KPA Supreme Command Threatens to “Nullify” Armistice Agreement

A spokesman of the KPA Supreme Command reads a statement on 5 March 2013 threatening to “nullify” the armistice agreement which ended active hostilities of the Korean War (Fatherland Liberation War). The spokesman appears to be Gen. Kim Yong Chol, Chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and member of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission (Photos: KCNA)

DPRK state media reported on 5 March (Tuesday) that a spokesman of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Supreme Command said that it “will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totaly nullified, that the “Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form’s sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage” and that “this land (the DPRK) is neither the Balkans nor Iraq nor Libya.”  Based on images released in state media the spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command was Gen. Kim Yong Chol, chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which is responsible for anti-ROK [South Korea] intelligence operations.

Parsing the KPA Supreme Command’s statement Glyn Ford told Russia’s RT: “There’s a difference between saying you no longer recognize an armistice and actually starting shooting again. They’re not quite the same thing.”  Ford also said “I think he [Kim Jong-Un] is more likely to be turning away once we get through the next month or so towards looking at economic modernization rather than repeating the missile and the nuclear tests. I could be wrong, of course. It’s very difficult to read North Korea, but it seems to me that that’s where the thinking is.”

According to KCNA’s English-language version of the statement:

On Dec. 12 last year the DPRK legitimately and successfully launched a satellite for peaceful purposes, ensuring international transparency, going beyond practice, and choosing a comparatively mild situation for it.

Seizing the DPRK’s satellite launch as an occasion for stifling it from the outset, the U.S. and its allies deliberately negated the DPRK’s sovereignty over its satellite launch. They finally prodded the UN Security Council into adopting a “resolution on sanctions” before opting for high-handed hostile acts against the DPRK.

These hostile acts are still going on.

Under this situation the DPRK was compelled to take practical counteractions to defend the security and sovereignty of the country. On Feb. 12 it admirably and successfully conducted the third underground nuclear test for self-defence at the highest level as part of those counteractions.

However, the U.S. imperialists and their allied forces including south Korea are making more persistent and desperate efforts to slap new tougher “sanctions” against the DPRK, far from drawing a due lesson.

Not content with this, they kicked off again the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises to stifle the DPRK by force of arms by mobilizing huge armed forces of aggression. They will reportedly last for two months from March 1.

Unlike last year the current joint military exercises will be participated in by super-large nuclear-powered carrier task force carrying at least 100 nuclear warheads, B-52H strategic bombers and other means of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces for making ground, sea and air nuclear strikes and its allied forces including south Korea, U.K. and Australia.

From this point of view, the exercises cannot be construed otherwise than the most dangerous nuclear war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK and the most undisguised military provocation to be made by a group of all hues of hostile forces.

This serious situation clearly indicates that the actions of the U.S., south Korea and other hostile forces to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK are now leading to a military offensive for aggression, going beyond the level of outrageous economic “sanctions.”

In view of the prevailing situation, the Supreme Command of the KPA which is responsible for the national defence and security of the country and the destiny of the nation sent a meaningful warning message to the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces through the KPA Panmunjom mission on February 23. It warned them that if they ignite a war of aggression in the end, from that moment their fate will be hung by a thread with every hour.

But, the joint military exercises have persisted and the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have become all the more undisguised in their base moves to kick up their “sanctions.”

Looking back on history, the Korean people have neither shot even a single arrow nor thrown a single stone at the land of the U.S.

The U.S. is, however, working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the DPRK, not content with having incurred the pent-up grudge of the Korean people which can never be settled.

What matters is that the south Korean puppet forces steeped in worship and sycophancy toward the U.S. are dancing to its tune.

Of late Kim Kwan Jin, puppet minister of Defense, and Jong Sung Jo, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, inspected frontline army corps, fleet command and guided missile units where they blustered that a sort of military provocation is expected from the north and cried out for making “deadly strikes” and “preemptive strikes” at the “bases for provocations.”

As far as these guys are concerned, they are a group of traitors who pushed the inter-Korean relations to a collapse together with traitor Lee Myung Bak who knows nothing about politics and military affairs. They are military gangsters who go reckless, unaware of what their master U.S. has in mind, what is the intention of the neighbouring countries and what all fellow countrymen and nation desire.

The puppet authorities, too, are crying out for the dismantlement of nukes and halt to provocation as dictated by their master, without knowing what is precious wealth for the nation. They move like a robot and repeat anything like a parrot.

The sovereignty and dignity of the nation are violated and the supreme interests of the country are seriously threatened by the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people, and maniacs of confrontation with fellow countrymen grouping worst traitors. The army and people of the DPRK can never remain a passive onlooker to this fact.

The spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command is authorized to declare the following important measures:

First, it will take the second and third strong practical counteractions in succession to cope with the high-handed war acts of the U.S. and all other hostile forces as it had already declared.

The army and people of the DPRK never make an empty talk.

It is the mettle of Military-First (So’ngun) Korea to do what it is determined to do.

It won victories in the two wars and has advanced along the road of victory despite manifold difficulties.

The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.

Now that the U.S. imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style.

Those means are bound to be launched once their buttons are pressed, and the enemies’ strongholds be turned into a sea in flames.

This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya.

The army and people of the DPRK have everything including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past.

Second, the KPA Supreme Command will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totally nullified.

The war maneuvers being staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are a vivid expression of their systematic violation of the AA.

Accordingly, the Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form’s sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage.

The DPRK will make a strike of justice at any target anytime as it pleases without limit, not bound to the AA, and achieve the great cause of the country’s reunification, the cherished desire of the nation.

Third, the KPA Supreme Command will totally stop the activities of the Panmunjom mission of the KPA which was tentatively established and operated by it as a negotiating body for establishing a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.

In this regard it will simultaneously make a decision to cut off the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. military telephone.

Our choice has become clear now that the moves of all hostile forces to encroach upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK are reaching a dangerous phase.

It is the unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK and the mode of counteraction of Mt. Paektu style to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean style more powerful than them.

The U.S. imperialists and their allies should not forget even a moment that they are standing at the crossroads of their life and death.

A final victory is in store for the army and people of the DPRK who are all out to protect its sovereignty.

Rumors of Dismissed People’s Security Minister Floated in ROK Media

Gen. Ri Myong Su (L), last known Minister of People’s Security and Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il (R) whom South Korean sources claim replaced Ri as head of People’s Security (Photos: Xinhua file photo and KCTV screengrab)

South Korean [ROK] media, citing an interview with an unnamed ROK government official, are circulating rumors that DPRK Minister of People’s Security, Gen. Ri Myong Su (Ri Myo’ng-su) has been removed from office and replaced by Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il, currently serving as Vice Chief of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Staff.  Gen. Ri was appointed Minister in April 2011 and has held the office for nearly two years. In a 26 February report  Yonhap News Agency quoted the unnamed official who said, “To my knowledge, North Korea recently appointed Choi Bu-il, deputy chief of staff at the North’s military, to the minister of people’s security” and also reported that “the source declined to give further details, including exactly when Cho was named, but the apparent replacement is believed to be linked to a ‘part of loyalty test by Kim Jong-un.’”

JoongAng Ilbo published a similar story on 27 February and reported that “Choe Pu-il, former vice chief of the general staff of the North Korean army, has been appointed to the minister of people’s security, a position similar to a national police commissioner in the South, a high-ranking South Korean official told reporters yesterday at a private meeting.” JoongAng Ilbo also reports that Gen. Ri Myong Su “hasn’t appeared in public since September 2012.”  Yonhap also reported that Gen. Ri “”has not been seen in public for months, raising speculation that he might have been purged.”

Either ROK media or their mystery man in the ROK government, are simply wrong about Gen. Ri’s public appearances.  Ri Myong Su’s last reported public appearance was on 4 January 2013 when he attended a meeting of People’s Security and Korean People’s Internal Security Forces [KPISF] personnel “to carry out the important tasks” itemized in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day Address.  Prior to that Gen. Ri visited Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun with KJU on New Year’s Day, attended a banquet given for personnel involved in the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, visited Ku’msusan on 24 December 2012, attended an unveiling ceremony of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il statues in Hamhu’ng on 20 December 2012 , attended the first central party banquet for the U’nha-3 launch personnel on 21 December 2012 and attended a national memorial service commemorating one year since Kim Jong Il’s demise.  Gen. Ri also attended a national meeting of people’s security officers and a KJU commemorative photo session in late November 2012 and attended Forestry Workers’ national meeting on or around 7 November 2012.  Gen. Ri’s public appearances have been relatively spotty, as Luke Herman wrote in NK News about in October 2012, but he has “appeared in public” well after September 2012 despite current media reporting.

Gen Ri Myong Su (2nd R) attend a forestry workers’ meeting on 7 November 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

This does not mean Ri Myong Su’s position could not be in jeopardy.  There have been the aforementioned gaps between his public appearances, which could be ascribed either to his political standing or to the Minister having to directly supervise People’s Security’s various missions directly from headquarters.  A lot of the ceremonial aspects of the Minister’s position have been undertaken by the head of the People’s Security/KPSIF Political Bureau, Col. Gen. Ri Pyong Sam, who presided over a ceremony at which the MPS University was renamed after KJI and two awards ceremonies for KPISF personnel killed on duty.  There have also been rumors in Pyongyang implicating members of Ri Myong Su’s family in malfeasance in their foreign trading corporations.  If Ri was removed from office, it would indicate that Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power by making his own personnel appointments, in lieu of keeping Kim Jong Il’s old retainers.  It should also be noted hat Gen. Ri has also held senior positions during the DPRK’s three nuclear test.  In 2006 Ri was serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau.  In 2009, Ri was director of the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] Administration Department.  In 2012, Ri was Minister of People’s Security, which, according to some researchers. controls some of the units responsible for major construction and engineering projects at the P’unggye-ri Nuclear Test Site.

South Korean official and media sources have also previously provided conflicting information about Ri’s alleged replacement, Choe Pu Il.  Choe has served as Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff since 2009.  However some ROK sources have identified Choe also concurrently serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operation Bureau, and other ROK sources have claimed that Choe commanding the IX Army Corps or serving as regional commander of KPA forces in what be termed it Northeast Military District.  This does not preclude Choe from being appointed to People’s Security, and his career history reveals ample criteria for his potential appointment.  And yet, previous information from ROK sources about Choe’s position within the DPRK ‘s national security community has been inconsistent and highly speculative.

Pyongyang watchers also may recall that back in November 2012, VMar Kim Jong Gak was quietly removed from serving as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and replaced by Gen. Kim Kyok Sik.  This led country watchers to speculate as to whether VMar Kim was part of an ongoing purge, or if he was dismissed because of allegations that one of his sons had attempted to defect via China.  Although Gen. Kim Kyok Sik’s appointment as the country’s defense minister was later publicized, it hardly affected Kim Jong Gak’s political standing and he has made a number of public appearances, including at so-called #1 Events with Kim Jong Un.

Previous Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim (L) and Ju Sang Son (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrab and KCNA)

There have been numerous occasions in the past in which a senior official is seen at an event close to The Center, or continues to make public appearances, even though they’ve already been marked for dismissal.  Often these have involved the more opaque maneuverings within the Party Central Committee and DPRK Government.  However the Ministry of People’s Security, and particularly the individual serving as Minister, operates (in very relative terms) transparently.  Gen. Ri Myong Su’s three predecessors as Minister were all publicly removed from office and their replacement publicly announced.  In July 2003 the Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim was removed (due both to political reasons and old age) from office by an order of the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium.**  His replacement, Choe Ryong Su, was immediately announced.  Choe Ryong Su’s tenure was short-lived.  Barely a year after his appointment Choe was replaced by Gen. Ju Sang Song, then-commander of the IV Army Corps.  Gen. Ju had a lengthy tenure, serving as Minister for nearly seven years.  In March 2011 Gen. Ju was publicly removed from office by an order of the NDC “due to his illness.”  On 7 April 2011, Ju was replaced by Gen. Ri Myong Su through an order of the NDC (to which People’s Security is subordinate) and ratified by the 4th session of the 12th SPA held the same day.

**Until 2009 the Ministry of People’s Security was part of the DPRK Cabinet, and the Minister appointed by the SPA.  After 2009, the MPS was directly subordinate to the National Defense Commission.  Thus, Paek Hak Rim and Choe Ryong Su were removed from office by the SPA Presidium (standing committee).  In 2011 Gen. Ju Sang Song was removed as Minister by the National Defense Commission, and Gen. Ri Myong Su appointed to replace him, however the dismissal and appointment were ratified at the 4th session of the 12th SPA.

Nuclear Test Personnel Visit Ku’msusan and Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery After Arriving in Pyongyang

Personnel who contributed to or participated in the 12 February 2013 nuclear test pay their respects at the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photos: KCNA)

DPRK state media reported on 21 February that personnel involved in the 12 February 2013 nuclear test visited the Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun and paid their respects at the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Mt. Taeso’ng in Pyongyang.  According to KCNA “scientists, technicians, workers, soldier-builders and officials who took part in the successful third underground nuclear test visited” Ku’msusan where they paid their respects to the remains of the late DPRK founder and president, Kim Il Sung, and the late supreme leader Kim Jong Il.  After visiting the remains of the two leaders they toured “the halls where the orders the Generalissimos received are on display and the halls which house cars, an electric car, a boat and train coaches used by them for field guidance and foreign tour till the last period of their lives.”

Personnel involved in the DPRK’s third nuclear test visit the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

The nuclear test personnel also brought floral bouquets and visited the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery.  DPRK state media reported that they placed floral bouquets beneath the bronze memorial bust of Kim Jong Suk, wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong Il and Kim Kyong Hui.  After paying their respects to Kim Jong Suk, according to KCNA, “they also laid a wreath and bouquets on the wreath-laying stand of the cemetery and paid silent tribute to anti-Japanese revolutionary martyrs.”

On 21 February the scientists, technicians, construction workers, KPA service members and others who contributed to the country’s third experimental nuclear detonation received a congratulatory message sent on behalf of the Party Central Military Commission and the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] which “said that the recent nuclear test fully demonstrated the excellent performance of the nuclear deterrence of the DPRK that has been diversified, and the technology of manufacturing nuclear weapons of Military-First (So’ngun) Korea that has reached a cutting-edge level.”  According to KCNA the joint CMC-NDC message also said:

The underground nuclear test conducted by the DPRK in the wake of its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyo’ngsong 3-2 represented a great political and military victory as it made the international community confidently recognize the status of the DPRK as a strategic rocket and nuclear weapons state and brought about a fundamental change in the world political structure and the balance of forces.

People in the field of national defence science carried out the test, exercise of the independent right of the country, thus dealing sledge-hammer blows at the U.S. imperialists, Japanese reactionaries and the south Korean puppet forces who are working with bloodshot eyes to force the DPRK to “disarm itself” and to “overturn its social system”, the message added.

It highly appreciated the scientists, technicians, workers and officials in the field of national defence science and soldier-builders who have made great contributions to winning a great victory in the all-out confrontation with the U.S. imperialists and its allies, and safeguarding the supreme interests of the DPRK.

It is firm determination and will of the dear respected Kim Jong Un to finally conclude the confrontation with the U.S. imperialists by dint of arms of Songun [military-first] and build the strongest power which the whole world looks up and a people’s paradise on this land, the message stressed.

It expressed the conviction that the scientists, technicians, workers and officials in the field of national defence science and soldier-builders would win one victory after another, closely united around Supreme Commander Marshal Kim Jong Un.

A motor coach ferrying personnel involved in the DPRK’s third underground nuclear test passes through Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang on 20 February 2013 (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

KWP Secretary Pak To Chun (L) and Deputy (vice) Director of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department [MID] Hong Sung Mu (2nd L) greet participants and contributors to the 12 February 2013 nuclear test, as they arrive at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 20 February 2013. The MID was one of the key organizations involved in the technical and logistical aspects of the country’s third underground nuclear test (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

The nuclear test personnel arrived in Pyongyang on 20 February (Wednesday).  Pyongyangites lined the streets as the nuclear test personnel’s motor coaches (buses) motorcaded throughout Pyongyang before arriving at the nuclear test personnel’s accommodation at the Koryo Hotel.  Kyodo World Service reported on 20 February on the nuclear testers’ arrival: “Korean Central Television footage showed citizens lined up on major streets to welcome visitors arriving in buses. A large banner displayed at the lobby of the Pyongyang Koryo Hotel, which they are staying, reads, ‘Successful third underground nuclear test!’  According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, which caters to domestic radio listeners, nuclear scientists and others visited bronze statues of former leader Kim Jong Il and his father and state founder Kim Il Sung on Mansu Hill in the heart of Pyongyang.”  According to KCNA, after arriving at the Koryo the personnel were greeted by Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Secretary for Machine-Building Industry Pak To Chun, KWP Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Kim Ki Nam and senior managers of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department.

Final Countdowns at P’unggye-ri Test Site? (Will but you won’t)

Overview of area around the nuclear test area near Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province. The red lines denote the closure or roads to human and vehicular traffic (Photo: Google image, route lines and annotations by M. Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

(Photos: Google images)

 

Yonhap News Agency,citing anonymous South Korean [ROK] government sources, reported on 12 February (Tuesday) that personnel and equipment may have been pulled out of the area close to the DPRK’s nuclear test site in P’unggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province.  According to Yonhap ”no movement of manpower and equipment has been observed since Friday [8 February] at the country’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site.”  An unnamed official said “When manpower and equipment are withdrawn, it can be an indication that a nuclear test is imminent.  We’re watching the developments closely to know whether a nuclear test is imminent or it’s another deceptive tactic.” This follows another report in South Korean media that while the date of a nuclear test “still remains unclear, with the tension expected to enter the most critical phase this week, a senior official in Seoul said Monday [11 February]” and this week will be “the most critical point.”

The community of Punggye-ri, located 12.5 km (7.7 miles) from the nuclear test area (Photo: Google images)

Speculation among South Korean officials and experts about a forthcoming nuclear test occurred after an 8 February 2013 essay appeared in DPRK media outlet T’ongil Sinbo said that “the United States and hostile forces, based on their own hypothesis and arguments, jumped to the conclusion that the Republic would conduct a ‘third nuclear test,’ and they are prattling that if this were to become a reality, they should not only impose ‘high-intensity sanctions’ but even mount a ‘preemptive attack’” and “The United States and hostile forces’ reasoning behind “the nuclear threat of the North” is brigandish sophistry coercing unconditional submission and surrender, as it argues that the nuclear weapons possessed by the Republic constitute some kind of ‘threat,’ though they are for the purpose of defending the dignity and sovereignty of the nation and the peace and security of this land by boldly countering the United States’ threat of war of northward aggression and nuclear threat that are becoming more undisguised with each passing day. This does not work on the Republic, though its pawns may take it seriously.”

South Korean government officials described the T’ongil Sinbo essay as “a distraction tactic.”  Other North Korea experts said that “that Pyongyang plans to check Washington and Beijing’s responses to its changed rhetoric in order to consider additional options” and quoted Professor Kim Yong-hyun of the North Korean Studies Department at Dongguk University who said “North Korea could show the international community its new uranium enrichment facility in order to boast its nuclear capabilities that have grown considerably.”

According to FNK, road closures and blockages were put in place on 5 February.  Roads to and around P’unggye-ri were closed to vehicular and human traffic indefinitely and prevented DPRK citizens from traveling from  North Hamgyo’ng Province to Paegam County, Ryanggang Province.  Personnel from the Military Security Command wearing armbands “are guarding the roads, showing no sign of allowing passage no matter how one pleads one’s case.”  FNK‘s source recalled security precautions prior to the October 2006 nuclear test saying the roads “were completely blocked from 7 to 20 October during the nuclear test conducted in October 2006. People who are stranded, unable to come and go, are worried about ‘how their families waiting at home would manage to live if movement of the populace is restricted for 15 days like the time of the last test’.”  The FNK source also noted that “bribes that worked with soldiers and security officials enforcing control and restriction in the past proved to be ineffective this time, leaving one to only wait with nothing to be done.”

(Photo: Google image)

Taep’ung Investment Group Formally Dissolved

A 2010 meeting of borad members of the DPRK State Development Bank, linked to the Taep’ung International Investment Group. In this image are Jon Il Chun (R) and Ro Tu Chol (2nd R) (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Yonhap News Agency reported and confirmed on 1 February (Friday) that the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group has dissolved.  Taep’ung began as an energy provider selling oil and gas (via Sinu’iju) to the Korean People’s Army [KPA] and Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee.  Its leading executive was Pak Chol Su, a Korean resident in China.  Through his sales of energy supplies to the party and army, Pak became part of the Pyongyang social scene and eventually developed close ties with senior KPA and KWP officials.  In 2006 Taep’ung was formally organized as one of the country’s direct foreign investment entities.  Until 2010 there was little reported about Taep’ung’s activities in the country.

In early 2010, Taep’ung was designated as a key investment entity of the DPRK through authorization by Kim Jong Il and the National Defense Commission.  On 20 January 2010, the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group was formally incorporated and held a meeting of its 7 member board of directors in Pyongyang.  KWP Secretary and United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon was appointed director-general of the board in his capacity as Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee with Pak Chol Su appointed a deputy director-general of the board.  According to DPRK state media Taepu’ng was organized under the auspices of the DPRK National Defense Commission, the DPRK Cabinet and Ministry of Finance and the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee.  Incorporated and organized alongside Taepu’ng’s expansion was the State Development Bank, which would be led by Jon Il Chun, a proxy for the National Defense Commission and a close aide to the late leader Kim Jong Il.  Jon, also (and currently) a deputy director of the KWP Finance and Accounting Department, was elevated to head the State Development Bank at the same time he was appointed to manage the powerful DPRK conglomerate Taeso’ng Group and as the key head of Office #39, lucrative entities earning foreign currency for the DPRK.  Taep’ung had attained such a flavor-of-the-week status  that one of its key KPA contacts appeared on an April 2010 military promotions list.

Despite several attempts, including the internal transfer of several state-owned enterprises, and a high profile trip by Jon Il Chun at the head of a large delegation of executives under the auspices of Taepu’ng, the company attained little to no foreign direct investment.  There were also unconfirmed  (and likely erroneous) rumors Taepu’ng became the business rival to another DPRK entity, reportedly  established as a competing venture by Gen. O Kuk Ryol.  According to Yonhap, Taep’ung “oversaw the now-suspended joint tourist program in Mount Kumgang on the eastern coast of North Korea” and  was dissolved along with “another extra-governmental organization in charge of trade promotion and foreign investment with its work believed to have been reassigned to the government’s Commission for Joint Venture and Investment.”  It appears that a lot of direct foreign investment has now been consolidated under the Joint Venture and Investment Commission [JVIC], which is under the direction of Ri Ryong Nam and Ri Chol, along with the heavy hand of the Ryo’ngdoja, Jang Song Taek.  There also became problems with Taepu’ng’s Chinese backer Pak Chol Su and it did not help Taepu’ng’s external activities to have the imprimatur of the National Defense Commission, which is subjected to numerous United Nations and unilateral sanctions.

Similarly Taepu’ng’s existence may have presented a fundamental obstacle, or proven the wrong entity, for progress in the development of Special Economic Trade Zones in Rajin-So’nbong (Raso’n) and Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng/Wihwa Islands.  Of course, one corporation is but a small obstruction to howeverUnited Nations Security Council reacts to the potential nuclear test.   And yet, development in Raso’n (despite what one might read in the general lit.) seems to making some progress, likely in anticipation of the thaw of Unggi Bay.  It remains to be seen if the upcoming nuclear detonation and its UNSC blowback will affect the activities and formation of various PRC-DPRK development working groups (anchored in China) in late December 2012, and the signing of additional and explicit agreements on infrastructure and design using both DPRK and Chinese entities (no one will use the term iron-clad, just yet).

On 23 January, Chinese media reported that the DPRK Government approved the opening of a Chinese commercial bank primarily to settle transactions in Raso’n.  The bank was founded and a ribbon cutting ceremony held on 18 January.  According to Hunchun Rexian “Chinese Commercial Bank was put together and founded by China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Company Ltd. The bank’s primary business is renminbi settlement, handling letter of credit, bill of exchange, letter of guarantee, and guaranty for cross-border renminbi transactions, and offering savings, loans, banking, and other financial services. Chinese Commercial Bank was founded to conform with the needs of massive development of Sino- DPRK economic and trade at present as well as the needs of the “Outline of General Program for Joint Development and Joint Management of Naso’n Economic and Trade Zone As Well As Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng Economic Zone,” which was signed by China and the DPRK; it will act as a bridge and a bond in promoting and safeguarding Sino-DPRK economic and trade development.”   Hunchun (PRC) Vice Mayor Ren Puyu said that, ”Agreement on Joint Development and Joint Management of Raso’n Economic and Trade Zone” between the Chinese and the DPRK governments, and is the bridge and bond for serving Sino-DPRK financial cooperation and trade interactions; it will definitely play a positive role in promoting Sino-DPRK economic and trade interactions as well as economic prosperity in the future.”

4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries Closes

Kim Jong Un spekas during the last day of the 4th Meeting Party Cell Secretaries on 29 January 2013 in Pyongyang (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported on 29 January (Tuesday) that the 4th Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries closed.  Kim Jong Un and other members of the central leadership attended.  KJU’s last reported public appearance was at the opening day of the party cell secretaries meeting.  KCNA reported that speakers on the second day of the meeting “were unanimous in praising the leadership feats of the peerlessly great persons of Mt. Paektu associated with their fields and units, and analyzed and reviewed achievements, experience and defects in their party work in the past” and “made pledges to glorify generation after generation the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s idea on party-building and their feats, bring about an epochal turn in the party work under the leadership of the dear respected Kim Jong Un and thus contribute to turning the party into an unbreakable integral whole with firm center of leadership and unity, a genuine mother party that is linked with the people through one blood vessel and a guiding force that leads the building of a thriving nation.”

During their visit to Pyongyang, according to KCNA, party cell secretaries visited the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, celebrated their birthdays with a banquet and performance and visited textile mills.

Speakers on the second day of the conference included:

• Jo Jong Suk, secretary of the party cell of the Management Station of Revolutionary Battle Site of Mt. Paektu
• Yun Yong Bok, secretary of the party cell of the Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports
• Yun In Dok, secretary of the party cell of North Hamgyong Provincial People’s Hospital
• Jang Myong Sok, chief secretary of the Sinchon County Party Committee
• Ri Man Gon, chief secretary of the North Phyongan Provincial Committee of the WPK
• Jong U Yong, secretary of the party cell of the Fourth Shop of the Pukchang Thermal Power Complex
• Yom Yong Gil, secretary of the branch party committee of the Tools Shop of the Pyongyang Textile Machine Factory
• Jong Kwang Bok, secretary of the party cell of the Rodong Sinmun

Kim Jong Un delivered a keynote address at the meeting.  There were no nuclear invocations or martial rhetoric, but his remarks were a direct attack on corrupt mid-level party and government officials.    His full speech, according to KCNA:

I think that the report to the Conference and speeches have properly reviewed the achievements, experiences and shortcomings in the work of Party cells of the past and I would like to refer to some problems arising in enhancing the functions and role of Party cells drastically in line with the requirements of our Party and the developing revolution.

Comrades, At present our revolution has entered a new turning phase.

Our Party, army and people have been united more closely under the immortal flags bearing the beaming images of President Kim Il Sung and General Kim Jong Il and are advancing straight along the road of independence, the road of Songun and the road of socialism true to their instructions.

We have firmly had in our hands the powerful assets and the key with which to win a greater victory by having steadily defended the precious revolutionary legacies the General bequeathed to us and adding brilliance to them despite trying ordeals and hardships.

In particular, the successful launch of artificial earth satellite Kwangmyo’ngso’ng 3-2 last year was a historic event that demonstrated the inexhaustible power of the powerful Mt. Paektu nation to the whole world and a mega event that dealt a crushing blow to hostile forces trying viciously to stifle our Republic.

Now we have taken the initiative more firmly in the face-off with the imperialists and it is a matter of time to bring about a turn in the building of an economic giant and the standard of the people’s living.

We should effect a radical turn in the economic construction and the people’s livelihoods in the spirit and mettle displayed in conquering outer space and fly the red flag of victory on the peak of a thriving socialist country.

To step up the building of a thriving country, we should further strengthen the Party, the general staff and guiding force of the revolution, organizationally and ideologically, rally all the people around it closely and mobilize them effectively to carry out its policies.

It is the nature and the traditional revolutionary mode of the great party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that the entire Party is bound together with a single ideology and purpose and the Party and people are pushing the revolution and construction in a harmonious whole.

The President and the General developed our Party into an invincible party in which the monolithic ideological system and the monolithic leadership system have been established firmly and which has taken root deep among the people and set up a prosperous and strong socialist country by relying on the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative strength of the people united rock-hard around the Party.

The red flag of our Party in which only victory and glory have been etched and the socialist gains achieved on this land are associated with the proud history of single-hearted unity in which the leader believed in the Party members and people and the Party members and people trusted him absolutely and supported him with loyalty.

We should take the undying exploits performed by the President and the General in Party building as an eternal treasure so as to further develop our Party into a powerful, militant general staff that is knitted closely together in a single ideology and purpose and takes root deep among the people and surely build the strongest country, the people’s paradise the world looks up to, on this land on the strength of the Party-people harmonious whole.

The position and role of Party cells are very important in strengthening our Party further and speeding up the building of a thriving country in line with the requirements of a new era of the Juche-based revolution.

Party cell is a base of the Party life for the Party members, the Party’s end nerve stretched out into the masses of the people and a scouting group in carrying out the Party’s policies.

When Party cells are strong the Party will never shake in any adversity and there will be nothing we are afraid of or we can not do.

As the consolidation of Party cells is the first step and the essential thing for strengthening the whole Party, the Party Central Committee has convened the Conference of Cell Secretaries as the first meeting for improving Party work since the Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea and regards this Conference as important as a Party congress and conference.

In order to make the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea a turning point in enhancing the Party’s militant might in every way and stepping up the building of a thriving country, the participants in the Conference and the cell secretaries of the whole Party should understand the Party’s intention clearly and improve the work of Party cells radically.

The most important task facing Party cells at present is to prepare the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists and true comrades and comrades-in-arms of our Party.

Preparing all the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists is a prerequisite and decisive guarantee for developing ours into the eternal party of the President and the General and winning the final victory in the building of a thriving country and the Juche-based revolution.

Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist means the soldier and follower loyal to the President and the General, who takes Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism as his firm faith and devotes his all to victory in the Juche- based revolution under the leadership of our Party.

Party cells should hold it as the main task to prepare the Party members as genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists and provide scrupulous guidance to their organizational and ideological life in the Party.

They should undertake education in Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism substantially among the Party members so as to train them soundly into ardent revolutionary fighters who are thoroughly armed with the Juche idea and the Songun idea of our Party and are equipped with the spirit of safeguarding the leadership of the revolution at the cost of their lives, firm faith in socialism and steadfast class consciousness against imperialism.

Stalwart members of the Society for Rallying Comrades, the first organization of our Party, are the exemplars from whom all the Party members should learn.

Party cells should conduct education energetically so that all the Party members venerate the Party and the leader with absolute faith and pure conscience like our Party’s first-generation members including Cha Kwang Su and Kim Hyok and carry forward the tradition of single- hearted unity steadily.

A habit of leading a voluntary Party life on the basis of a high sense of organizational duty should be established in Party cells and the Party members should be trained in the furnace of the Party’s organizational life so that they become stout revolutionaries with boundless loyalty to the Party, leader, country and people and a strong sense of organization and discipline.

Particular attention should be paid to implanting the Party members with love for the people and spirit of serving them devotedly in preparing them as true Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists.

Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is, in essence, the people-first doctrine and a person who worships the people as God and works devotedly for them is just a genuine Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist.

It is the firm determination of our Party to respect our people and devote everything to them as we hold the President and the General in high esteem.

The slogan “Everything for the people and everything by relying on them!” contains the Party’s will to fill the whole Party with love for and trust in the people.

All the officials and Party members should be genuine comrades and comrades-in-arms who steadily follow, together with our Party, the road of l ove for the people the President and the General had taken throughout their lives.

Party cells should implant their noble outlook on the people deep in the officials and Party members to make them serve and love the people like their parents, wives and children.

The Party cells to which officials belong, in particular, should take it as an important task to prepare them as the true servants of the people and enhance guidance over and control of their Party life.

From the very beginning after he founded our Party the President saw the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices manifested among officials as the most dangerous poison a working- class ruling party should guard against and ensured that a consistent struggle was waged against them.

The General put forward the slogan “We serve the people!” and devoted energy and soul to developing our Party into a motherly party serving the people faithfully, not a party that indulges in power abuse and bureaucracy.

However, whenever the Party underlined the need to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices, Party organizations simply called meetings for criticizing ideological defects and punished some officials.

Then they did not make persevering efforts to transform officials on a revolutionary pattern.

Abuse of power and bureaucracy are not merely a matter of personal character or work style of officials, but a matter of their ideology.

When they abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner, officials will not merely lose their popularity among the masses and get a blot on their political integrity, but impair the Party’s authority and the prestige of socialism, which will end up leading the revolution and construction to ruin.

Today when the enemy is resorting to more vicious schemes to undermine the single-hearted unity between our Party and people, those who abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner are the major targets of criticism, those whom our Party should punish resolutely.

The Party Central Committee is firmly determined not simply to weed out but to root out the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices that are like the poisonous weeds sprouting on the garden of socialism centred on the masses of the people.

The campaign against power abuse and bureaucracy is a Party-wide undertaking in which all Party organizations and their members should turn out.

In order to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices officials and cell secretaries should try hard to train themselves in a revolutionary way, and Party cells, to say nothing of the Party Central Committee, provincial, city and county Party committees and their primary organizations, should wage an intensive, principled struggle against power abuse and bureaucracy.

There are ranks in work, but there can never be members of high or low rank in the Party life and the double standards of discipline are never allowed in the Party.

Party cells should create a strict atmosphere of criticism and ideological campaign and intensify criticism from bottom up in particular to give comradely help to officials to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices and prepare themselves as the true servants of the people.

Party cells should clearly distinguish between demands of officials and bureaucracy.

When abuse of power and bureaucratic practices are manifested among officials even in the slightest degree, they should not neglect them but wage a struggle against them promptly.

All Party cells should not be indifferent to the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices of the officials who do not belong to them but actively struggle against them; as for serious cases, they should report on them to higher Party organizations, including the Party Central Committee, before it is too late.

Another important task facing Party cells at present is to work with the masses properly so that broad segments of people establish a firm bond of kinship with our Party.

The masses are the grass-roots foothold the Party relies on and the eternal companions with whom our Party should share the destiny until the final victory will have been won in the revolution.

If the Party loses their support and trust it will lose its grass-roots basis, fail to fulfil its militant mission and in the end become unable to maintain its own existence.

If we are to defend socialism and build a thriving country amid the fierce showdown with the enemy and reunify the country, we should fully grasp the public sentiments and win over as many people as possible through efficient work with them.

As rallying broad masses of people around the Party is an important issue decisive of the destiny of the Party and revolution, an amnesty was proclaimed last year in the run-up to the 100th birthday of the President and the 70th birthday of the General.

It was ensured that most of the participants in the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Korean Children’s Union were the children of ordinary workers, farmers, service personnel and intellectuals, rather than those of cadres, and the children of those who committed offences against the country were not discriminated in being chosen as delegates if they were exemplary in study and organizational life of the Children’s Union.

The embrace that cares more for sick and wounded children, gives them love and affection, cures their sour wounds, helps them up and puts them forward again, instead of blaming them this is the embrace of our motherly Party.

We should train all the people to be strong in ideology and faith with great force produced by the motherly Party’s love and trust that are more powerful than nuclear weapons, thereby building rings of fortresses around the Party Central Committee.

All Party cells should work with the masses properly in keeping with our Party’s benevolent politics and all-embracing politics so that they shout “Long live the Workers’ Party!” even though they are left alone in out-of-the-way mountains.

Only then will all the people fight for the Party, the revolution and the country at the risk of their lives in a do-or-die war.

In order to conduct work with the masses effectively in line with the Party’s intention Party cells should assess the people properly in the interests of the revolution.

People have emotions and express their feelings differently according to their characters.

Party cells, guided by the General’s saying that they should know the real minds of people even though they do not know what there is in the fathomless water, should read the innermost thoughts of people and make an unbiased assessment of them.

They should not only stick to collective education but channel great efforts into individual education in educating the masses.

Party work, work with the masses, cannot be conducted with any formula or a single solution.

It is imperative to study appropriate methods of educating people of different characters and apply them to practice so as to make even one more person support the Party.

We should not indiscriminately discard people, even though they are unwilling to accept the Party’s ideas.

If so, it will result in a gradual decrease in the number of the people to be rallied around the Party.

Party cells should not cram the Party’s ideas into the heads of the masses, but educate them persuasively and perseveringly so that they would willingly accept the Party’s ideas.

It is very important to place trust in the people in winning over the masses. Political trust is followed by loyalty, but distrust produces betrayal.

As he is not a Buddhist image made of stone, man may make mistakes in his work and life and even commit unforgivable crimes.

No matter what serious mistakes or crimes he may make, and even though we find in him 99 per cent of demerits and only one per cent of merit or conscience, we should value his conscience, boldly t rust him and lead him to start with a clean slate.

People who have deep-seated mental agonies should be treated more kind-heartedly and particular attention should be paid to freeing them from worries lingering in their minds.

Only then can all the people be developed into indefatigable fighters who will only trust and follow our Party in any adversity, just like white gem that preserves its colour even if it is broken into pieces and bamboo that keeps its straightness even if it is burnt.

Our Party expects that all Party cells will become the blood vessels that link broad masses of the people with the Party with a feeling of kinship and the stones supporting the fortress of single-hearted unity.

Today when the general advance for building a thriving socialist country is gaining momentum, an important task facing Party cells is to actively mobilize the Party members and other working people to carry out the Party’s policies.

The most important revolutionary task facing our Party at present is to translate into brilliant reality the lofty wish of the General who continued super-intensity forced march energetically until the last moment of his life to bring all the benefits of socialism to our people.

In order to bring about a radical turn in the building of an economic giant and the standard of the people’s living, the Party organizations at all levels, Party cells in particular, should creditably play a role of the death-defying corps and scouting group in implementing the Party’s policies.

A Party cell that fails to work efficiently to carry out the Party’s policies cannot be said to be a living Party cell.

At present a great emphasis is put on establishing the monolithic leadership system in the entire Party more thoroughly; whether the Party’s monolithic leadership system is established finds concentrated expression in how the Party’s policies are implemented.

At present not a few Party cells are conducting their work in such a way as to transmit the Party’s policies and instructions to the people and exhort them to turn out for their implementation.

Then the Party’s policies, however correct they may be, cannot be carried out properly and the people’s livelihoods can never be improved.

Party cells should carry out the Party’s policies perseveringly till they pay off in the people’s livelihoods.

Now our officials hold that in order to ensure the Party’s authority it is important to publish a lot of books and intensify information work.

However, the Party’s leadership authority is not ensured by means of texts or words; it is possible only when the Party’s policies are carried out in a thoroughgoing way and people enjoy subsequent benefits.

Party cells should inspire all the Party members and officials to be a valuable foundation for translating the Party’s policies into reality with an unusual determination to sweat blood to improve the people’s living standards.

They should resolutely overcome the tendency to work like a flash in the pan in implementing the Party’s policies and carry them through to the end with unfailing efforts so that our Party’s policies prove to be effective in the people’s livelihoods.

To be the death-defying corps and scouting group in implementing the Party’s policies, Party cells should conduct organizational and political work in a progressive manner to raise a hot wind of Kim Jong Il’s patriotism to the full.

When the hearts of the people are beating vigorously with patriotism of the General who had burnt himself up like a candle for the sake of the country, there will be no difficulty we cannot surmount, nor will there be any fortress we cannot conquer.

Party cells should encourage the Party members and other working people to cherish Kim Jong Il’s patriotism in their minds and devote their heart and soul to carrying out the Party’s lines and policies, holding dear every stone and every blade of grass on this land and warming them up with their blood.

Today our Party requires creating a new spirit of the times advancing towards the world by restoring the fighting spirit in the 1970s when the drum of revolution resounded.

The creators of the spirit of the present times should naturally be produced among the officials and Party members who are the commanding personnel and vanguard fighters of the revolution.

When all the officials and Party members become a locomotive and a scout who plough their way through virgin snow in the van of their sectors and units, like those of the 1970s who had ushered in a heyday in the era of the Workers’ Party under the leadership of the General, leaps and innovations will be made in all posts and the overall affairs of the country will go smoothly.

The Party’s lines and policies can be implemented successfully when all the masses as well as Party members turn out.

Party cells should enlist Party members and the hardcore of the masses to make one person rouse ten others and ten a hundred again, and an innovation in a unit lead on to innovations in other units.

They should bring about a great innovation, a great leap forward racing against time on all fronts of building a socialist economic giant and a civilized nation by dynamically mobilizing workers, farmers, intellectuals and all other sections of people in carrying out the Party’s policies.

Special efforts should be channelled into work with young people in organizing and mobilizing the masses in implementing the Party’s policies.

Young people are vanguard fighters who have taken the lead in supporting the Party and leader in each period and stage of our revolution.

It was none other than young people who lit the torch of the great Chollima upsurge by exerting themselves with patriotism at the furnaces in Kangson in the postwar days and who wrought miracles in the Haeju-Hasong railway project.

Party cells should put forward the young people of new generation and lead them to give fullest play to their resources and gallantry to perform epoch-making heroic exploits in every field of building a thriving nation as their fathers and mothers did in their youth.

This is an age of science and technology, the age of knowledge-based economy, and the building of a prosperous country and its future are inconceivable apart from science and technology.

Party cells should render positive encouragement and sustaining assistance to scientists and technicians so that they raise the hot wind of breaking through the cutting edge as the space scientists who conquered space did.

And they should provide scrupulous Party guidance to ensure that officials, Party members and other working people find out a key to self-reliance and increased production in science and technology and that they try hard to learn advanced science and technology and solve all problems on the strength of science and technology.

By so doing, they should fan the flames of the industrial revolution in the new century and the campaign for breaking through the cutting edge, which the great General kindled, more fiercely in all sectors and units.

Cell secretaries should enhance their sense of responsibility and role in order for Party cells to discharge the heavy mission and duty they assume on behalf of the times and the revolution.

The combat efficiency of Party cells largely depends on the preparedness and role of cell secretaries.

Party cell secretaries are the point men of our Party in building it up and implementing its lines and policies.

When the cell secretaries of the whole Party become the standard-bearers of the revolution and struggle and discharge their responsibilities, Party cells will be consolidated and our revolution advance faster that much.

If Party cell secretaries are to fulfil their duty, they should be like the mother of a family.

The essence of the work of Party cell secretaries is to arouse people through efficient political work to move their hearts .

To this end, they should devote all their sincerity as mothers do to their children.

There is an impressive passage in song “The Voice of the Mother” which goes that although the voice of a mother is heard only in a family, the voice of the Party reverberates throughout the country; it is none other than cell secretaries who should ensure that the voice of the motherly Party full of love and trust resounds throughout the country.

Reflecting themselves on the song, all our cell secretaries should get closer to the minds of people like the mother of a family and rally them firmly behind the Party.

If they are to be like mothers, they should be so warm-hearted and broad-minded that everybody is willing to come to them and unbosom himself or herself.

They should always rack their brains over how to lead people along the right track and add glory to their political integrity.

They should think about the problems of their comrades and the masses before their own family affairs and devote themselves entirely to the collective as mothers would dedicate their blood, flesh and even their lives unhesitatingly to their children.

Always looking up to the beaming images of the President and the General in their minds, cell secretaries should treat people tenderly and warmly with motherly affectionate eyes, bright expression and polite manner.

Only then will people gather around them as honey bees swarm around fragrant flowers and an amicable atmosphere pervade the collective.

If they are to fulfil their duty with credit, Party cell secretaries should set examples for the masses in carrying out the revolutionary tasks.

If they put their backs into difficult tasks ahead of others and make tireless efforts to implement the Party’s policies, this is a political work more powerful than hundreds of words.

Those who take on the most dangerous and difficult undertaking ahead of others and make a breakthrough in the advance like Kim Kum Su, a former Party cell secretary of the explosive disposal squad under the Kangwon Provincial People’s Security Bureau, are genuine cell secretaries required by our Party.

Cell secretaries should not merely call upon Party members and other working people to turn out in implementing the Party’s policies but lead the masses to the struggle and exploits by setting practical examples.

If they are devoted to the Party and the revolution in the van of the masses they may rest or sleep less than others, but they should regard it as comfort, not as toil.

To fulfil their responsibilities and role, Party cell secretaries should improve their political and practical qualifications.

If they are poorly qualified, they cannot work skillfully with people and arouse them forcefully to the implementation of the Party’s policies, however great their determination and enthusiasm may be.

Cell secretaries should not try to have a say on the strength of the Party’s authority or their position but secure authority in work and trust of the masses by means of their practical abilities.

They should make an in-depth study of the works of the President and the General and Party documents to have better knowledge of the Party’s ideas, lines and policies than anybody else and get familiar with the instructions of the President and the General and the Party’s policies which are related to their sectors and units and Party work, in particular.

By making a substantial study of Party Rules and the standards of Party life they should be well acquainted with all practical matters as to the work of Party cells including the organization and guidance of Party life and the expansion of Party membership.

They should have many-sided knowledge of different fields such as politics, the military, the economy and culture and be well-informed about the situation at home and abroad.

The capability to correctly read people’s minds and move their hearts is an indispensable qualification of cell secretaries.

They should acquire proficient methods of working with the masses and be persons of versatile talents who know how to dance, sing and make a motivational speech in front of the masses.

In order to enhance the militant functions and role of Party cells as required by the developing times and revolution, it is necessary to establish the climate of attaching importance and giving positive help to them throughout the Party.

Party committees at all levels should pay close attention to building up the ranks of cell secretaries with those who are politically and ideologically staunch, popular among Party members and practically prepared and improving their qualifications.

They should transmit and disseminate Party documents and policies to cell secretaries in time, regularly inform them of the decisions and directives of higher Party organizations for their implementation and specify correct orientation of work.

In the guidance of lower organizations, Party committees at all levels should fully meet the Party’s demands that officials help and teach cell secretaries, while going down to Party cells and giving guidance to the Party life of their members.

It is also necessary to run the day of Party cell secretaries efficiently on a regular basis and widely organize short courses, discussions about experiences and the like.

For the present, the short course to be given in the wake of this Conference should be organized properly so as to give a substantial help to cell secretaries in their work.

Party cell secretaries assume heavy responsibilities and duties in the efforts to develop our Party into the glorious party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and expedite the building of a thriving nation.

The Party Central Committee firmly believes that all the Party cell secretaries and Party officials will creditably fulfil the honourable mission and duty they assume on behalf of the Party and revolution, fully aware that they themselves hold the flag of the Chuch’e-oriented Party.

After his speech, according to KCNA, meeting participants “extended greatest glory and warmest thanks to Kim Jong Un, who has further strengthened the WPK shining with the august names and feats of the great Generalissimos, remarkably enhanced its leadership role and thus provided the undying important programme to effect a great swing in the revolution and construction” and that “letter of pledge to the WPK was adopted at the conference.”

Kim Jong Un then delivered a closing speech in which he said “the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea will be etched in the history of our Party as the one that marks a milestone in strengthening the militant might of the Party to the maximum as required by a new historic age in the accomplishment of the revolutionary cause of Juche and achieving the final victory in the building of a thriving nation” and “The revolutionary ideas of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are a science, and doing things as told by them leads to a sure victory in whatever difficulties and trials. This is the truth proved by our revolutionary practice.”  According to KCNA Kim Jong Un also said “the participants in the Conference and other cell secretaries of the whole Party should bear in their minds the spirit of the Conference and fully apply them to their work, so as to give fullest play to the vitality of the Conference in the reality of the gigantic struggle to build a thriving country” and “Fully convinced that all the participants in the Conference and other cell secretaries of the whole Party will discharge their revolutionary duties in the sacred struggle for bringing earlier the prosperous future, firmly rallied around the Party Central Committee, Kim Jong Un declared the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the WPK closed. “

DPRK Newspaper Says Nuclear Test is “people’s demand” as Construction Progresses in Kilchu County

Images of a tunnel entrance (top) and tunnel leading to the nuclear detonation site. These images appeared in episode 4 of the 2009 Korea Film Studios’ feature The Country I Saw, which included a depiction of the 25 May 2009 nuclear test (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Yonhap News Agency reported on 26 January (Saturday) that an editorial in Rodong Sinmun, the daily newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, said that  ”A nuclear test is the demand of the people and no other choice can be made” and “It is the people’s demand that there should be something even greater than a nuclear test.”  The 26 January 2013 editorial was published three days after the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] passed resolution #2087 (2013) which “condemns” the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket and “demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation.”  The 26 January Rodong editorial said that that UNSC “gave us no other choice . . .but to go to the very end.”  It is not clear if going “to the very end” is part of an “upcoming all-out action” which announced in a 24 January (Thursday) statement by the DPRK’s supreme power organization the National Defense Commission.  

The Rodong editorial was published the same day as DPRK state media reported that the country’s 23 January Foreign Ministry statement “as regards the fabrication of the ‘resolution’ by the U.S. and its allies at the U.N. Security Council in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK was distributed as an official document S/2013/50 at the UNSC on Jan. 25 (Friday).”  On 26 January (Saturday) DPRK state media conducted a few “man on the street” interviews about the UNSC resolution.  According to KCNA the slogan (likely authored by Korean Workers’ Party Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Kim Ki Nam, the country’s slogan master) “‘Death to the U.S. imperialists, sworn enemy of the Korean people” can be heard everywhere in the country.”  KCNA reported that “Many young people are volunteering for military services, out of their will to annihilate the enemies while other people visit military posts with aid materials.”  In one interview elderly Moranbong District resident Kim Tok Jong said, “A nation’s sovereignty is more precious than one’s life” and that he ”lived for nearly 70 years. The past years clearly shows that words do not go on the U.S. and only force is needed to settle accounts with it.  If a war breaks out, I will take arms in my hand to fight against the U.S. scoundrels.   I will also do my utmost to wipe out the group of evils running amuck to trample down the nation’s right to existence and development.”

(Photo: KCTV screengrab from The Country That I Saw,)

Meanwhile, in Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province, “satellite imagery from January 23, 2013 and previous images dating back a month reveal that the site appears to be at a continued state of readiness that would allow the North to move forward with a test in a few weeks or less once the leadership in Pyongyang gives the order,” according to an analysis by Jack Liu for 38 North.

Liu’s analysis shows that imagery “reveals continued activity at the area near the possible test tunnel entrance through the appearance of bare ground and open roads. There was significant snowfall in November 2012, and the area has been cleared in the dead of winter, indicating the intent to maintain site readiness.”  Another image reveals “a close-up of a December 24 GeoEye satellite image shows an apparent pile of material in the yard of the main administrative buildings near the entrance to the possible command bunker.  (The presence of a bus, probably used to transport personnel working at the site, is another indicator of continued activity.) The purpose of that material remains unclear. One possible explanation is that it is intended for ‘stemming’ or sealing the tunnel in.”  An image captured in early January shows a significant personnel presence “ another indicator of continued activity and readiness at the site. Thirty or more personnel, possibly soldiers or security guards, can be seen in formation in the same area. They may be there for special duty, for example to greet visiting officials, or for some other more routine purpose.”  Finally, an image taken three days ago, as the NDC warned of “all-out action” finds that “that the pile of material in the yard of the administrative area has shrunk. If this material is intended for stemming, one possible explanation is that operations have begun to seal the test tunnel. This image also provides the clearest view of the tunnel entrance to date. Roads to the entrance continue to remain clear.”

Even if a third experimental detonation (HEU, thermonuclear or otherwise), there remains the matter of a delivery system.  The Japanese Defense Minister, Itsunori Onodera said at a meeting attended by new PM Shinzo Abe that DPRK missile research capability had “entered into a new stage.”  According to Xinhua English (note the media source), ” Onodera said that “the missile, which the DPRK called as a rocket to send a satellite into orbit, could reach U.S. western coast more accurately with a range of more than 10,000 km (6,213 miles)” and “that the capability of the DPRK’s short-or-middle-range missiles has also been improved, posing more threats to Japan’s security.”  Onodera’s remarks were based on an analysis of the 12 December 2012 U’nha-3 launch.

On 25 January (Friday) UNSC Resolution #2087 (2013) and the DPRK’s reactions to the resolution was a hot topic at the US State Department’s daily briefing (during the course of Victoria Nuland’s briefing it seems a group of people got lost in the building).  Still on North Korea? Yes, indeedy.  The relevant sections excerpted (for Empsonian close reading and interpretation) below:

QUESTION:North Korea threatening to go to war with the South?

MS. NULAND: As you know, my colleague Jay Carney spoke to these issues yesterday. These statements coming out in North Korea are needlessly provocative. Any kind of further test would be another significant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and only will serve to further Pyongyang’s isolation. As you all know, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 earlier in the week in response to the December missile launch, and that resolution tightens the sanctions on North Korea and works hard to ensure that it cannot succeed as a proliferator of missile technology, et cetera.

And it’s just – it’s really a pretty sad story because the new North Korean leader has a choice to make, as the Secretary has said so many times. He can serve to focus on the needs of his people, to bring his country out of isolation and back into compliance with international obligations, open it back up to the world, or he can continue to waste what little money the country has on missile technologies and things while his people go hungry. So –

QUESTION: I have a question on that. The new leader is not all that new. I mean, you have a pattern of events that you can look at – the original failed test, the subsequent missile test that was successful, and now the threat to conduct a third nuclear test. Does it seem to you all now that he has made his choice and how – what kind of a strategy, a diplomatic strategy, can you pursue if he is not interested in serious talks about his nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

MS. NULAND: Well, you’re not wrong that the pattern of choices is concerning, which is why we felt very strongly that the international community – oh, we seem to have some guests. Hi, guys. Not sure who they were, but I think they were lost.

So again, the pattern of choices appears to be quite concerning. That’s why it’s been so important to keep the international community united in response to these negative choices, why we took the time we did to get it right with Resolution 2087, to make clear to North Korea that particularly the Six-Party states, including all of North Korea’s neighbors, are united in ensuring that there is a price to say, that there will be increasing sanctions, that we are going to be vigilant about their proliferation activity, the activities of their banks, and that it’s going to take the country in the wrong direction.

I think you know that Ambassador Glyn Davies is out in the region now. He is in Beijing today, had very productive and useful meetings with counterparts there, including Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, his counterpart Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei, and others. He was in Seoul yesterday and he’s going on to Tokyo tomorrow. So very much a project to stay coordinated with our Six-Party counterparts in watching this and in ensuring that North Korea gets the message that nothing good is going to come from this.

QUESTION: And turn back to the China issue in this whole mix. Today, the Chinese press seemed to be suggesting that they’ve told North Korea that if it goes ahead with its nuclear test that they will actually – Beijing could cut its aid to Pyongyang. That seems to be an interesting move on the part of the Chinese. What would you have to say on that?

MS. NULAND: Well, I didn’t see those particular comments. But we have, as you know, regularly encouraged Beijing to use the significant influence that it has with Pyongyang. They have, at various times, been able to make clear that the continued support of Beijing in terms of trade, aid, the energy relationship, et cetera, depends on North Korea making the right choices. Again, China joins strongly with us in Resolution 2087, which was important, and we, as Glyn Davies said – he had a very good visit to Beijing in terms of plotting the course forward together.

QUESTION: How important – if they go ahead and do something like that – how important could such a cut in Chinese aid to North Korea be in changing the calculations of the North Korean leadership?

MS. NULAND: Well, I don’t want to speculate on scenarios to be determined. But obviously, North Korea remains quite dependent on its aid and trade relationship with Beijing.

Jill, still on this?

QUESTION: Toria, are the Six-Party Talks off, as they seem to be indicating in the North Korean statement?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve made clear for more than a year now that the Six-Party Talks couldn’t go forward to a new round unless we saw real evidence that the DPRK was prepared to meet its obligations. So we’re still in the state that we’ve been for more than a year in terms of not having the kind of intent that we need to go forward.

QUESTION: New topic?

MS. NULAND: Still on North Korea?

QUESTION: Still on North Korea.

MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please, here.

QUESTION: Do you – this time around, do you have any reason to believe the North Koreans will get that message and actually take astep on – well, make the – what you would call the right choice and actually open up to dialogue, or perhaps discontinue their programs or even do anything in the right direction?

MS. NULAND: Well, anybody who endeavored to be predictive about North Korean behavior is probably foolish. But what’s been important to us is strong unity among the Six-Party Talks countries, strong unity in the region about a positive course forward, and the fact that there will be consequences if they keep making bad choices.

QUESTION: One more?

MS. NULAND: Yeah.

QUESTION: What types of consequences?

MS. NULAND: Well, I think –

QUESTION: Because there’s been few besides UN resolutions that haven’t changed their behavior. There hasn’t really been any significant consequences otherwise.

MS. NULAND: I would reject that, Brad. If you look at UN Security Council that was just passed, 2087, and go through it, and I would commend to you the fact sheet that USUN put out on this, it imposes new sanctions on North Korean companies and government agencies, including a broad range of sanctions against their space agency, which was responsible for the launch, as well as the Bank of East Land and several individuals in the North Korean system who had previously not been sanctioned. Six entities and four individuals will have their assets frozen and will be prohibited from engaging in financial transactions. This is UN sanctions, not just U.S. sanctions. There’s an updated list of nuclear and ballistic missile technology that’s going to be banned from transfer to or from the DPRK. I could continue. But –

QUESTION: Do you think there’s space to squeeze them further on the sanctions route, that this country which is perhaps the most heavily sanctioned in the world can still be – there’s still consequences along this sanctions route left?

MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, and we wouldn’t have put new sanctions on them if we didn’t think that they would be effective.

Please.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up quickly as far as North Korea’s missile technology or missiles are concerned. Despite UN Security Council resolutions or UN sanctions, international sanctions, still North Korea is continuing and not listening to the international community. So if China is with you, Madam, since China was always helping North Korea. But who else is behind this technology or behind North Korea?

MS. NULAND: Well, again, I think what we just have been through here is the fact that the international community now with this new resolution has spoken with one voice in putting on increasingly tough sanctions on the DPRK, including getting at the space agency, getting at the banks, naming individuals who had not previously been named, as contributing to taking the country in the wrong direction. And we will continue to look for further opportunities to make our views clear in this kind of a way if the DPRK doesn’t change course.

QUESTION: And when this new leader came in North Korea, everybody hoped that things will change to the right direction for the people of North Korea, but still they are going in the worst direction as far as the people are concerned.

MS. NULAND: Well, again, we would certainly agree with that. I mean, as you know, we were a year ago engaged in trying to work out some kind of a food assistance deal, but we didn’t get the kind of assurance that we needed from the government that it was going to go to the right place. So it’s very disappointing.

Please.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Does the United States have any separate plan for additional sanctions toward North Korea for the third nuclear test?

MS. NULAND: In response to the December test, what you will see and what you’ve seen in the last couple of days are U.S. decisions that implement the larger UN Security Council decisions in 2087. So you’re starting to see us put out our own sanctioning information to ensure that we are complying now in our own law with 2087.

UNSC “Condemns” U’nha-3 Launch

U’nha-3 rocket on display at the Sanum-dong research and development facility in northern Pyongyang (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

On 22 January (Tuesday) the United Nations Security Council voted on a resolution 2087 (2013) which “condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)” and “Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches” and “Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation.”

The UNSC also sanctioned four DPRK officials tied to the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket launch: Paek Chang Ho, head of the Korean Committee for Space Technology Satellite Control Center; Jang Myong Jin (Chang Myong-chin), manager of the Sohae Satellite Launch Center; Ra Kyong Su, manager of Tanch’on Commercial Bank; and, Kim Kwang Il, another manager of Tanch’on Commercial Bank.  The UNSC also sanctioned and froze the assets of: the Korean Committee for Space Technology; Tongbang Bank (Bank of East Land),which is part of the Green Pine Corporation; Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation, a subsidiary trading corporation of the Korean Mining Development Trading Corporation [KOMID]; Tosong Technology Corporation, another subsidiary of KOMID; Korean Ryo’nha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, a subsidiary Korean Ryo’nbong General Corporation; and the Hong Kong-based Leader International.

In reply to the resolution, most notably the DPRK Foreign Ministry said “ that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged” and “the September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier, due to the U.S. hostile policy to the DPRK that has become evermore pronounced.”  The Foreign Ministry also stated “the DPRK will take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defence including the nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively to cope with the evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. to apply sanctions and pressure against the DPRK.”

Below is the full text of the UNSC’s preamble and resolution:

The Security Council, condemning the launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology in violation of the sanctions imposed on it, today demanded that the country not proceed with any further such activities and expressed its “determination to take significant action” in the event it did so.

In that connection, the Council demanded, through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2087 (2013), immediate compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly.

It deplored the country’s violations of the measures imposed on it in 2006, and strengthened in 2009, including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, and underscored its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from that country or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to the activities banned by those resolutions.

The Council recalled that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with its previous resolutions, and clarified that the methods for disposal included, but were not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another States other than the originating or destination States for disposal.

It further clarified that the sanctions banned the transfer of any items if a State involved in the transaction has reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity, under the previous resolutions, is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer.

In a related provision, the Council called for enhanced vigilance by Member States and directed the relevant sanctions Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice in the event a vessel refused to allow an inspection authorized by its Flag State or if any vessel flagged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refused to be inspected, in line with its obligations.

Reaffirming its support for the six-party talks, the Council called for their resumption and urged all participants to intensify efforts to fully and expeditiously implement the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China.

The meeting was called to order at 3:08 p.m. and adjourned at 3:10 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2087 (2013) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

“Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,

“1.   Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“2.   Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

“3.   Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;

“4.   Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“5.   Recalls the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and determines that:

(a)   The measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II, and the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I; and,

(b)   The measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 and S/2012/947;

“6.   Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions, including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;

“7.   Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding situations where a vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s Flag State or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009);

“8.   Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;

“9.   Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;

“10.  Calls upon Member States which have not yet done so to report on the measures they have taken to implement the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), encourages other Member States to submit, if any, additional information on implementing the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“11.  Encourages international agencies to take necessary steps to ensure that all their activities with respect to the DPRK are consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and further encourages relevant agencies to engage with the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the DPRK that may relate to provisions of these resolutions;

“12.  Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, underscores its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) or 1874 (2009) and the importance of appropriate action by States in this regard, calls on States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, directs the Committee to review reported violations and take action as appropriate, including through designating entities and individuals that have assisted the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“13.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“14.  Reaffirms its desire for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, and underlines the need to refrain from any action that might aggravate tensions;

“15.  Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;

“16.  Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“17.  Reemphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

“18.  Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

“19.  Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’scompliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

“20.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze

1.    PAEK CHANG-HO

a.    Description: senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.

b.    AKA: Pak Chang-Ho; Paek Ch’ang-Ho

c.    Identifiers: Passport: 381420754; Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011; Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016; D.O.B. 18 June 1964; P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK

2.    CHANG MYONG-CHIN

a.    Description: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.

b.    AKA: Jang Myong-Jin

c.    Identifiers: D.O.B. 1966; Alt. D.O.B. 1965

3.    RA KY’ONG-SU

a.    Description: Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

4.    KIM KWANG-IL

a.    Description: Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Annex II

Asset Freeze

1.    KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR SPACE TECHNOLOGY

a.    Description: The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohaelaunch area.

b.    AKA: DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST

c.    Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

2.    BANK OF EAST LAND

a.    Description: DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Green Pine was designated by the Committee in April 2012.

b.    AKA: Dongbang BANK; TONGBANG U’NHAENG; TONGBANG BANK

c.    Location: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK

3.    KOREA KUMRYONG TRADING CORPORATION

a.    Description: Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

4.    TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION

a.    Description: The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

b.    Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

5.    KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION

a.    Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.

b.    AKA: CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION; RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION

c.    Location: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK

6.    LEADER ( HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL

a.    Description: Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’sprimary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

b.    AKA: Leader International Trading Limited

c.    Location: Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, 173 Des Voeux Road, Hong Kong

The DPRK Foreign Ministry’s full response, according to KCNA:

The DPRK’s successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year fully demonstrated its space science and technology and its overall national power. This was a stark fact favored by the world and recognized even by hostile forces including the United States.

In the wake of desperate efforts on the part of the U.S. and its followers to block the victorious advance of the DPRK, they cooked up a “resolution” of the UN Security Council on Tuesday in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK.

The U.S.-sponsored “resolution” is run through with hostile steps aiming at banning DPRK’s satellite launch for peaceful purposes and tightening “sanctions” against it to block its economic development and hamstring its work for developing economy and bolstering up defence capability.

The above-said countries insist that the DPRK’s satellite launch is problematic, asserting that “it uses ballistic missile technology” though they know better than any others about the fact that ballistic missile technology is the only means for launching satellite and they launch satellites more than any others. This is self-deception and the height of double-standards.

The essence of the matter is the U.S. brigandish logic that a satellite launch for peaceful purposes by a country which the U.S. antagonizes should not be allowed because any carrier rocket launched by it can be converted into long-range ballistic missile threatening the U.S. The UNSC is a marionette of the U.S.

The UNSC “resolutions” adopted under the pretext of the DPRK’s satellite launches are products of its blind pursuance of the hostile policy of the U.S. seeking disarmament of the DPRK and collapse of its system in violation of the universally accepted international laws.

Repeating wrongdoings without courage or responsibility to rectify them are despicable behaviors of cowards deceiving themselves and others. They are putting the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at greater peril.

The present situation clearly proves that the DPRK should counter the U.S. hostile policy with strength, not with words and that the road of independence and Songun chosen by the DPRK is entirely just.

To cope with the prevailing situation, the DPRK Foreign Ministry declares as follows:

First, the DPRK flatly rejects the unjust acts of the UNSC aimed at wantonly violating the sovereignty of the DPRK and depriving it of the right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes.

The hostile forces are seriously mistaken if they think they can bring down the DPRK with sanctions and pressure, and such an attempt will always bring them a disgraceful defeat.

The UNSC should apologize for its crime of seriously encroaching upon the independence of a sovereign state, following the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK in disregard of the universally recognized international laws, and repeal all the unreasonable “resolutions” at once.

Second, the DPRK will continue to exercise its independent and legitimate right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes while abiding by universally recognized international law on the use of space for peaceful purposes.

Scientists and technicians of the DPRK will develop and launch many more application satellites including communications satellite and more powerful carrier rockets essential for building an economic giant in the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in successfully launching satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2.

The DPRK will continuously launch satellites for peaceful purposes to conquer space and become a world-level space power.

Third, the DPRK drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged.

The September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier, due to the U.S. hostile policy to the DPRK that has become evermore pronounced.

There can be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula.

Fourth, the DPRK will take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defence including the nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively to cope with the evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. to apply sanctions and pressure against the DPRK.

The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will reliably defend the security and sovereignty of the country and safeguard the regional peace and stability with the might of Songun. They are full of the steadfast will to take a bold step to root out the source of provocations the hostile forces seek to continue against the DPRK.

No force on earth can block the great people proud of independence, powerful thanks to Songun politics and advancing in unity, convinced of truth.

Imports and Exports

Debris of the U’nha-3 rocket retrieved by South Korean [ROK] in late December 2012 (Photo: Yonhap)

The United Nations Security Council [UNSC] continues to deliberate on its reaction to the DPRK’s 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 carrier rocket and the Kwangmyo’ngso’ng-3 [KMS-3] satellite.  The rumors about the UN’s reaction disparate.  Yonhap News Agency reported on 18 January (Friday) that the UNSC  was” poised to adopt a new resolution calling for tougher sanctions against North Korea for its recent rocket launch” and citing unnamed sources who claimed “the move comes as China, a veto-wielding council member and a key ally of North Korea, apparently reversed its stance against taking strict actions against the North and agreed to punish Pyongyang.”  KBS Global‘s English service, however, reported that the UNSC will make an announcement on Saturday (19 January) and citing another unnamed source “the U.S. and China have agreed to announce a presidential statement as early as Saturday strongly denouncing North Korea’s long-range rocket launch.”

While the DPRK continues its dilatory opening policies and expands its foreign trade relationships, news items in South Korea [ROK] and Japanese media find foreign footprints in the DPRK’s strategic weapons program.  On 16 January (Wednesday) Munhwa Ilbo reported that South Korea’s [ROK] preliminary investigation of the U’nha-3 debris retrieved during 26 to 27 December was most likely a  patchwork of DPRK, Chinese, Russian and European components.  According to Munhwa‘s unnamed source ”the aluminum alloy fuselage, pressure sensor for the control system and the electric wiring systems were imported from Russia, China or other nations with advanced missile technology.”  Another unnamed official said that  the U’nha-3′s rocket engine was “composed both of banned items and dual-use components.”  In late December 2012 Aera reported that uranium enrichment centrifuges, which were produced inside the DPRK, were modeled after those manufactured by Urenco Group and and at a uranium enrichment facility  in Rokkasho, Aomori in Japan.  When a US group of nuclear experts toured a DPRK uranium enrichment facility in November 2010, a DPRK engineer told them “All components in this facility were produced domestically.  But they were modeled after the centrifuges at Almelo and Rokkasho-mura.”

These images reportedly depict the DPRK’s May 2009 nuclear test. They appeared in an episode of the Korea Film Studios’ feature The Country I Saw, broadcast in September 2010, which included a depiction of the 2009 experimental detonation. (Photo: KCTV)

Almelo is a small city in the east of The Netherlands, and the location of a Urenco Group uranium enrichment facility (producing gas centrifuges for nuclear reactors).  According to Aera Urenco’s facility in Almelo was the employer of the notorious Pakistani engineer and nuclear scientist Dr. Abdual Qadeer Khan and is where  he attained knowledge on uranium enrichment.  How the DPRK attained technical knowledge from Japan’s facilities in Rokkasho is not clear.  The facilities in Rokkasho extract plutonium and uranium from spent nuclear fuel from Japan’s nuclear power plants, and the Rokkasho complex contains its own uranium enrichment facility.  Some external experts claim that the DPRK operated a network of experts and technicians who acquired the information from Japan and forwarded it back to the DPRK.  Aera reported in 1998 that a senior party official remarked that “scientists and engineers in Japan are engaged in patriotic activities to make their socialist home country a rich and powerful state and to realize the unification of two Koreas.”  The Japanese, for their part, issued a 2006 memorandum “to take caution against suspicious personnel.”