NK News about in October 2012, but he has “appeared in public” well after September 2012 despite current media reporting.

Gen Ri Myong Su (2nd R) attend a forestry workers' meeting on 7 November 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

Gen Ri Myong Su (2nd R) attend a forestry workers’ meeting on 7 November 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

This does not mean Ri Myong Su’s position could not be in jeopardy.  There have been the aforementioned gaps between his public appearances, which could be ascribed either to his political standing or to the Minister having to directly supervise People’s Security’s various missions directly from headquarters.  A lot of the ceremonial aspects of the Minister’s position have been undertaken by the head of the People’s Security/KPSIF Political Bureau, Col. Gen. Ri Pyong Sam, who presided over a ceremony at which the MPS University was renamed after KJI and two awards ceremonies for KPISF personnel killed on duty.  There have also been rumors in Pyongyang implicating members of Ri Myong Su’s family in malfeasance in their foreign trading corporations.  If Ri was removed from office, it would indicate that Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power by making his own personnel appointments, in lieu of keeping Kim Jong Il’s old retainers.  It should also be noted hat Gen. Ri has also held senior positions during the DPRK’s three nuclear test.  In 2006 Ri was serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau.  In 2009, Ri was director of the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] Administration Department.  In 2012, Ri was Minister of People’s Security, which, according to some researchers. controls some of the units responsible for major construction and engineering projects at the P’unggye-ri Nuclear Test Site.

South Korean official and media sources have also previously provided conflicting information about Ri’s alleged replacement, Choe Pu Il.  Choe has served as Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff since 2009.  However some ROK sources have identified Choe also concurrently serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operation Bureau, and other ROK sources have claimed that Choe commanding the IX Army Corps or serving as regional commander of KPA forces in what be termed it Northeast Military District.  This does not preclude Choe from being appointed to People’s Security, and his career history reveals ample criteria for his potential appointment.  And yet, previous information from ROK sources about Choe’s position within the DPRK ‘s national security community has been inconsistent and highly speculative.

Pyongyang watchers also may recall that back in November 2012, VMar Kim Jong Gak was quietly removed from serving as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and replaced by Gen. Kim Kyok Sik.  This led country watchers to speculate as to whether VMar Kim was part of an ongoing purge, or if he was dismissed because of allegations that one of his sons had attempted to defect via China.  Although Gen. Kim Kyok Sik’s appointment as the country’s defense minister was later publicized, it hardly affected Kim Jong Gak’s political standing and he has made a number of public appearances, including at so-called #1 Events with Kim Jong Un.

Previous Ministers of People's Security Paek Hak Rim (L) and Ju Sang Song (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrab and KCNA)

Previous Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim (L) and Ju Sang Son (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrab and KCNA)

There have been numerous occasions in the past in which a senior official is seen at an event close to The Center, or continues to make public appearances, even though they’ve already been marked for dismissal.  Often these have involved the more opaque maneuverings within the Party Central Committee and DPRK Government.  However the Ministry of People’s Security, and particularly the individual serving as Minister, operates (in very relative terms) transparently.  Gen. Ri Myong Su’s three predecessors as Minister were all publicly removed from office and their replacement publicly announced.  In July 2003 the Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim was removed (due both to political reasons and old age) from office by an order of the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium.**  His replacement, Choe Ryong Su, was immediately announced.  Choe Ryong Su’s tenure was short-lived.  Barely a year after his appointment Choe was replaced by Gen. Ju Sang Song, then-commander of the IV Army Corps.  Gen. Ju had a lengthy tenure, serving as Minister for nearly seven years.  In March 2011 Gen. Ju was publicly removed from office by an order of the NDC “due to his illness.”  On 7 April 2011, Ju was replaced by Gen. Ri Myong Su through an order of the NDC (to which People’s Security is subordinate) and ratified by the 4th session of the 12th SPA held the same day.

**Until 2009 the Ministry of People’s Security was part of the DPRK Cabinet, and the Minister appointed by the SPA.  After 2009, the MPS was directly subordinate to the National Defense Commission.  Thus, Paek Hak Rim and Choe Ryong Su were removed from office by the SPA Presidium (standing committee).  In 2011 Gen. Ju Sang Song was removed as Minister by the National Defense Commission, and Gen. Ri Myong Su appointed to replace him, however the dismissal and appointment were ratified at the 4th session of the 12th SPA.

DPRK Conducts Third Nuclear Test

12 Feb
A United States Geological Survey poster showing the 12 February 2013 seismic event near the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility in North Hamgyo'ng Province (Photo: USGS)

A United States Geological Survey poster showing the 12 February 2013 seismic event near the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility in North Hamgyo’ng Province (Photo: USGS)

The DPRK conducted its third nuclear test in the late morning of 12 February (Tuesday).  The first indication of the third experimental detonation was a seismic event  with its epicenter on the premises of the DPRK’s nuclear test facility near P’unggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province.  The seismic event was later identified in South Korea media reporting as a “man-made earthquake” and had an estimate magnitude between 4.7 and. 5.2.  According to a preliminary analysis by the South Korean [ROK] government the nuclear test of between six (6) and seven (7) kilotons.  According to a public health official in Primorsky Krai, the Russian administrative district that borders the DPRK, there were no increased raditation levels and “everything is normal and (the levels) correspond to the natural background.”  It remains to be seen whether the DPRK tested a plutonium or uranium device.

Hours after media reports on the seismic event in North Hamgyo’ng Province, DPRK state media released a report in which it said “the scientific field for national defense of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.”  According to KCNA’s report on the nuclear test:

The scientific field for national defence of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday.

The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK’s legitimate right to launch satellite for peaceful purposes.

The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power. It was confirmed that the test did not give any adverse effect to the surrounding ecological environment.

The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.

The nuclear test will greatly encourage the army and people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation with the same spirit and mettle as displayed in conquering space, and offer an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region.

DPRK state media also released a statement from the country’s Foreign Ministry which described the test as “a resolute step for self-defense taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it” and said that the “main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last”:

The DPRK’s third nuclear test is a resolute step for self-defence taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it.

Its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year was a peaceful one from A to Z which was conducted according to its plan for scientific and technological development for economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living.

The world including hostile countries recognized its application satellite’s entry into orbit and greatly admired its development of space technology.

The U.S., however, again prodded the UN Security Council into cooking up a new “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK, terming its satellite launch a violation of the UNSC’s “resolution”.

Encroaching upon the right to satellite launch is an unpardonable grave hostile act as it is an infringement on the DPRK’s sovereignty.

By origin, the DPRK had neither need nor plan to conduct a nuclear test.

The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has already acquired the trustworthy capability strong enough to make a precision strike at bases for aggression and blow them up at a single blow no matter where they are on the earth.

It was the DPRK’s goal to focus efforts on economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living by dint of nuclear deterrence for self-defence provided by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il all their lives.

The DPRK exercised its maximum self-restraint when the U.S. fabricated the “presidential statement” over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes by abusing the UNSC in April last year.

But the DPRK’s patience reached its limit as the U.S. intensified such hostile act as implementing before anyone else the UNSC’s “resolution on sanctions”, far from apologizing for its renewed wanton violation of the DPRK’s right to satellite launch.

The main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last.

The DPRK’s nuclear test is a just step for self-defence not contradictory to any international law.

The U.S. has long put the DPRK on the list of preemptive nuclear strike.

It is quite natural just measure for self-defence to react to the U.S. ever-increasing nuclear threat with nuclear deterrence.

The DPRK withdrew from the NPT after going through legitimate procedures and chose the way of having access to nuclear deterrence for self-defence to protect the supreme interests of the country.

There have been on the earth more than 2 000 nuclear tests and at least 9 000 satellite launches in the UN history spanning over 60 years but there has never been a UNSC resolution on banning any nuclear test or satellite launch.

It is the U.S. that has conducted more nuclear tests and launched more satellites than any others. It, however, cooked up the UNSC’s “resolution” banning only the DPRK’s nuclear test and satellite launch. This is the breach of international law and the height of double standards.

Had the UNSC been impartial even a bit, it would not have taken issue with a sovereign state’s exercise of the right to self-defence and its scientific and technological activities for peaceful purposes but with the U.S. policy for preemptive nuclear strike, a threat to global peace and security, to begin with.

The current nuclear test is the primary countermeasure taken by the DPRK in which it exercised its maximum self-restraint.

If the U.S. takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession.

The inspection of ships and maritime blockade touted by the hostile forces will be regarded as war actions and will invite the DPRK’s merciless retaliatory strikes at their strongholds.

The U.S., though belatedly, should choose between the two options: To respect the DPRK’s right to satellite launch and open a phase of detente and stability or to keep to its wrong road leading to the explosive situation by persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK.

In case the U.S. chooses the road of conflict finally, the world will clearly see the army and people of the DPRK defend its dignity and sovereignty to the end through a do-or-die battle between justice and injustice, greet a great revolutionary event for national reunification and win a final victory.

The KCNA report and DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement were echoed in remarks made by the 1st Secretary of the DPRK Mission to the UN Geneva, Jon Yong Ryong said “The US and their followers are sadly mistaken if they miscalculate the DPRK (North Korea) would accept the entirely unreasonable resolutions against it.  The DPRK will never be bound to any resolutions.  Jon also said the nuclear test will “greatly encourage the army and the people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation… and offers an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region.”  Jon also said “”the prospect for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula has become gloomier due to the US hostile policies to the DPRK that have become ever more pronounced” and that if the “EU truly wants peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, it should urge the US first to terminate its hostile policy towards the DPRK on an impartial basis.”

In Beijing the PRC Foreign Ministry released a statement which said the Chinese government was ”strongly dissatisfied with” and “firmly opposed to” the DPRK’s third nuclear test.  The statement also urged “the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization and refrain from any move that may further worsen the situation. To safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves the common interests of all parties.”  The PRC Foreign Ministry also announced that it summoned DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong to “lodge a solemn representation.”

The Japanese Government convened an emergency meeting and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the test “is a grave threat to our nation’s safety and cannot be tolerated as it will significantly damage international society’s peace and safety.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which “we insist that North Korea should stop illegal actions, strictly fulfil all requirements of the UN Security Council, fully abandon missile and nuclear programs, return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA comprehensive guarantees” and “calls on all interested parties to show restraint and plans together with other six-party negotiators not to ease up in efforts towards normalization of the situation on the peninsula through political and diplomatic means.”  The statement also said, “Only so and no other way North Korea will be able to pull out from effective international isolation, which will open the door to international cooperation in different directions without exclusion of peaceful atom and space.  We are confident that this path meets interests, first of all, of North Korea itself.”

On 6 February Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexandr Timonin told Interfax, “As before, our country advocates the continuation of the search for political and diplomatic ways to stabilize the situation in the Northeast Asia and will do its best to facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for resuming the six-party talks on the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula.  In this respect, it is extremely important that all interested parties do not commit actions capable to aggravate the situation in the Korean peninsula and lead to a new arms race.”

The United Nations Security Council [UNSC], of which South Korea holds the monthly rotating presidency, held an emergency meeting on 12 February which “strongly condemned” the third test.  According to the UNSC’s statement:

The members of the Security Council held urgent consultations to address the serious situation arising from the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The members of the Security Council strongly condemned this test, which is a grave violation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and therefore there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security.

The members of the Security Council recalled that in January, they unanimously adopted resolution 2087 (2013), which expressed the Council’s determination to take “significant action” in the event of a further Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear test.

In line with this commitment and the gravity of this violation, the members of the Security Council will begin work immediately on appropriate measures in a Security Council resolution.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon “strongly” condemned the 12 February nuclear test and described it as “ clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions” and  said that Ban is “gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation”:

The Secretary-General condemns the underground nuclear weapon test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) today. It is a clear and grave violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It is deplorable that Pyongyang defied the strong and unequivocal call from the international community to refrain from any further provocative measures. The Secretary-General had repeatedly called on the new leadership in Pyongyang to address international concerns and start building confidence with neighbouring countries and the international community.

The Secretary-General is gravely concerned about the negative impact of this deeply destabilizing act on regional stability as well as the global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. He once again urges the DPRK to reverse course and work towards de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The Secretary-General is confident that the Security Council will remain united and take appropriate action. In the meantime, the Secretary-General remains in close contact with all concerned parties and stands ready to assist their efforts.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, “expressed deep regret” about the nuclear test and “strongly urged the DPRK to fully implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and all relevant IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.”   According to a brief statement Amano said, “I understand that the DPRK announced it had carried out a third test of a nuclear weapon, despite calls from the international community not to do so. This is deeply regrettable and is in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions.  The IAEA remains ready to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue by resuming its nuclear verification activities in the country as soon as the political agreement is reached among countries concerned.”

Institutions and power organizations involved in the 12 February 2013 (abridged edition)

The 12 February 2013 nuclear test was the culmination of activity within departments, offices, sections and units of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP], the DPRK Government and the Korean People’s Army [KPA].  The third nuclear test was authorized through government channels by the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] and through party channels during an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission [CMC] on 3 February 2013.  Kim Jong Un’s last reported public appearance was at the expanded CMC meeting.  Like the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, the experimental detonation was a combined effort of scientists and technicians (who typically work for party and government agencies) and elements of the KPA.  Personnel involved in each phase of the nuclear test would interface with Kim Jong Un and other core leadership through the KWP Machine Building Industry Department’s deputy (vice) director Hong Sung Mu and the KWP Organization Guidance Department [OGD].  When Kim Jong Il was alive, the nuclear weapons program was commanded directly by KJI through a former Kim Il Sung University professor So Sang Kuk, who held the position of OGD deputy (vice) director and worked in KJI’s office.

Information about the DPRK’s strategic weapons program in general, and its testing of nuclear weapons in particular, is speculative and contradictory.  However, there are some key organizations that would have been involved in the actual nuclear test.  The nuclear test was conducted by elements of the KPA General Staff’s Nuclear-Chemical, Ordnance and Communications Bureaus working in cooperation with personnel from the 5th Bureau of the Second Economy Commission [SEC], the 2nd National Academy of Sciences [SANS] and the Nuclear Bureau.  According to some researchers, the Nuclear Bureau is part of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department (formerly known as the KWP Munitions Industry Department), however other sources says that the Nuclear Bureau was subordinated directly to the NDC, after it was bureaucratically migrated from the KWP along with SANS.  SANS personnel would have been involved in the nuclear physics, engineering and other technical aspects of the test, while the 5th Bureau of the SEC would have been involved in production of the nuclear device (as well as preliminary high explosive testing).  The construction of the detonation area and tunnels may have been conducted by a Ministry of People’s Security [MPS] engineering unit or a specialized construction unit of the KPA.  Support roles would have been played by the KPA General Logistics Department (subordinate to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces [MPAF]) and for mission security by elements of the Military Security Command [MSC] and the Ministry of State Security’s Defense Industry Security Bureau, possibly augmented by personnel of the Guard Command.

Leadership Activities Prior to 12 February 2013 nuclear test

On 12 February, DPRK state media reported that a meeting of the KWP Political Bureau convened on 11 February (Monday).  Kim Jong Un was not reported to have attended.  The Political Bureau meeting passed a lengthy decision to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of active hostilities of the Fatherland Liberation (Korean) War and the 65th anniversary of the DPRK’s foundation.  However, the Political Bureau meeting was most likely the forum at which the central leadership was formally notified of an impending third nuclear test.

Kim Jong Un’s last public appearance was reported on 3 February 2012 and was his chairing and attending the expanded CMC meeting.  Prior to the CMC meeting, KJU attended a commemorative photo-op with participants of the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries.  Notable members of his entourage at the photo-op were VMar Kim Yong Chun and Gen. O Kuk Ryol, two of the KPA’s key senior officials tied to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.  Interestingly, VMar Kim and Gen. O were part of a personnel shake-up of the KPA’s high command in February 2009, three months prior to the May 2009 nuclear test.  At that time, Gen. O was appointed Vice Chairman of the NDC and VMar Kim was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces.  VMar Kim was later replaced as minister and appointed director of the KWP Civil Defense Department, which has a major public safety function during a nuclear test.  Also in February 2009, Kim Kyok Sik was replaced as Chief of the KPA General Staff by Ri Yong Ho.  Ri was later famously dismissed in July 2012, but Kim Kyok Sik resurfaced in a senior position when he was appointed Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in November 2012, approximately three months ahead of the 12 February 2013 nuclear test.

Late DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il tours revolutionary historical sites in Yo'nsa County, North Hamgyo'ng Province in his last reported public appearance before the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test on 25 May 2009.

Late DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il tours revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province in his last reported public appearance before the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test on 25 May 2009. Yo’nsa County is only 65 km (40 miles) from the Punggye-ri nuclear testing area (Photos: KCNA)

KJU’s lack of public activity contrasts with Kim Jong Il’s (his father) public appearances prior to the second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.  On 23 May 2009, DPRK state media reported that the late KJI inspected revolutionary historical sites in Yo’nsa County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, located 65 km  (40 miles) from the P’unggye-ri test site.  On the day of the test, KJI was reported to have attended a concert given by the Persimmon Tree (kamnamu) Company of the KPA.  State media did not disclose where the concert took place, making it likely that KJI watched the concert in Pyongyang or at the Persimmon Tree Company’s headquarters in Kangwo’n Province.

Political Bureau Meeting

12 Feb
The KWP CC Political Bureau, as of January 2013 (Photo: NK Leadership Watch graphic)

The KWP CC Political Bureau, as of January 2013 (Photo: NK Leadership Watch graphic)

DPRK state media reported on 12 February (Tuesday) that the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Political Bureau met on 11 February (Monday).  The meeting, attended by “members of the Presidium, members and alternate members,” adopted the decision ”On marking the 65th anniversary of the DPRK and the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War as grand festivals of victors.”  The Political Bureau’s position “stressed the need to continue launching satellites of Kwangmyo’ngso’ng series and powerful long-range rockets.”  According to KCNA the Political Bureau’s decision was:

The decision emphasized the need to further deepen and accomplish the sacred cause of holding in high esteem the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il as eternal leaders of the WPK and the revolution.

The decision called for splendidly and significantly organizing political events marking the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War and the 65th anniversary of the DPRK.

According to it, various political events will be held with splendor to mark the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. They will include a parade of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), mass demonstration of Pyongyang citizens, grand mass gymnastic and artistic performance “Arirang” and army-people joint meeting with war veterans.

The decision stressed the need to successfully rebuild the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum and spruce up the revolutionary battle sites, revolutionary sites and revolutionary museums including the revolutionary museum at Kim Il Sung University, the Museum of the Fatherland Liberation War and the Jonsung Revolutionary Museum.

It called for newly building a martyrs cemetery of the KPA in Pyongyang and sprucing up KPA martyrs cemeteries and monuments to the fallen fighters of the KPA in various parts of the country.

It underlined the need to resolutely foil all the hostile forces’ moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK by achieving proud victory in building an economic power and improving the people’s living standard.

It also underscored the need for all fields and units to do a lot of good works for the prosperity of the country and its people’s happiness on the occasion of the 65th birthday of the Republic.

It called for staging an all-out action of high intensity for reliably protecting the security and sovereignty of the country in view of the prevailing grave situation and marking the 65th anniversary of the DPRK and the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War with fresh achievements in bolstering up capability for self-defence.

It stressed the need to continue launching satellites of Kwangmyongsong series and powerful long-range rockets.

It called on the KPA to keep itself fully ready for combat and put maximum spurs to rounding off its combat preparedness in order to bolster up one-beats-a hundred combat capability. It stressed that once an order is issued, the KPA should blow up the stronghold of aggression at a strike and wipe out the brigandish U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet army to the last man and thus accomplish the historic cause of national reunification.

The decision called for sincerely helping the army and significantly conducting the work for putting forward and preferentially treating the war veterans and wartime merited persons as a social movement on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the war victory.

It underscored the need to give further spurs to building a highly civilized socialist nation.

It referred to the tasks for completing the preparations for the universal 12-year compulsory education within this year, establishing a medical information service network and telemedicine system, building a children’s hospital, a dental hospital and a recovery center and winding up the first phase project for updating the Hungnam Pharmaceutical Factory.

It also underscored the need to build a modern combined center for sports trainings and different kinds of mass sporting facilities and raise hot wind of sports throughout the country.

It called for face-lifting the central part of Pyongyang and building more modern cultural facilities including pleasure grounds and Munsu Wading Pool.

The decision stressed the need to arouse all compatriots to the struggle for resolutely foiling the anti-DPRK moves and “sanctions” racket of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors and thoroughly implementing the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration so as to open up a new phase for national reunification.

It called for conducting external activities to grandly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War as a common event for the anti-imperialist independent forces and the world progressive people.

The Political Bureau along with other organizations of the KWP Central Committee (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watcher (NKLW))

The Political Bureau along with other organizations of the
KWP Central Committee (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watcher (NKLW))

Kim Jong Un Chairs Meeting of Party Central Military Commission and KPA Senior Command

3 Feb
Kim Jong Un delivers a speech during an enlarged meeting of the Party Central Military Commission which provided "as guidelines for further strengthening the KPA into a matchless revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and defending the security and sovereignty of the country as required by the WPK and the developing revolution." (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Kim Jong Un delivers a speech during an enlarged meeting of the Party Central Military Commission which provided “as guidelines for further strengthening the KPA into a matchless revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and defending the security and sovereignty of the country as required by the WPK and the developing revolution.” (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

The Party Central Military Commission, as of August 2012.  There may have been personnel changes reflecting Gen. Kim Kyok Sik's appointment as Minister of the People's Armed Forces in November 2012 and Gen. Jong Myong Do's removal fro office as KPA Navy Commander in  April 2012 but DPRK state media has not publicized those changes (Photo: Graphic by Michael Madden/NKLW)

The Party Central Military Commission, as of August 2012. There may have been personnel changes reflecting Gen. Kim Kyok Sik’s appointment as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces in November 2012 and Gen. Jong Myong Do’s removal from office as KPA Navy Commander in April 2012 but DPRK state media has not publicized those changes (Photo: Graphic by Michael Madden/NKLW)

DPRK state media reported on 3 February (Sunday) that Kim Jong Un chaired a meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission [CMC], staff of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Supreme Command, commanding officers of KPA large combined units (taeyonhap pudae), senior commanders of the KPA Navy, KPA Air and Anti-Air Forces and the KPA Strategic Rocket Force Command [SRFC].  KJU’s last reported public appearance was at a photo-op with participants of the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries.  DPRK state media described it as an enlarged meeting of the CMC which “discussed the issue of bringing about a great turn in bolstering up the military capability, true to the Military-First (So’ngun) revolutionary leadership of the WPK, and an organizational issue.”  According to KCNA the meeting was “held at an important time when a turning phase is being opened in building a thriving socialist nation and achieving the cause of national reunification will mark an important occasion in powerfully encouraging the army and people of the DPRK all out in the general advance of the new year full of conviction of certain victory and optimism and bolstering up the defence capability of the country in every way.”

Kim Jong Un (L) delivers a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (Photos: KCNA)

Kim Jong Un (L) delivers a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (Photos: KCNA)

Overview of enlarged Party Central Military Commission meeting (Photos: Rodong Sinmun)

Overview of enlarged Party Central Military Commission meeting (Photos: Rodong Sinmun)

At the meeting Kim Jong Un delivered a speech “which serves as guidelines for further strengthening the KPA into a matchless revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and defending the security and sovereignty of the country as required by the WPK and the developing revolution.”  After KJU’s speech, “the participants in the meeting extended highest glory and deepest thanks to Kim Jong Un, who is ushering in the greatest heyday of increasing the military capability with his extraordinary wisdom and stratagem, matchless grit and pluck and noble virtues and evinced their firm determination to unconditionally and thoroughly implement the militant tasks set forth by him in his speech.”

Unlike previous statements issued by the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC], DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and editorials and essays that appeared in state media outlets KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, or Minju Choson, this particular news item on the CMC meeting contained no overt references to “upcoming all-out action” or possible nuclear test activities.  The report on the CMC meeting did note “an organizational issue” which may indicate personnel changes in the KPA high command or within the CMC itself.  It should be noted that the CMC is one body (the NDC being in the other in joint coordination) which authorizes and has oversight over military industry production, research and development.  If an experimental nuclear detonation is imminent at the test site at Punggye-ri in Kilchu County, North Hamgy’ong Province, this enlarged CMC meeting may represent formal authorization (“bolstering up the military capability” and  ”increasing the military capability”)  for the test to proceed.

The Party Central Military Commission along with other organizations of the KWP Central Committee (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watcher (NKLW))

The Party Central Military Commission along with other organizations of the
KWP Central Committee (Graphic: Michael Madden/NK Leadership Watch (NKLW))

4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries Closes

31 Jan
Kim Jong Un spekas during the last day of the 4th Meeting Party Cell Secretaries on 29 January 2013 in Pyongyang (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

Kim Jong Un spekas during the last day of the 4th Meeting Party Cell Secretaries on 29 January 2013 in Pyongyang (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported on 29 January (Tuesday) that the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries closed.  Kim Jong Un and other members of the central leadership attended.  KJU’s last reported public appearance was at the opening day of the party cell secretaries meeting.  KCNA reported that speakers on the second day of the meeting “were unanimous in praising the leadership feats of the peerlessly great persons of Mt. Paektu associated with their fields and units, and analyzed and reviewed achievements, experience and defects in their party work in the past” and “made pledges to glorify generation after generation the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s idea on party-building and their feats, bring about an epochal turn in the party work under the leadership of the dear respected Kim Jong Un and thus contribute to turning the party into an unbreakable integral whole with firm center of leadership and unity, a genuine mother party that is linked with the people through one blood vessel and a guiding force that leads the building of a thriving nation.”

During their visit to Pyongyang, according to KCNA, party cell secretaries visited the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, celebrated their birthdays with a banquet and performance and visited textile mills.

Speakers on the second day of the conference included:

  • Jo Jong Suk, secretary of the party cell of the Management Station of Revolutionary Battle Site of Mt. Paektu
  • Yun Yong Bok, secretary of the party cell of the Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports
  • Yun In Dok, secretary of the party cell of North Hamgyong Provincial People’s Hospital
  • Jang Myong Sok, chief secretary of the Sinchon County Party Committee
  • Ri Man Gon, chief secretary of the North Phyongan Provincial Committee of the WPK
  • Jong U Yong, secretary of the party cell of the Fourth Shop of the Pukchang Thermal Power Complex
  • Yom Yong Gil, secretary of the branch party committee of the Tools Shop of the Pyongyang Textile Machine Factory
  • Jong Kwang Bok, secretary of the party cell of the Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong Un delivered a keynote address at the meeting.  There were no nuclear invocations or martial rhetoric, but his remarks were a direct attack on corrupt mid-level party and government officials.    His full speech, according to KCNA:

I think that the report to the Conference and speeches have properly reviewed the achievements, experiences and shortcomings in the work of Party cells of the past and I would like to refer to some problems arising in enhancing the functions and role of Party cells drastically in line with the requirements of our Party and the developing revolution.

Comrades, At present our revolution has entered a new turning phase.

Our Party, army and people have been united more closely under the immortal flags bearing the beaming images of President Kim Il Sung and General Kim Jong Il and are advancing straight along the road of independence, the road of Songun and the road of socialism true to their instructions.

We have firmly had in our hands the powerful assets and the key with which to win a greater victory by having steadily defended the precious revolutionary legacies the General bequeathed to us and adding brilliance to them despite trying ordeals and hardships.

In particular, the successful launch of artificial earth satellite Kwangmyo’ngso’ng 3-2 last year was a historic event that demonstrated the inexhaustible power of the powerful Mt. Paektu nation to the whole world and a mega event that dealt a crushing blow to hostile forces trying viciously to stifle our Republic.

Now we have taken the initiative more firmly in the face-off with the imperialists and it is a matter of time to bring about a turn in the building of an economic giant and the standard of the people’s living.

We should effect a radical turn in the economic construction and the people’s livelihoods in the spirit and mettle displayed in conquering outer space and fly the red flag of victory on the peak of a thriving socialist country.

To step up the building of a thriving country, we should further strengthen the Party, the general staff and guiding force of the revolution, organizationally and ideologically, rally all the people around it closely and mobilize them effectively to carry out its policies.

It is the nature and the traditional revolutionary mode of the great party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that the entire Party is bound together with a single ideology and purpose and the Party and people are pushing the revolution and construction in a harmonious whole.

The President and the General developed our Party into an invincible party in which the monolithic ideological system and the monolithic leadership system have been established firmly and which has taken root deep among the people and set up a prosperous and strong socialist country by relying on the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative strength of the people united rock-hard around the Party.

The red flag of our Party in which only victory and glory have been etched and the socialist gains achieved on this land are associated with the proud history of single-hearted unity in which the leader believed in the Party members and people and the Party members and people trusted him absolutely and supported him with loyalty.

We should take the undying exploits performed by the President and the General in Party building as an eternal treasure so as to further develop our Party into a powerful, militant general staff that is knitted closely together in a single ideology and purpose and takes root deep among the people and surely build the strongest country, the people’s paradise the world looks up to, on this land on the strength of the Party-people harmonious whole.

The position and role of Party cells are very important in strengthening our Party further and speeding up the building of a thriving country in line with the requirements of a new era of the Juche-based revolution.

Party cell is a base of the Party life for the Party members, the Party’s end nerve stretched out into the masses of the people and a scouting group in carrying out the Party’s policies.

When Party cells are strong the Party will never shake in any adversity and there will be nothing we are afraid of or we can not do.

As the consolidation of Party cells is the first step and the essential thing for strengthening the whole Party, the Party Central Committee has convened the Conference of Cell Secretaries as the first meeting for improving Party work since the Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea and regards this Conference as important as a Party congress and conference.

In order to make the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea a turning point in enhancing the Party’s militant might in every way and stepping up the building of a thriving country, the participants in the Conference and the cell secretaries of the whole Party should understand the Party’s intention clearly and improve the work of Party cells radically.

The most important task facing Party cells at present is to prepare the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists and true comrades and comrades-in-arms of our Party.

Preparing all the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists is a prerequisite and decisive guarantee for developing ours into the eternal party of the President and the General and winning the final victory in the building of a thriving country and the Juche-based revolution.

Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist means the soldier and follower loyal to the President and the General, who takes Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism as his firm faith and devotes his all to victory in the Juche- based revolution under the leadership of our Party.

Party cells should hold it as the main task to prepare the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists and provide scrupulous guidance to their organizational and ideological life in the Party.

They should undertake education in Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism substantially among the Party members so as to train them soundly into ardent revolutionary fighters who are thoroughly armed with the Juche idea and the Songun idea of our Party and are equipped with the spirit of safeguarding the leadership of the revolution at the cost of their lives, firm faith in socialism and steadfast class consciousness against imperialism.

Stalwart members of the Society for Rallying Comrades, the first organization of our Party, are the exemplars from whom all the Party members should learn.

Party cells should conduct education energetically so that all the Party members venerate the Party and the leader with absolute faith and pure conscience like our Party’s first-generation members including Cha Kwang Su and Kim Hyok and carry forward the tradition of single- hearted unity steadily.

A habit of leading a voluntary Party life on the basis of a high sense of organizational duty should be established in Party cells and the Party members should be trained in the furnace of the Party’s organizational life so that they become stout revolutionaries with boundless loyalty to the Party, leader, country and people and a strong sense of organization and discipline.

Particular attention should be paid to implanting the Party members with love for the people and spirit of serving them devotedly in preparing them as true Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists.

Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is, in essence, the people-first doctrine and a person who worships the people as God and works devotedly for them is just a genuine Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist.

It is the firm determination of our Party to respect our people and devote everything to them as we hold the President and the General in high esteem.

The slogan “Everything for the people and everything by relying on them!” contains the Party’s will to fill the whole Party with love for and trust in the people.

All the officials and Party members should be genuine comrades and comrades-in-arms who steadily follow, together with our Party, the road of l ove for the people the President and the General had taken throughout their lives.

Party cells should implant their noble outlook on the people deep in the officials and Party members to make them serve and love the people like their parents, wives and children.

The Party cells to which officials belong, in particular, should take it as an important task to prepare them as the true servants of the people and enhance guidance over and control of their Party life.

From the very beginning after he founded our Party the President saw the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices manifested among officials as the most dangerous poison a working- class ruling party should guard against and ensured that a consistent struggle was waged against them.

The General put forward the slogan “We serve the people!” and devoted energy and soul to developing our Party into a motherly party serving the people faithfully, not a party that indulges in power abuse and bureaucracy.

However, whenever the Party underlined the need to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices, Party organizations simply called meetings for criticizing ideological defects and punished some officials.

Then they did not make persevering efforts to transform officials on a revolutionary pattern.

Abuse of power and bureaucracy are not merely a matter of personal character or work style of officials, but a matter of their ideology.

When they abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner, officials will not merely lose their popularity among the masses and get a blot on their political integrity, but impair the Party’s authority and the prestige of socialism, which will end up leading the revolution and construction to ruin.

Today when the enemy is resorting to more vicious schemes to undermine the single-hearted unity between our Party and people, those who abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner are the major targets of criticism, those whom our Party should punish resolutely.

The Party Central Committee is firmly determined not simply to weed out but to root out the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices that are like the poisonous weeds sprouting on the garden of socialism centred on the masses of the people.

The campaign against power abuse and bureaucracy is a Party-wide undertaking in which all Party organizations and their members should turn out.

In order to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices officials and cell secretaries should try hard to train themselves in a revolutionary way, and Party cells, to say nothing of the Party Central Committee, provincial, city and county Party committees and their primary organizations, should wage an intensive, principled struggle against power abuse and bureaucracy.

There are ranks in work, but there can never be members of high or low rank in the Party life and the double standards of discipline are never allowed in the Party.

Party cells should create a strict atmosphere of criticism and ideological campaign and intensify criticism from bottom up in particular to give comradely help to officials to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices and prepare themselves as the true servants of the people.

Party cells should clearly distinguish between demands of officials and bureaucracy.

When abuse of power and bureaucratic practices are manifested among officials even in the slightest degree, they should not neglect them but wage a struggle against them promptly.

All Party cells should not be indifferent to the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices of the officials who do not belong to them but actively struggle against them; as for serious cases, they should report on them to higher Party organizations, including the Party Central Committee, before it is too late.

Another important task facing Party cells at present is to work with the masses properly so that broad segments of people establish a firm bond of kinship with our Party.

The masses are the grass-roots foothold the Party relies on and the eternal companions with whom our Party should share the destiny until the final victory will have been won in the revolution.

If the Party loses their support and trust it will lose its grass-roots basis, fail to fulfil its militant mission and in the end become unable to maintain its own existence.

If we are to defend socialism and build a thriving country amid the fierce showdown with the enemy and reunify the country, we should fully grasp the public sentiments and win over as many people as possible through efficient work with them.

As rallying broad masses of people around the Party is an important issue decisive of the destiny of the Party and revolution, an amnesty was proclaimed last year in the run-up to the 100th birthday of the President and the 70th birthday of the General.

It was ensured that most of the participants in the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Korean Children’s Union were the children of ordinary workers, farmers, service personnel and intellectuals, rather than those of cadres, and the children of those who committed offences against the country were not discriminated in being chosen as delegates if they were exemplary in study and organizational life of the Children’s Union.

The embrace that cares more for sick and wounded children, gives them love and affection, cures their sour wounds, helps them up and puts them forward again, instead of blaming them this is the embrace of our motherly Party.

We should train all the people to be strong in ideology and faith with great force produced by the motherly Party’s love and trust that are more powerful than nuclear weapons, thereby building rings of fortresses around the Party Central Committee.

All Party cells should work with the masses properly in keeping with our Party’s benevolent politics and all-embracing politics so that they shout “Long live the Workers’ Party!” even though they are left alone in out-of-the-way mountains.

Only then will all the people fight for the Party, the revolution and the country at the risk of their lives in a do-or-die war.

In order to conduct work with the masses effectively in line with the Party’s intention Party cells should assess the people properly in the interests of the revolution.

People have emotions and express their feelings differently according to their characters.

Party cells, guided by the General’s saying that they should know the real minds of people even though they do not know what there is in the fathomless water, should read the innermost thoughts of people and make an unbiased assessment of them.

They should not only stick to collective education but channel great efforts into individual education in educating the masses.

Party work, work with the masses, cannot be conducted with any formula or a single solution.

It is imperative to study appropriate methods of educating people of different characters and apply them to practice so as to make even one more person support the Party.

We should not indiscriminately discard people, even though they are unwilling to accept the Party’s ideas.

If so, it will result in a gradual decrease in the number of the people to be rallied around the Party.

Party cells should not cram the Party’s ideas into the heads of the masses, but educate them persuasively and perseveringly so that they would willingly accept the Party’s ideas.

It is very important to place trust in the people in winning over the masses. Political trust is followed by loyalty, but distrust produces betrayal.

As he is not a Buddhist image made of stone, man may make mistakes in his work and life and even commit unforgivable crimes.

No matter what serious mistakes or crimes he may make, and even though we find in him 99 per cent of demerits and only one per cent of merit or conscience, we should value his conscience, boldly t rust him and lead him to start with a clean slate.

People who have deep-seated mental agonies should be treated more kind-heartedly and particular attention should be paid to freeing them from worries lingering in their minds.

Only then can all the people be developed into indefatigable fighters who will only trust and follow our Party in any adversity, just like white gem that preserves its colour even if it is broken into pieces and bamboo that keeps its straightness even if it is burnt.

Our Party expects that all Party cells will become the blood vessels that link broad masses of the people with the Party with a feeling of kinship and the stones supporting the fortress of single-hearted unity.

Today when the general advance for building a thriving socialist country is gaining momentum, an important task facing Party cells is to actively mobilize the Party members and other working people to carry out the Party’s policies.

The most important revolutionary task facing our Party at present is to translate into brilliant reality the lofty wish of the General who continued super-intensity forced march energetically until the last moment of his life to bring all the benefits of socialism to our people.

In order to bring about a radical turn in the building of an economic giant and the standard of the people’s living, the Party organizations at all levels, Party cells in particular, should creditably play a role of the death-defying corps and scouting group in implementing the Party’s policies.

A Party cell that fails to work efficiently to carry out the Party’s policies cannot be said to be a living Party cell.

At present a great emphasis is put on establishing the monolithic leadership system in the entire Party more thoroughly; whether the Party’s monolithic leadership system is established finds concentrated expression in how the Party’s policies are implemented.

At present not a few Party cells are conducting their work in such a way as to transmit the Party’s policies and instructions to the people and exhort them to turn out for their implementation.

Then the Party’s policies, however correct they may be, cannot be carried out properly and the people’s livelihoods can never be improved.

Party cells should carry out the Party’s policies perseveringly till they pay off in the people’s livelihoods.

Now our officials hold that in order to ensure the Party’s authority it is important to publish a lot of books and intensify information work.

However, the Party’s leadership authority is not ensured by means of texts or words; it is possible only when the Party’s policies are carried out in a thoroughgoing way and people enjoy subsequent benefits.

Party cells should inspire all the Party members and officials to be a valuable foundation for translating the Party’s policies into reality with an unusual determination to sweat blood to improve the people’s living standards.

They should resolutely overcome the tendency to work like a flash in the pan in implementing the Party’s policies and carry them through to the end with unfailing efforts so that our Party’s policies prove to be effective in the people’s livelihoods.

To be the death-defying corps and scouting group in implementing the Party’s policies, Party cells should conduct organizational and political work in a progressive manner to raise a hot wind of Kim Jong Il’s patriotism to the full.

When the hearts of the people are beating vigorously with patriotism of the General who had burnt himself up like a candle for the sake of the country, there will be no difficulty we cannot surmount, nor will there be any fortress we cannot conquer.

Party cells should encourage the Party members and other working people to cherish Kim Jong Il’s patriotism in their minds and devote their heart and soul to carrying out the Party’s lines and policies, holding dear every stone and every blade of grass on this land and warming them up with their blood.

Today our Party requires creating a new spirit of the times advancing towards the world by restoring the fighting spirit in the 1970s when the drum of revolution resounded.

The creators of the spirit of the present times should naturally be produced among the officials and Party members who are the commanding personnel and vanguard fighters of the revolution.

When all the officials and Party members become a locomotive and a scout who plough their way through virgin snow in the van of their sectors and units, like those of the 1970s who had ushered in a heyday in the era of the Workers’ Party under the leadership of the General, leaps and innovations will be made in all posts and the overall affairs of the country will go smoothly.

The Party’s lines and policies can be implemented successfully when all the masses as well as Party members turn out.

Party cells should enlist Party members and the hardcore of the masses to make one person rouse ten others and ten a hundred again, and an innovation in a unit lead on to innovations in other units.

They should bring about a great innovation, a great leap forward racing against time on all fronts of building a socialist economic giant and a civilized nation by dynamically mobilizing workers, farmers, intellectuals and all other sections of people in carrying out the Party’s policies.

Special efforts should be channelled into work with young people in organizing and mobilizing the masses in implementing the Party’s policies.

Young people are vanguard fighters who have taken the lead in supporting the Party and leader in each period and stage of our revolution.

It was none other than young people who lit the torch of the great Chollima upsurge by exerting themselves with patriotism at the furnaces in Kangson in the postwar days and who wrought miracles in the Haeju-Hasong railway project.

Party cells should put forward the young people of new generation and lead them to give fullest play to their resources and gallantry to perform epoch-making heroic exploits in every field of building a thriving nation as their fathers and mothers did in their youth.

This is an age of science and technology, the age of knowledge-based economy, and the building of a prosperous country and its future are inconceivable apart from science and technology.

Party cells should render positive encouragement and sustaining assistance to scientists and technicians so that they raise the hot wind of breaking through the cutting edge as the space scientists who conquered space did.

And they should provide scrupulous Party guidance to ensure that officials, Party members and other working people find out a key to self-reliance and increased production in science and technology and that they try hard to learn advanced science and technology and solve all problems on the strength of science and technology.

By so doing, they should fan the flames of the industrial revolution in the new century and the campaign for breaking through the cutting edge, which the great General kindled, more fiercely in all sectors and units.

Cell secretaries should enhance their sense of responsibility and role in order for Party cells to discharge the heavy mission and duty they assume on behalf of the times and the revolution.

The combat efficiency of Party cells largely depends on the preparedness and role of cell secretaries.

Party cell secretaries are the point men of our Party in building it up and implementing its lines and policies.

When the cell secretaries of the whole Party become the standard-bearers of the revolution and struggle and discharge their responsibilities, Party cells will be consolidated and our revolution advance faster that much.

If Party cell secretaries are to fulfil their duty, they should be like the mother of a family.

The essence of the work of Party cell secretaries is to arouse people through efficient political work to move their hearts .

To this end, they should devote all their sincerity as mothers do to their children.

There is an impressive passage in song “The Voice of the Mother” which goes that although the voice of a mother is heard only in a family, the voice of the Party reverberates throughout the country; it is none other than cell secretaries who should ensure that the voice of the motherly Party full of love and trust resounds throughout the country.

Reflecting themselves on the song, all our cell secretaries should get closer to the minds of people like the mother of a family and rally them firmly behind the Party.

If they are to be like mothers, they should be so warm-hearted and broad-minded that everybody is willing to come to them and unbosom himself or herself.

They should always rack their brains over how to lead people along the right track and add glory to their political integrity.

They should think about the problems of their comrades and the masses before their own family affairs and devote themselves entirely to the collective as mothers would dedicate their blood, flesh and even their lives unhesitatingly to their children.

Always looking up to the beaming images of the President and the General in their minds, cell secretaries should treat people tenderly and warmly with motherly affectionate eyes, bright expression and polite manner.

Only then will people gather around them as honey bees swarm around fragrant flowers and an amicable atmosphere pervade the collective.

If they are to fulfil their duty with credit, Party cell secretaries should set examples for the masses in carrying out the revolutionary tasks.

If they put their backs into difficult tasks ahead of others and make tireless efforts to implement the Party’s policies, this is a political work more powerful than hundreds of words.

Those who take on the most dangerous and difficult undertaking ahead of others and make a breakthrough in the advance like Kim Kum Su, a former Party cell secretary of the explosive disposal squad under the Kangwon Provincial People’s Security Bureau, are genuine cell secretaries required by our Party.

Cell secretaries should not merely call upon Party members and other working people to turn out in implementing the Party’s policies but lead the masses to the struggle and exploits by setting practical examples.

If they are devoted to the Party and the revolution in the van of the masses they may rest or sleep less than others, but they should regard it as comfort, not as toil.

To fulfil their responsibilities and role, Party cell secretaries should improve their political and practical qualifications.

If they are poorly qualified, they cannot work skillfully with people and arouse them forcefully to the implementation of the Party’s policies, however great their determination and enthusiasm may be.

Cell secretaries should not try to have a say on the strength of the Party’s authority or their position but secure authority in work and trust of the masses by means of their practical abilities.

They should make an in-depth study of the works of the President and the General and Party documents to have better knowledge of the Party’s ideas, lines and policies than anybody else and get familiar with the instructions of the President and the General and the Party’s policies which are related to their sectors and units and Party work, in particular.

By making a substantial study of Party Rules and the standards of Party life they should be well acquainted with all practical matters as to the work of Party cells including the organization and guidance of Party life and the expansion of Party membership.

They should have many-sided knowledge of different fields such as politics, the military, the economy and culture and be well-informed about the situation at home and abroad.

The capability to correctly read people’s minds and move their hearts is an indispensable qualification of cell secretaries.

They should acquire proficient methods of working with the masses and be persons of versatile talents who know how to dance, sing and make a motivational speech in front of the masses.

In order to enhance the militant functions and role of Party cells as required by the developing times and revolution, it is necessary to establish the climate of attaching importance and giving positive help to them throughout the Party.

Party committees at all levels should pay close attention to building up the ranks of cell secretaries with those who are politically and ideologically staunch, popular among Party members and practically prepared and improving their qualifications.

They should transmit and disseminate Party documents and policies to cell secretaries in time, regularly inform them of the decisions and directives of higher Party organizations for their implementation and specify correct orientation of work.

In the guidance of lower organizations, Party committees at all levels should fully meet the Party’s demands that officials help and teach cell secretaries, while going down to Party cells and giving guidance to the Party life of their members.

It is also necessary to run the day of Party cell secretaries efficiently on a regular basis and widely organize short courses, discussions about experiences and the like.

For the present, the short course to be given in the wake of this Conference should be organized properly so as to give a substantial help to cell secretaries in their work.

Party cell secretaries assume heavy responsibilities and duties in the efforts to develop our Party into the glorious party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and expedite the building of a thriving nation.

The Party Central Committee firmly believes that all the Party cell secretaries and Party officials will creditably fulfil the honourable mission and duty they assume on behalf of the Party and revolution, fully aware that they themselves hold the flag of the Chuch’e-oriented Party.

After his speech, according to KCNA, meeting participants “extended greatest glory and warmest thanks to Kim Jong Un, who has further strengthened the WPK shining with the august names and feats of the great Generalissimos, remarkably enhanced its leadership role and thus provided the undying important programme to effect a great swing in the revolution and construction” and that “letter of pledge to the WPK was adopted at the conference.”

Kim Jong Un then delivered a closing speech in which he said “the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea will be etched in the history of our Party as the one that marks a milestone in strengthening the militant might of the Party to the maximum as required by a new historic age in the accomplishment of the revolutionary cause of Juche and achieving the final victory in the building of a thriving nation” and “The revolutionary ideas of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are a science, and doing things as told by them leads to a sure victory in whatever difficulties and trials. This is the truth proved by our revolutionary practice.”  According to KCNA Kim Jong Un also said “the participants in the Conference and other cell secretaries of the whole Party should bear in their minds the spirit of the Conference and fully apply them to their work, so as to give fullest play to the vitality of the Conference in the reality of the gigantic struggle to build a thriving country” and “Fully convinced that all the participants in the Conference and other cell secretaries of the whole Party will discharge their revolutionary duties in the sacred struggle for bringing earlier the prosperous future, firmly rallied around the Party Central Committee, Kim Jong Un declared the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the WPK closed. “

Documentary Film on KJU’s Security Orgs Visits During August to November 2012

22 Jan

DPRK state media over the weekend release a documentary film of Kim Jong Un’s visiting Korean People’s Army [KPA] sites, interactions with members of internal security agencies and and attending KPA-based performances and sports events.

The first scenes of the documentary film show Kim Jong Un, joined his wife Ri Sol Ju and senior KPA and party officials visiting the statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on the campus of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces.

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Commemorative photo taken in front of the KIS-KJI statues at the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces.  In this image (L-R): Hwang Pyong So, VMar Kim Jong Gak, Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un, Gen. Choe Ryong Hae and Gen. Hyon Yong Chol (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Commemorative photo taken in front of the KIS-KJI statues at the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. In this image (L-R): Hwang Pyong So, VMar Kim Jong Gak, Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un, Gen. Choe Ryong Hae and Gen. Hyon Yong Chol (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un visited the KPA Exhibition of Arms and Equipment, and toured its E-Library.

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un (L) at a computer workstation at the KPA Exhibition of Arms and Equipment E-Library (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un (L) at a computer workstation at the KPA Exhibition of Arms and Equipment E-Library (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un examines an artillery piece (L) and stands at the entrance of the KPA Exhibition of Arms and Equipment (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un examines an artillery piece (L) and stands at the entrance of the KPA Exhibition of Arms and Equipment (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un, Ri Sol Ju and members of the central leadership attended a performance by the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces All-Woman Brass Ensemble

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

After the KPISF all-woman brass ensemble performance, Kim Jong Un talked with members of the central leadership (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

After the KPISF all-woman brass ensemble performance, Kim Jong Un talked with members of the central leadership (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

KJU, Madame Ri and members of the central leadership attended a performance of the KPA Brass Band .

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un smokes a cigarette after the KPA Brass Band performance (top) and talking to officials (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

Kim Jong Un smokes a cigarette after the KPA Brass Band performance (top) and talking to officials (Photos: KCTV screengrab)

KJU visits the headquarters of the Ministry of State Security to view the statue of Kim Jong Il.

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un, Ri Sol Ju and several close aides watch a shooting competition and women’s volleyball game

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un and a number of senior party and KPA officials visited the equestrian company of KPA Unit #534.  Kim Jong Il visited the unit in November 2008 as he recuperated from his stroke.  During his visit Kim Jong Un instructed that the equestrian grounds be turned over to the management of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission, so it can be used by DPRK civilians.

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrab)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un visited the Ministry of State Security’s headquarters, where he posed for commemorative photographs with MSS personnel and met senior MSS management.

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

KJU attended a commemorative photograph session with participants at a meeting of local police officials of the Ministry of People’s Security and Korean People’s Internal Security Forces.

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

(Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

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