The Megaphone War and Light Water Reactors

In a 29 March editorial Korean Central News Agency hits back at external observation and reporting about KJI’s health, its internal economic situation and recent contingency planning around the country:

Pyongyang – There is now a deluge of “news” about the internal situation in the DPRK from the US, Japan and South Korea.

Various kinds of “reports” are pouring in to give impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK and wild rumors about even the health of the supreme leader are afloat. There are “analysis and comment” that shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the “failure of monetary reform”.

There is also misinformation that the DPRK continues missile and other arms smuggling, its nuclear capacity is being steadily bolstered up, there is concern about its possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is opening Rajin Port and sending workers to foreign countries en masse in a bid to earn foreign currency due to financial difficulties. The scenario for vituperation seems to know no bound.

The campaign to mislead the public opinion by concentrically and malignantly tarnishing the image of the other party by such specialized methods and means of psychological warfare has been called a black propaganda campaign. This campaign naturally seeks an aim. Behind this despicable propaganda are forces displeased with any investment in the DPRK. It is aimed at holding in check investment in the DPRK in a bid to hamstring its efforts to improve the people’s standard of living by focusing efforts on economic construction.

The DPRK uses the editorial to announce that will build a light water reactor:

They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of the independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside.

The DPRK will witness the appearance of a light water reactor power plant relying on its own nuclear fuel in the near future in the 2010s in the wake of mass-production of juche iron and Juche-based vinalon cotton, its reply to them.

While Kyodo focuses on the megaphone war, Xinhua’s report emphasizes the construction of the light water reactor:

Media reports from the United States, South Korea and Japan are pointing to an economic crisis in the DPRK, which is not true, according to the KCNA.

These reports are giving impression that “contingency” is imminent in the DPRK as shortage of food and economic difficulties are more serious than those in the 1990s due to the failure of monetary reform, it said.

There are even rumors about the health of DPRK supreme leader Kim Jong Il, it added.

“They would be well advised to remember that the DPRK has a firm foundation of an independent national economy which remains solid despite any storm from outside,” said the KCNA.

The DPRK announced it would “develop a light water reactor actively” last April. In September last year, the DPRK’s representative to the United Nations told the Security Council that the country had succeeded in experimental uranium enrichment.

The editorial seems to be a continuation of one from last week which named several defector-staffed, ROK-based media outfits as participating in “smear campaigns.”  It also seems to be a response to reports* about testimony to US Congressional committees by General Walter Sharp and Admiral Robert Willard, a portion of which addressed contingencies on the Peninsula.

The announcement of the construction of the light water reactor may well set the table for the 2nd session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly on 9 April.  In terms of succession;  the light water reactor may also be another propaganda accomplishment the Party History Institute will add to the Morningstar General’s resume.

*I need to underscore that this editorial seems a response to the media coverage and reporting (which focused on contingency planning) on General Sharp’s and Admiral Willard’s testimony to US House and US Senate (sub-) committees, and not the testimony itself.

Possible New Third Floor Director

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun is first from left in this image from the 3 February KCTV broadcast on Kim Jong-il's tour of a fish factoryin Kumya County, South Hamgyong (Photo: KCNA/KCTV).

Here may a confirmable personnel change within the Central Party.  Korea Times reports that Kim Tong-un, chief executive of Office #39 (also known as the Third Floor), was replaced by by Jon Il-chun.  Kim Tong-un, 73 and a geologist by training, had

The man belived to be new Third Floor Director Jon Il-chun is third from left in this photo of Kim Jong-il's tour in Kumya County, South Hamgyong (Photo: KCNA/KCTV).

been director of the Third Floor since April 1994.  KT cites Mr. Kim’s recent appearance on an EU travel ban as the reason for his removal from the post.  The new Third Floor director, Mr. Jon, was reported as escorting Kim Jong-il a day or two ago at the Wonphyong Taehung Fishery Station, Kumya County, South Hamgyong.

North Korea has recently named Chon Il-chun, vice chief in charge of managing the safe of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his family, to head the office of the ruling Workers’ Party, Yonhap News reported Thursday.

Chon replaced Kim Dong-un who was put on a “blacklist” by the European Union last December, the report said, quoting sources in Seoul.

North Korea’s media reported Wednesday that Chon, a ranking official of the Workers’ Party, was among those who accompanied Kim Jong-il on his trip to a fishery office in South Hamgyeong Province.

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun had a seat at the main table during the first meeting of the new North Korean development bank on 20 January of this year.

The man believed to be Jon Il-chun is first from right in this image from a KCTV story annoucning the formation of a North Korean investment bank (Photo: KCTV)

As with Pak Nam-gi, the possible retirement/dismissal of Kim Tong-un seems more a matter of pretext (in this case, the EU travel ban) as against job performance.  These high level personnel movements are merely administrative planning to prepare for the post-KJI era in North Korea.

Personnel reassignments such as this (as well as last year’s Cabinet attrition) are one significant political indicator of crisis/contingency in North Korea.  However, in that regard, it seems that at present the Central Party is manuevering to prevent a devestating internal situation where they would have to mobilize large numbers of internal security units or, as the most desperate measure, making an emergency call to Beijing.

Siege Mentality Tunnel of Love

So, while Pyongyang watchers wait around for the sixty or so hours for the Bosworth-Kang summit to conclude in a mushroom cloud of white or black smoke, a few stories are still emerging from and around the DPRK.  The ever-reliable Tony Chang from Yonhap has a write-up on an RFA broadcast of a Hwang Jang-yop discourse.  On a pedantically repetitive note, Mr. Hwang is one of the highest level DPRK defectors, having been a KWP Secretary of Ideology and President of Kim Il-sung University.  Mr. Hwang held forth on tunnels constructed below Pyongyang: “[he] claimed that there were secret tunnels built more than 300 meters (984 feet) below ground, linking Pyongyang with strategic locations within a radius of 40 to 50 kilometers . . . passages were connected with underground railway networks and were built to be used as escape routes and shelter for the country’s leader and top officials in emergencies [...] There were fresh water and grass growing within a underground tunnel that linked Pyongyang to a nearby mountain. In particular, an ultra-deep underground tunnel was built to connect one of Kim’s residences in Pyongyang to Nampo (on the western coast).”

Also mentioned is a tunnel that runs from the DPRK to China, presumably from the Kim Family Residence in Changsong, North Pyongan.   There also accounts (not in this particular iteration) of a tunnel with subway system that runs from a residence around Taesong or Samsok District, Pyongyang to Pyongsong, possibly to the Jamo Mountain Chalet.  There is also a tunnel near a North Korean elite residential area in Kangdong County (suburban Pyongyang)  that runs under the Taedong River into another elite residential area.  There are also several command and control centers located around Pyongyang, one of which is a Guard Command station located in Ryongsong District near the so-called #55 Residence.  In the event of a sudden crisis affecting the stability of the current leadership in the DPRK, central authority will likely reside with the Guard Command (which is directly subordinate to Kim Jong-il) and the State Security Department mobilized.