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CMC Meetings Shown in DPRK Documentary on Kim Jong Un’s Military Activities

18 Mar

On 5 March DPRK state media released a documentary film which compiled film footage of Kim Jong Un (Kim Cho’ng-u’n) inspecting Korean People’s Army [KPA] units, observing training exercises and visiting construction projects utilizing KPA personnel from his accession in January 2012 to live fire exercises in 2013.  Loosely translated as Unleashing a New Heyday of the Formidable Forces of Mt. Paektu, the 80 minute film consists mainly of footage that has previously appeared in short documentaries about KJU’s activities.  Aside from a few new, brief scenes of KJU talking with note taking senior officials, the films includes footage of the expanded meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission [CMC] meeting held late in the afternoon on 3 February 2013.  The meeting was a key event preceding the DPRK’s third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.  The CMC meeting ended with Kim Jong Un, assisted by Chief of the KPA General Staff Hyon Yong Chol, giving meeting participants handguns in presentation boxes.  

External establishing shot showing the KWP flag over the KWP #1 Office Building in Pyongyang (L);  The 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (C); Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

External establishing shot showing the KWP flag over the KWP #1 Office Building in Pyongyang (L); The 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (C); Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un chairing the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (top) and 3rd generation KPA commanders and officials (middle and bottom) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un chairing the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meeting (top) and 3rd generation KPA commanders and officials (middle and bottom) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members attended the 3 February 2013 meeting (L-R) Jang Song Taek; Pak To Chun; VMar Kim Yong Chun; Gen. Kim Won Hong; and Gen. Ri Myong Su (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members attended the 3 February 2013 meeting (L-R) Jang Song Taek; Pak To Chun; VMar Kim Yong Chun; Gen. Kim Won Hong; and Gen. Ri Myong Su (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members and senior officials attending the 3 February 2013 meeting.  In this image are VMar Kim Jong Gak (front row, R), Ju Kyu Chang (front row, 2nd R), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (front row, 3rd R) and Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (2nd row, R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC Members and senior officials attending the 3 February 2013 meeting. In this image are VMar Kim Jong Gak (front row, R), Ju Kyu Chang (front row, 2nd R), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (front row, 3rd R) and Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (2nd row, R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members applaud during the meeting.  Among those in the front row in this image are Jang Song Taek (L), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (2nd L), Pak To Chun (3rd L) and VMar Kim Yong Chun (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members applaud during the meeting. Among those in the front row in this image are Jang Song Taek (L), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (2nd L), Pak To Chun (3rd L) and VMar Kim Yong Chun (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation boxes (L) containing an autographed message from Kim Jong Un (C) of handguns (R) presented to meeting participants (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation boxes (L) containing an autographed message from Kim Jong Un (C) of handguns (R) presented to meeting participants (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meetings.  Among those presented with these guns were: VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (3.), Pak To Chun (4.), VMar Kim Yong Chun (5.), VMar Hyon Chol Hae (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Kim Yong Chol (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of the 3 February 2013 expanded CMC meetings. Among those presented with these guns were: VMar Choe Ryong Hae (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), Gen. Kim Kyok Sik (3.), Pak To Chun (4.), VMar Kim Yong Chun (5.), VMar Hyon Chol Hae (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Kim Yong Chol (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Over view of presentation ceremony at the end of the expanded CMC meeting (L) Gen. Hyon Yong Chol handing a presentation box to Kim Jong Un (C) and meeting participants applauding at the conclusion of the meeting (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Over view of presentation ceremony at the end of the expanded CMC meeting (L) Gen. Hyon Yong Chol handing a presentation box to Kim Jong Un (C) and meeting participants applauding at the conclusion of the meeting (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

The film also included footage of another expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission, held between February and March 2012.  This would have been a key event preceding the 13 April 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, which crashed shortly after it was launched.  Unlike the February 2013 CMC meeting, KWP civilian officials are attired in KPA dress uniforms.  Based on the protocol from the February ’13 meeting, it is likely then-Chief of the KPA General Staff, VMar Ri Yong Ho, participated in the handgun presentation ceremony at the meeting’s conclusion, however VMar Ri is not shown in this film.

Overview of expanded CMC meeting held in February or March 2012 (L), Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (C) and a view of CMC members and meeting participants (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of expanded CMC meeting held in February or March 2012 (L), Kim Jong Un chairing the meeting (C) and a view of CMC members and meeting participants (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members attending the 2012 meeting.  In the front row are Ju Kyu Chang (L), Choe Ryong Hae (2nd L) Pak To Chun (3rd L) and Kim Jong Gak (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members attending the 2012 meeting. In the front row are Ju Kyu Chang (L), Choe Ryong Hae (2nd L) Pak To Chun (3rd L) and Kim Jong Gak (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members standing at the 2012 meeting: Choe Ryong Hae (L), Pak To Chun (C) and Kim Jong Gak (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members standing at the 2012 meeting: Choe Ryong Hae (L), Pak To Chun (C) and Kim Jong Gak (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the meeting in 2012.  In the front row are: Gen. Kim Kyong Ok (L), Gen. Kim Won Hong (2nd L), Gen. Jong Myong Do (3rd L) and Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the meeting in 2012. In the front row are: Gen. Kim Kyong Ok (L), Gen. Kim Won Hong (2nd L), Gen. Jong Myong Do (3rd L) and Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the 2012 meeting.  In the front row in this image are VMar Kim Yong Chun (R), Jang Song Taek (2nd R), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3rd R), Pak To Chun (4th R), Choe Ryong Hae (5th R) and Ju Kyu Chang (6th R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members stand during the 2012 meeting. In the front row in this image are VMar Kim Yong Chun (R), Jang Song Taek (2nd R), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3rd R), Pak To Chun (4th R), Choe Ryong Hae (5th R) and Ju Kyu Chang (6th R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members and senior security officials stand during the 2012 meeting.  In this image in the front row are: Gen. Ri Myong Su (L) Hyon Chol Hae (2nd L),  Choe Kyong Song (3rd L), and Gen. Yun Jong Rin (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

CMC members and senior security officials stand during the 2012 meeting. In this image in the front row are: Gen. Ri Myong Su (L) Hyon Chol Hae (2nd L), Choe Kyong Song (3rd L), and Gen. Yun Jong Rin (4th L) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of an expanded Party Central Military Commission meeting held in February or March 2012 with images of Kim Jong Un speaking, and 3rd generation KPA commanders and security officials (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Overview of an expanded Party Central Military Commission meeting held in February or March 2012 with images of Kim Jong Un speaking, and 3rd generation KPA commanders and security officials (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation box of a handgun (L) presented to participants at the 2012 CMC meeting.  The grip contains KJU's autograph (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation box of a handgun (L) presented to participants at the 2012 CMC meeting. The grip contains KJU’s autograph (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of an expanded CMC meeting held in early 2012.  Among those presented with handguns are: VMar Kim Yong Chun (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3.), Choe Ryong Hae (4.), Ju Kyu Chang (5.), Kim Kyong Ok (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Jong Myong Do (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presentation ceremony of handguns at the end of an expanded CMC meeting held in early 2012. Among those presented with handguns are: VMar Kim Yong Chun (1.), Jang Song Taek (2.), VMar Kim Jong Gak (3.), Choe Ryong Hae (4.), Ju Kyu Chang (5.), Kim Kyong Ok (6.), Gen. Kim Won Hong (7.) and Gen. Jong Myong Do (8.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presented with handguns at the conclusion of the expanded CMC meeting in early 2012 were: Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (1.), Gen. Choe Pu Il (2.), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (3.), Gen. Ri Myong Su (4.), Col. Gen. Jo Kyong Chol (5.), Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (6.), Lt. Gen. Pak Jong Chon (7.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Presented with handguns at the conclusion of the expanded CMC meeting in early 2012 were: Gen. Ri Pyong Chol (1.), Gen. Choe Pu Il (2.), Gen. Yun Jong Rin (3.), Gen. Ri Myong Su (4.), Col. Gen. Jo Kyong Chol (5.), Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (6.), Lt. Gen. Pak Jong Chon (7.) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un (L) concludes an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (R) held in early 2012 (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Kim Jong Un (L) concludes an expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission (R) held in early 2012 (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

KPA Supreme Command Threatens to “Nullify” Armistice Agreement

5 Mar
A spokesman of the KPA Supreme Command reads a statement on 5 March 2013 threatening to "nullify" the armistice agreement which ended active hostilities of the Korean War (Fatherland Liberation War).  The spokesman appears to be Gen. Kim Yong Chol, Chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and member of the Korean Workers' Party Central Military Commission (Photos: KCNA)

A spokesman of the KPA Supreme Command reads a statement on 5 March 2013 threatening to “nullify” the armistice agreement which ended active hostilities of the Korean War (Fatherland Liberation War). The spokesman appears to be Gen. Kim Yong Chol, Chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and member of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission (Photos: KCNA)

DPRK state media reported on 5 March (Tuesday) that a spokesman of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Supreme Command said that it “will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totaly nullified, that the “Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form’s sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage” and that “this land (the DPRK) is neither the Balkans nor Iraq nor Libya.”  Based on images released in state media the spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command was Gen. Kim Yong Chol, chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which is responsible for anti-ROK [South Korea] intelligence operations.

Parsing the KPA Supreme Command’s statement Glyn Ford told Russia’s RT: “There’s a difference between saying you no longer recognize an armistice and actually starting shooting again. They’re not quite the same thing.”  Ford also said “I think he [Kim Jong-Un] is more likely to be turning away once we get through the next month or so towards looking at economic modernization rather than repeating the missile and the nuclear tests. I could be wrong, of course. It’s very difficult to read North Korea, but it seems to me that that’s where the thinking is.”

According to KCNA’s English-language version of the statement:

On Dec. 12 last year the DPRK legitimately and successfully launched a satellite for peaceful purposes, ensuring international transparency, going beyond practice, and choosing a comparatively mild situation for it.

Seizing the DPRK’s satellite launch as an occasion for stifling it from the outset, the U.S. and its allies deliberately negated the DPRK’s sovereignty over its satellite launch. They finally prodded the UN Security Council into adopting a “resolution on sanctions” before opting for high-handed hostile acts against the DPRK.

These hostile acts are still going on.

Under this situation the DPRK was compelled to take practical counteractions to defend the security and sovereignty of the country. On Feb. 12 it admirably and successfully conducted the third underground nuclear test for self-defence at the highest level as part of those counteractions.

However, the U.S. imperialists and their allied forces including south Korea are making more persistent and desperate efforts to slap new tougher “sanctions” against the DPRK, far from drawing a due lesson.

Not content with this, they kicked off again the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises to stifle the DPRK by force of arms by mobilizing huge armed forces of aggression. They will reportedly last for two months from March 1.

Unlike last year the current joint military exercises will be participated in by super-large nuclear-powered carrier task force carrying at least 100 nuclear warheads, B-52H strategic bombers and other means of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces for making ground, sea and air nuclear strikes and its allied forces including south Korea, U.K. and Australia.

From this point of view, the exercises cannot be construed otherwise than the most dangerous nuclear war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK and the most undisguised military provocation to be made by a group of all hues of hostile forces.

This serious situation clearly indicates that the actions of the U.S., south Korea and other hostile forces to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK are now leading to a military offensive for aggression, going beyond the level of outrageous economic “sanctions.”

In view of the prevailing situation, the Supreme Command of the KPA which is responsible for the national defence and security of the country and the destiny of the nation sent a meaningful warning message to the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces through the KPA Panmunjom mission on February 23. It warned them that if they ignite a war of aggression in the end, from that moment their fate will be hung by a thread with every hour.

But, the joint military exercises have persisted and the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have become all the more undisguised in their base moves to kick up their “sanctions.”

Looking back on history, the Korean people have neither shot even a single arrow nor thrown a single stone at the land of the U.S.

The U.S. is, however, working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the DPRK, not content with having incurred the pent-up grudge of the Korean people which can never be settled.

What matters is that the south Korean puppet forces steeped in worship and sycophancy toward the U.S. are dancing to its tune.

Of late Kim Kwan Jin, puppet minister of Defense, and Jong Sung Jo, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, inspected frontline army corps, fleet command and guided missile units where they blustered that a sort of military provocation is expected from the north and cried out for making “deadly strikes” and “preemptive strikes” at the “bases for provocations.”

As far as these guys are concerned, they are a group of traitors who pushed the inter-Korean relations to a collapse together with traitor Lee Myung Bak who knows nothing about politics and military affairs. They are military gangsters who go reckless, unaware of what their master U.S. has in mind, what is the intention of the neighbouring countries and what all fellow countrymen and nation desire.

The puppet authorities, too, are crying out for the dismantlement of nukes and halt to provocation as dictated by their master, without knowing what is precious wealth for the nation. They move like a robot and repeat anything like a parrot.

The sovereignty and dignity of the nation are violated and the supreme interests of the country are seriously threatened by the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people, and maniacs of confrontation with fellow countrymen grouping worst traitors. The army and people of the DPRK can never remain a passive onlooker to this fact.

The spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command is authorized to declare the following important measures:

First, it will take the second and third strong practical counteractions in succession to cope with the high-handed war acts of the U.S. and all other hostile forces as it had already declared.

The army and people of the DPRK never make an empty talk.

It is the mettle of Military-First (So’ngun) Korea to do what it is determined to do.

It won victories in the two wars and has advanced along the road of victory despite manifold difficulties.

The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.

Now that the U.S. imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style.

Those means are bound to be launched once their buttons are pressed, and the enemies’ strongholds be turned into a sea in flames.

This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya.

The army and people of the DPRK have everything including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past.

Second, the KPA Supreme Command will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totally nullified.

The war maneuvers being staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are a vivid expression of their systematic violation of the AA.

Accordingly, the Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form’s sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage.

The DPRK will make a strike of justice at any target anytime as it pleases without limit, not bound to the AA, and achieve the great cause of the country’s reunification, the cherished desire of the nation.

Third, the KPA Supreme Command will totally stop the activities of the Panmunjom mission of the KPA which was tentatively established and operated by it as a negotiating body for establishing a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.

In this regard it will simultaneously make a decision to cut off the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. military telephone.

Our choice has become clear now that the moves of all hostile forces to encroach upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK are reaching a dangerous phase.

It is the unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK and the mode of counteraction of Mt. Paektu style to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean style more powerful than them.

The U.S. imperialists and their allies should not forget even a moment that they are standing at the crossroads of their life and death.

A final victory is in store for the army and people of the DPRK who are all out to protect its sovereignty.

Rumors of Dismissed People’s Security Minister Floated in ROK Media

28 Feb
Gen. Ri Myong Su (L), last known Minister of People's Security and Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il (R) whom South Korean sources claim  replaced Ri as head of People's Security (Photos: Xinhua file photo and KCTV screengrab)

Gen. Ri Myong Su (L), last known Minister of People’s Security and Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il (R) whom South Korean sources claim replaced Ri as head of People’s Security (Photos: Xinhua file photo and KCTV screengrab)

South Korean [ROK] media, citing an interview with an unnamed ROK government official, are circulating rumors that DPRK Minister of People’s Security, Gen. Ri Myong Su (Ri Myo’ng-su) has been removed from office and replaced by Col. Gen. Choe Pu Il, currently serving as Vice Chief of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] General Staff.  Gen. Ri was appointed Minister in April 2011 and has held the office for nearly two years. In a 26 February report  Yonhap News Agency quoted the unnamed official who said, “To my knowledge, North Korea recently appointed Choi Bu-il, deputy chief of staff at the North’s military, to the minister of people’s security” and also reported that “the source declined to give further details, including exactly when Cho was named, but the apparent replacement is believed to be linked to a ‘part of loyalty test by Kim Jong-un.’”

JoongAng Ilbo published a similar story on 27 February and reported that “Choe Pu-il, former vice chief of the general staff of the North Korean army, has been appointed to the minister of people’s security, a position similar to a national police commissioner in the South, a high-ranking South Korean official told reporters yesterday at a private meeting.” JoongAng Ilbo also reports that Gen. Ri Myong Su “hasn’t appeared in public since September 2012.”  Yonhap also reported that Gen. Ri “”has not been seen in public for months, raising speculation that he might have been purged.”

Either ROK media or their mystery man in the ROK government, are simply wrong about Gen. Ri’s public appearances.  Ri Myong Su’s last reported public appearance was on 4 January 2013 when he attended a meeting of People’s Security and Korean People’s Internal Security Forces [KPISF] personnel “to carry out the important tasks” itemized in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day Address.  Prior to that Gen. Ri visited Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun with KJU on New Year’s Day, attended a banquet given for personnel involved in the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket, visited Ku’msusan on 24 December 2012, attended an unveiling ceremony of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il statues in Hamhu’ng on 20 December 2012 , attended the first central party banquet for the U’nha-3 launch personnel on 21 December 2012 and attended a national memorial service commemorating one year since Kim Jong Il’s demise.  Gen. Ri also attended a national meeting of people’s security officers and a KJU commemorative photo session in late November 2012 and attended Forestry Workers’ national meeting on or around 7 November 2012.  Gen. Ri’s public appearances have been relatively spotty, as Luke Herman wrote in NK News about in October 2012, but he has “appeared in public” well after September 2012 despite current media reporting.

Gen Ri Myong Su (2nd R) attend a forestry workers' meeting on 7 November 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

Gen Ri Myong Su (2nd R) attend a forestry workers’ meeting on 7 November 2012 (Photo: KCNA/KCTV still)

This does not mean Ri Myong Su’s position could not be in jeopardy.  There have been the aforementioned gaps between his public appearances, which could be ascribed either to his political standing or to the Minister having to directly supervise People’s Security’s various missions directly from headquarters.  A lot of the ceremonial aspects of the Minister’s position have been undertaken by the head of the People’s Security/KPSIF Political Bureau, Col. Gen. Ri Pyong Sam, who presided over a ceremony at which the MPS University was renamed after KJI and two awards ceremonies for KPISF personnel killed on duty.  There have also been rumors in Pyongyang implicating members of Ri Myong Su’s family in malfeasance in their foreign trading corporations.  If Ri was removed from office, it would indicate that Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power by making his own personnel appointments, in lieu of keeping Kim Jong Il’s old retainers.  It should also be noted hat Gen. Ri has also held senior positions during the DPRK’s three nuclear test.  In 2006 Ri was serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau.  In 2009, Ri was director of the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] Administration Department.  In 2012, Ri was Minister of People’s Security, which, according to some researchers. controls some of the units responsible for major construction and engineering projects at the P’unggye-ri Nuclear Test Site.

South Korean official and media sources have also previously provided conflicting information about Ri’s alleged replacement, Choe Pu Il.  Choe has served as Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff since 2009.  However some ROK sources have identified Choe also concurrently serving as Chief of the KPA General Staff Operation Bureau, and other ROK sources have claimed that Choe commanding the IX Army Corps or serving as regional commander of KPA forces in what be termed it Northeast Military District.  This does not preclude Choe from being appointed to People’s Security, and his career history reveals ample criteria for his potential appointment.  And yet, previous information from ROK sources about Choe’s position within the DPRK ‘s national security community has been inconsistent and highly speculative.

Pyongyang watchers also may recall that back in November 2012, VMar Kim Jong Gak was quietly removed from serving as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and replaced by Gen. Kim Kyok Sik.  This led country watchers to speculate as to whether VMar Kim was part of an ongoing purge, or if he was dismissed because of allegations that one of his sons had attempted to defect via China.  Although Gen. Kim Kyok Sik’s appointment as the country’s defense minister was later publicized, it hardly affected Kim Jong Gak’s political standing and he has made a number of public appearances, including at so-called #1 Events with Kim Jong Un.

Previous Ministers of People's Security Paek Hak Rim (L) and Ju Sang Song (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrab and KCNA)

Previous Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim (L) and Ju Sang Son (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrab and KCNA)

There have been numerous occasions in the past in which a senior official is seen at an event close to The Center, or continues to make public appearances, even though they’ve already been marked for dismissal.  Often these have involved the more opaque maneuverings within the Party Central Committee and DPRK Government.  However the Ministry of People’s Security, and particularly the individual serving as Minister, operates (in very relative terms) transparently.  Gen. Ri Myong Su’s three predecessors as Minister were all publicly removed from office and their replacement publicly announced.  In July 2003 the Minister of People’s Security Paek Hak Rim was removed (due both to political reasons and old age) from office by an order of the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium.**  His replacement, Choe Ryong Su, was immediately announced.  Choe Ryong Su’s tenure was short-lived.  Barely a year after his appointment Choe was replaced by Gen. Ju Sang Song, then-commander of the IV Army Corps.  Gen. Ju had a lengthy tenure, serving as Minister for nearly seven years.  In March 2011 Gen. Ju was publicly removed from office by an order of the NDC “due to his illness.”  On 7 April 2011, Ju was replaced by Gen. Ri Myong Su through an order of the NDC (to which People’s Security is subordinate) and ratified by the 4th session of the 12th SPA held the same day.

**Until 2009 the Ministry of People’s Security was part of the DPRK Cabinet, and the Minister appointed by the SPA.  After 2009, the MPS was directly subordinate to the National Defense Commission.  Thus, Paek Hak Rim and Choe Ryong Su were removed from office by the SPA Presidium (standing committee).  In 2011 Gen. Ju Sang Song was removed as Minister by the National Defense Commission, and Gen. Ri Myong Su appointed to replace him, however the dismissal and appointment were ratified at the 4th session of the 12th SPA.

Nuclear Test Personnel Visit Ku’msusan and Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery After Arriving in Pyongyang

21 Feb
Personnel who contributed to or participated in the 12 February 2013 nuclear test pay their respects at the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photos: KCNA)

Personnel who contributed to or participated in the 12 February 2013 nuclear test pay their respects at the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photos: KCNA)

DPRK state media reported on 21 February that personnel involved in the 12 February 2013 nuclear test visited the Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun and paid their respects at the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Mt. Taeso’ng in Pyongyang.  According to KCNA “scientists, technicians, workers, soldier-builders and officials who took part in the successful third underground nuclear test visited” Ku’msusan where they paid their respects to the remains of the late DPRK founder and president, Kim Il Sung, and the late supreme leader Kim Jong Il.  After visiting the remains of the two leaders they toured “the halls where the orders the Generalissimos received are on display and the halls which house cars, an electric car, a boat and train coaches used by them for field guidance and foreign tour till the last period of their lives.”

Personnel involved in the DPRK's third nuclear test visit the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

Personnel involved in the DPRK’s third nuclear test visit the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang on 21 February 2013 (Photo: KCNA)

The nuclear test personnel also brought floral bouquets and visited the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery.  DPRK state media reported that they placed floral bouquets beneath the bronze memorial bust of Kim Jong Suk, wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong Il and Kim Kyong Hui.  After paying their respects to Kim Jong Suk, according to KCNA, “they also laid a wreath and bouquets on the wreath-laying stand of the cemetery and paid silent tribute to anti-Japanese revolutionary martyrs.”

On 21 February the scientists, technicians, construction workers, KPA service members and others who contributed to the country’s third experimental nuclear detonation received a congratulatory message sent on behalf of the Party Central Military Commission and the DPRK National Defense Commission [NDC] which “said that the recent nuclear test fully demonstrated the excellent performance of the nuclear deterrence of the DPRK that has been diversified, and the technology of manufacturing nuclear weapons of Military-First (So’ngun) Korea that has reached a cutting-edge level.”  According to KCNA the joint CMC-NDC message also said:

The underground nuclear test conducted by the DPRK in the wake of its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyo’ngsong 3-2 represented a great political and military victory as it made the international community confidently recognize the status of the DPRK as a strategic rocket and nuclear weapons state and brought about a fundamental change in the world political structure and the balance of forces.

People in the field of national defence science carried out the test, exercise of the independent right of the country, thus dealing sledge-hammer blows at the U.S. imperialists, Japanese reactionaries and the south Korean puppet forces who are working with bloodshot eyes to force the DPRK to “disarm itself” and to “overturn its social system”, the message added.

It highly appreciated the scientists, technicians, workers and officials in the field of national defence science and soldier-builders who have made great contributions to winning a great victory in the all-out confrontation with the U.S. imperialists and its allies, and safeguarding the supreme interests of the DPRK.

It is firm determination and will of the dear respected Kim Jong Un to finally conclude the confrontation with the U.S. imperialists by dint of arms of Songun [military-first] and build the strongest power which the whole world looks up and a people’s paradise on this land, the message stressed.

It expressed the conviction that the scientists, technicians, workers and officials in the field of national defence science and soldier-builders would win one victory after another, closely united around Supreme Commander Marshal Kim Jong Un.

A motor coach ferrying personnel involved in the DPRK's third underground nuclear test passes through Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang on 20 February 2013 (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

A motor coach ferrying personnel involved in the DPRK’s third underground nuclear test passes through Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang on 20 February 2013 (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

KWP Secretary Pak To Chun (L) and Deputy (vice) Director of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department [MID] Hong Sung Mu (2nd L) greet participants and contributors to the 12 February 2013 nuclear test, as they arrive at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 20 February 2013.  The MID was one of the key organizations involved in the technical and logistical aspects of the country's third underground nuclear test (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

KWP Secretary Pak To Chun (L) and Deputy (vice) Director of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department [MID] Hong Sung Mu (2nd L) greet participants and contributors to the 12 February 2013 nuclear test, as they arrive at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on 20 February 2013. The MID was one of the key organizations involved in the technical and logistical aspects of the country’s third underground nuclear test (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

The nuclear test personnel arrived in Pyongyang on 20 February (Wednesday).  Pyongyangites lined the streets as the nuclear test personnel’s motor coaches (buses) motorcaded throughout Pyongyang before arriving at the nuclear test personnel’s accommodation at the Koryo Hotel.  Kyodo World Service reported on 20 February on the nuclear testers’ arrival: “Korean Central Television footage showed citizens lined up on major streets to welcome visitors arriving in buses. A large banner displayed at the lobby of the Pyongyang Koryo Hotel, which they are staying, reads, ‘Successful third underground nuclear test!’  According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, which caters to domestic radio listeners, nuclear scientists and others visited bronze statues of former leader Kim Jong Il and his father and state founder Kim Il Sung on Mansu Hill in the heart of Pyongyang.”  According to KCNA, after arriving at the Koryo the personnel were greeted by Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Secretary for Machine-Building Industry Pak To Chun, KWP Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation [publicity and information] Kim Ki Nam and senior managers of the KWP Machine-Building Industry Department.

Nuclear Test Personnel Will Visit Pyongyang

20 Feb
An animation showing a tunnel (L) a nuclear device (C) and detonation (R) included in a short video released by Urminzokkiri, a DPRK state media outlet, on 17 February 2013 (Photos: Urminzokkiri screengrabs)

An animation of a tunnel (L) a nuclear device (C) and a detonation (R) included in a short video released by Urminzokkiri, a DPRK state media outlet, on 17 February 2013 (Photos: Urminzokkiri screengrabs)

DPRK state media reported on 20 February (Wednesday) that personnel involved in the country’s third nuclear test have been invited to Pyongyang, in a similar fashion to the personnel involved in the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket.  According to KCNA the group will include “scientists, technicians, workers, soldier-builders and officials who fully demonstrated the tremendous might of the great Mt. Paektu (Paektusan) nation by successfully conducting the third underground nuclear test will come to Pyongyang under the care of the Workers’ Party of Korea.”  Echoing recent DPRK rhetoric in public speeches and essays, KCNA described the test as “a historic result of the devoted efforts by the scientists, technicians, workers, soldier-builders and officials who have devotedly defended the party, revolution, country and its people on the forefront for an all-out action against the U.S.”

During their visit to Pyongyang the nuclear test personnel will “will spend significant days of Pyongyang visit, enjoying the greatest privileges and preferential treatment” and “spend joyful and delightful time at the People’s Open-air Ice Rink, Skate Park and other places.”  They will also pay their respects at the Ku’msusan Memorial Palace of the Sun, Kim il Sung’s birthplace and childhood home in Mangyo’ngdae and other locales.

Ice Sculpture Exhibition Opens in Samjiyon

14 Feb
An image of late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il at an ice sculpture festival and exhibition in the resort town of Samjiyo'n (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

An image of late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il at an ice sculpture festival and exhibition in the resort town of Samjiyo’n (Photo: Rodong Sinmun)

DPRK state media reported on 13 February (Wednesday) that an ice sculpture exhibition opened in Samjiyo’n, a DPRK resort town close to Mt. Paektu and the wooden house where the DPRK’s official chronicles claim that Kim Jong Il was born in February 1942.  According to KCNA the exhibition incorporates a “a variety of lighting methods were applied to suit the characteristics of ice sculptures, adding to the aesthetic value of each piece.”  On display “were thousands of ice sculptures created by inhabitants in Samjiyon County and members of the Ministry of People’s Security group under the 618 Construction Shock Brigade,” “sculptures depicting Jongil Peak imposingly standing in defense of the birthplace, Kimjongilia, big celebration lantern and vase which reflected deep reverence of the DPRK army and people for Kim Jong Il,” “sculptures depicting a green pine on Nam Hill and two pistols, the Marshal’s star on the Supreme Commander’s flag, satellite Kwangmyo’ngso’ng 3-2, Changjon Street, Pyongyang Folklore Park and Rungna Dolphinarium. They left deep impressions on the visitors” and there were ”some sculptures portrayed people who are full of enthusiasm to boost production in all fields and units of the national economy in hearty response to the New Year Address made by the dear respected Kim Jong Un.”

Ice sculptures on display at Samjiyo'n, a resort town on the Sino-DPRK border (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Ice sculptures on display at Samjiyo’n, a resort town on the Sino-DPRK border (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Ice sculptures of the U'nha-3 rocket (L) and the Changjon Street apartment complex in Pyongyang (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Ice sculptures of the U’nha-3 rocket (L) and the Changjon Street apartment complex in Pyongyang (R) (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

Final Countdowns at P’unggye-ri Test Site? (Will but you won’t)

12 Feb
Overview of area around the nuclear test area near Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo'ng Province.  The red lines denote the closure or roads to human and vehicular traffic (Photo: Google image, route lines and annotations by M. Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

Overview of area around the nuclear test area near Punggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province. The red lines denote the closure or roads to human and vehicular traffic (Photo: Google image, route lines and annotations by M. Madden/NK Leadership Watch)

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(Photos: Google images)

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Yonhap News Agency,citing anonymous South Korean [ROK] government sources, reported on 12 February (Tuesday) that personnel and equipment may have been pulled out of the area close to the DPRK’s nuclear test site in P’unggye-ri, Kilchu County, North Hamgyo’ng Province.  According to Yonhap ”no movement of manpower and equipment has been observed since Friday [8 February] at the country’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site.”  An unnamed official said “When manpower and equipment are withdrawn, it can be an indication that a nuclear test is imminent.  We’re watching the developments closely to know whether a nuclear test is imminent or it’s another deceptive tactic.” This follows another report in South Korean media that while the date of a nuclear test “still remains unclear, with the tension expected to enter the most critical phase this week, a senior official in Seoul said Monday [11 February]” and this week will be “the most critical point.”

The community of Punggye-ri, located 12.5 km (7.7 miles) from the nuclear test area (Photo: Google images)

The community of Punggye-ri, located 12.5 km (7.7 miles) from the nuclear test area (Photo: Google images)

Speculation among South Korean officials and experts about a forthcoming nuclear test occurred after an 8 February 2013 essay appeared in DPRK media outlet T’ongil Sinbo said that “the United States and hostile forces, based on their own hypothesis and arguments, jumped to the conclusion that the Republic would conduct a ‘third nuclear test,’ and they are prattling that if this were to become a reality, they should not only impose ‘high-intensity sanctions’ but even mount a ‘preemptive attack’” and “The United States and hostile forces’ reasoning behind “the nuclear threat of the North” is brigandish sophistry coercing unconditional submission and surrender, as it argues that the nuclear weapons possessed by the Republic constitute some kind of ‘threat,’ though they are for the purpose of defending the dignity and sovereignty of the nation and the peace and security of this land by boldly countering the United States’ threat of war of northward aggression and nuclear threat that are becoming more undisguised with each passing day. This does not work on the Republic, though its pawns may take it seriously.”

South Korean government officials described the T’ongil Sinbo essay as “a distraction tactic.”  Other North Korea experts said that “that Pyongyang plans to check Washington and Beijing’s responses to its changed rhetoric in order to consider additional options” and quoted Professor Kim Yong-hyun of the North Korean Studies Department at Dongguk University who said “North Korea could show the international community its new uranium enrichment facility in order to boast its nuclear capabilities that have grown considerably.”

According to FNK, road closures and blockages were put in place on 5 February.  Roads to and around P’unggye-ri were closed to vehicular and human traffic indefinitely and prevented DPRK citizens from traveling from  North Hamgyo’ng Province to Paegam County, Ryanggang Province.  Personnel from the Military Security Command wearing armbands “are guarding the roads, showing no sign of allowing passage no matter how one pleads one’s case.”  FNK‘s source recalled security precautions prior to the October 2006 nuclear test saying the roads “were completely blocked from 7 to 20 October during the nuclear test conducted in October 2006. People who are stranded, unable to come and go, are worried about ‘how their families waiting at home would manage to live if movement of the populace is restricted for 15 days like the time of the last test’.”  The FNK source also noted that “bribes that worked with soldiers and security officials enforcing control and restriction in the past proved to be ineffective this time, leaving one to only wait with nothing to be done.”

(Photo: Google image)

(Photo: Google image)

Taep’ung Investment Group Formally Dissolved

1 Feb
A 2010 meeting of borad members of the DPRK State Development Bank, linked to the Taep'ung Internati

A 2010 meeting of borad members of the DPRK State Development Bank, linked to the Taep’ung International Investment Group. In this image are Jon Il Chun (R) and Ro Tu Chol (2nd R) (Photo: KCTV screengrab)

Yonhap News Agency reported and confirmed on 1 February (Friday) that the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group has dissolved.  Taep’ung began as an energy provider selling oil and gas (via Sinu’iju) to the Korean People’s Army [KPA] and Korean Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee.  Its leading executive was Pak Chol Su, a Korean resident in China.  Through his sales of energy supplies to the party and army, Pak became part of the Pyongyang social scene and eventually developed close ties with senior KPA and KWP officials.  In 2006 Taep’ung was formally organized as one of the country’s direct foreign investment entities.  Until 2010 there was little reported about Taep’ung’s activities in the country.

In early 2010, Taep’ung was designated as a key investment entity of the DPRK through authorization by Kim Jong Il and the National Defense Commission.  On 20 January 2010, the Korea Taep’ung International Investment Group was formally incorporated and held a meeting of its 7 member board of directors in Pyongyang.  KWP Secretary and United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon was appointed director-general of the board in his capacity as Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee with Pak Chol Su appointed a deputy director-general of the board.  According to DPRK state media Taepu’ng was organized under the auspices of the DPRK National Defense Commission, the DPRK Cabinet and Ministry of Finance and the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee.  Incorporated and organized alongside Taepu’ng’s expansion was the State Development Bank, which would be led by Jon Il Chun, a proxy for the National Defense Commission and a close aide to the late leader Kim Jong Il.  Jon, also (and currently) a deputy director of the KWP Finance and Accounting Department, was elevated to head the State Development Bank at the same time he was appointed to manage the powerful DPRK conglomerate Taeso’ng Group and as the key head of Office #39, lucrative entities earning foreign currency for the DPRK.  Taep’ung had attained such a flavor-of-the-week status  that one of its key KPA contacts appeared on an April 2010 military promotions list.

Despite several attempts, including the internal transfer of several state-owned enterprises, and a high profile trip by Jon Il Chun at the head of a large delegation of executives under the auspices of Taepu’ng, the company attained little to no foreign direct investment.  There were also unconfirmed  (and likely erroneous) rumors Taepu’ng became the business rival to another DPRK entity, reportedly  established as a competing venture by Gen. O Kuk Ryol.  According to Yonhap, Taep’ung “oversaw the now-suspended joint tourist program in Mount Kumgang on the eastern coast of North Korea” and  was dissolved along with “another extra-governmental organization in charge of trade promotion and foreign investment with its work believed to have been reassigned to the government’s Commission for Joint Venture and Investment.”  It appears that a lot of direct foreign investment has now been consolidated under the Joint Venture and Investment Commission [JVIC], which is under the direction of Ri Ryong Nam and Ri Chol, along with the heavy hand of the Ryo’ngdoja, Jang Song Taek.  There also became problems with Taepu’ng’s Chinese backer Pak Chol Su and it did not help Taepu’ng’s external activities to have the imprimatur of the National Defense Commission, which is subjected to numerous United Nations and unilateral sanctions.

Similarly Taepu’ng’s existence may have presented a fundamental obstacle, or proven the wrong entity, for progress in the development of Special Economic Trade Zones in Rajin-So’nbong (Raso’n) and Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng/Wihwa Islands.  Of course, one corporation is but a small obstruction to howeverUnited Nations Security Council reacts to the potential nuclear test.   And yet, development in Raso’n (despite what one might read in the general lit.) seems to making some progress, likely in anticipation of the thaw of Unggi Bay.  It remains to be seen if the upcoming nuclear detonation and its UNSC blowback will affect the activities and formation of various PRC-DPRK development working groups (anchored in China) in late December 2012, and the signing of additional and explicit agreements on infrastructure and design using both DPRK and Chinese entities (no one will use the term iron-clad, just yet).

On 23 January, Chinese media reported that the DPRK Government approved the opening of a Chinese commercial bank primarily to settle transactions in Raso’n.  The bank was founded and a ribbon cutting ceremony held on 18 January.  According to Hunchun Rexian “Chinese Commercial Bank was put together and founded by China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Company Ltd. The bank’s primary business is renminbi settlement, handling letter of credit, bill of exchange, letter of guarantee, and guaranty for cross-border renminbi transactions, and offering savings, loans, banking, and other financial services. Chinese Commercial Bank was founded to conform with the needs of massive development of Sino- DPRK economic and trade at present as well as the needs of the “Outline of General Program for Joint Development and Joint Management of Naso’n Economic and Trade Zone As Well As Hwanggu’mp’yo’ng Economic Zone,” which was signed by China and the DPRK; it will act as a bridge and a bond in promoting and safeguarding Sino-DPRK economic and trade development.”   Hunchun (PRC) Vice Mayor Ren Puyu said that, ”Agreement on Joint Development and Joint Management of Raso’n Economic and Trade Zone” between the Chinese and the DPRK governments, and is the bridge and bond for serving Sino-DPRK financial cooperation and trade interactions; it will definitely play a positive role in promoting Sino-DPRK economic and trade interactions as well as economic prosperity in the future.”

UNSC “Condemns” U’nha-3 Launch

23 Jan
U'nha-3 rocket on display at the Sanum-dong research and development facility in northern Pyongyang (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

U’nha-3 rocket on display at the Sanum-dong research and development facility in northern Pyongyang (Photos: KCTV screengrabs)

On 22 January (Tuesday) the United Nations Security Council voted on a resolution 2087 (2013) which “condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)” and “Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches” and “Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation.”

The UNSC also sanctioned four DPRK officials tied to the 12 December 2012 launch of the U’nha-3 rocket launch: Paek Chang Ho, head of the Korean Committee for Space Technology Satellite Control Center; Jang Myong Jin (Chang Myong-chin), manager of the Sohae Satellite Launch Center; Ra Kyong Su, manager of Tanch’on Commercial Bank; and, Kim Kwang Il, another manager of Tanch’on Commercial Bank.  The UNSC also sanctioned and froze the assets of: the Korean Committee for Space Technology; Tongbang Bank (Bank of East Land),which is part of the Green Pine Corporation; Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation, a subsidiary trading corporation of the Korean Mining Development Trading Corporation [KOMID]; Tosong Technology Corporation, another subsidiary of KOMID; Korean Ryo’nha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, a subsidiary Korean Ryo’nbong General Corporation; and the Hong Kong-based Leader International.

In reply to the resolution, most notably the DPRK Foreign Ministry said “ that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged” and “the September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier, due to the U.S. hostile policy to the DPRK that has become evermore pronounced.”  The Foreign Ministry also stated “the DPRK will take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defence including the nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively to cope with the evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. to apply sanctions and pressure against the DPRK.”

Below is the full text of the UNSC’s preamble and resolution:

The Security Council, condemning the launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology in violation of the sanctions imposed on it, today demanded that the country not proceed with any further such activities and expressed its “determination to take significant action” in the event it did so.

In that connection, the Council demanded, through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2087 (2013), immediate compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly.

It deplored the country’s violations of the measures imposed on it in 2006, and strengthened in 2009, including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, and underscored its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from that country or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to the activities banned by those resolutions.

The Council recalled that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with its previous resolutions, and clarified that the methods for disposal included, but were not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another States other than the originating or destination States for disposal.

It further clarified that the sanctions banned the transfer of any items if a State involved in the transaction has reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity, under the previous resolutions, is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer.

In a related provision, the Council called for enhanced vigilance by Member States and directed the relevant sanctions Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice in the event a vessel refused to allow an inspection authorized by its Flag State or if any vessel flagged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refused to be inspected, in line with its obligations.

Reaffirming its support for the six-party talks, the Council called for their resumption and urged all participants to intensify efforts to fully and expeditiously implement the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China.

The meeting was called to order at 3:08 p.m. and adjourned at 3:10 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2087 (2013) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,

“1.   Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“2.   Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

“3.   Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;

“4.   Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“5.   Recalls the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and determines that:

(a)   The measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II, and the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I; and,

(b)   The measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 and S/2012/947;

“6.   Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions, including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;

“7.   Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding situations where a vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s Flag State or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009);

“8.   Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;

“9.   Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;

“10.  Calls upon Member States which have not yet done so to report on the measures they have taken to implement the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), encourages other Member States to submit, if any, additional information on implementing the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“11.  Encourages international agencies to take necessary steps to ensure that all their activities with respect to the DPRK are consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and further encourages relevant agencies to engage with the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the DPRK that may relate to provisions of these resolutions;

“12.  Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, underscores its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) or 1874 (2009) and the importance of appropriate action by States in this regard, calls on States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, directs the Committee to review reported violations and take action as appropriate, including through designating entities and individuals that have assisted the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“13.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“14.  Reaffirms its desire for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, and underlines the need to refrain from any action that might aggravate tensions;

“15.  Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;

“16.  Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“17.  Reemphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

“18.  Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

“19.  Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’scompliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

“20.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze

1.    PAEK CHANG-HO

a.    Description: senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.

b.    AKA: Pak Chang-Ho; Paek Ch’ang-Ho

c.    Identifiers: Passport: 381420754; Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011; Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016; D.O.B. 18 June 1964; P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK

2.    CHANG MYONG-CHIN

a.    Description: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.

b.    AKA: Jang Myong-Jin

c.    Identifiers: D.O.B. 1966; Alt. D.O.B. 1965

3.    RA KY’ONG-SU

a.    Description: Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

4.    KIM KWANG-IL

a.    Description: Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Annex II

Asset Freeze

1.    KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR SPACE TECHNOLOGY

a.    Description: The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohaelaunch area.

b.    AKA: DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST

c.    Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

2.    BANK OF EAST LAND

a.    Description: DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Green Pine was designated by the Committee in April 2012.

b.    AKA: Dongbang BANK; TONGBANG U’NHAENG; TONGBANG BANK

c.    Location: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK

3.    KOREA KUMRYONG TRADING CORPORATION

a.    Description: Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

4.    TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION

a.    Description: The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

b.    Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

5.    KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION

a.    Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.

b.    AKA: CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION; RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION

c.    Location: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK

6.    LEADER ( HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL

a.    Description: Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’sprimary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

b.    AKA: Leader International Trading Limited

c.    Location: Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, 173 Des Voeux Road, Hong Kong

The DPRK Foreign Ministry’s full response, according to KCNA:

The DPRK’s successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year fully demonstrated its space science and technology and its overall national power. This was a stark fact favored by the world and recognized even by hostile forces including the United States.

In the wake of desperate efforts on the part of the U.S. and its followers to block the victorious advance of the DPRK, they cooked up a “resolution” of the UN Security Council on Tuesday in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK.

The U.S.-sponsored “resolution” is run through with hostile steps aiming at banning DPRK’s satellite launch for peaceful purposes and tightening “sanctions” against it to block its economic development and hamstring its work for developing economy and bolstering up defence capability.

The above-said countries insist that the DPRK’s satellite launch is problematic, asserting that “it uses ballistic missile technology” though they know better than any others about the fact that ballistic missile technology is the only means for launching satellite and they launch satellites more than any others. This is self-deception and the height of double-standards.

The essence of the matter is the U.S. brigandish logic that a satellite launch for peaceful purposes by a country which the U.S. antagonizes should not be allowed because any carrier rocket launched by it can be converted into long-range ballistic missile threatening the U.S. The UNSC is a marionette of the U.S.

The UNSC “resolutions” adopted under the pretext of the DPRK’s satellite launches are products of its blind pursuance of the hostile policy of the U.S. seeking disarmament of the DPRK and collapse of its system in violation of the universally accepted international laws.

Repeating wrongdoings without courage or responsibility to rectify them are despicable behaviors of cowards deceiving themselves and others. They are putting the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at greater peril.

The present situation clearly proves that the DPRK should counter the U.S. hostile policy with strength, not with words and that the road of independence and Songun chosen by the DPRK is entirely just.

To cope with the prevailing situation, the DPRK Foreign Ministry declares as follows:

First, the DPRK flatly rejects the unjust acts of the UNSC aimed at wantonly violating the sovereignty of the DPRK and depriving it of the right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes.

The hostile forces are seriously mistaken if they think they can bring down the DPRK with sanctions and pressure, and such an attempt will always bring them a disgraceful defeat.

The UNSC should apologize for its crime of seriously encroaching upon the independence of a sovereign state, following the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK in disregard of the universally recognized international laws, and repeal all the unreasonable “resolutions” at once.

Second, the DPRK will continue to exercise its independent and legitimate right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes while abiding by universally recognized international law on the use of space for peaceful purposes.

Scientists and technicians of the DPRK will develop and launch many more application satellites including communications satellite and more powerful carrier rockets essential for building an economic giant in the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in successfully launching satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2.

The DPRK will continuously launch satellites for peaceful purposes to conquer space and become a world-level space power.

Third, the DPRK drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged.

The September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier, due to the U.S. hostile policy to the DPRK that has become evermore pronounced.

There can be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula.

Fourth, the DPRK will take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defence including the nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively to cope with the evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. to apply sanctions and pressure against the DPRK.

The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will reliably defend the security and sovereignty of the country and safeguard the regional peace and stability with the might of Songun. They are full of the steadfast will to take a bold step to root out the source of provocations the hostile forces seek to continue against the DPRK.

No force on earth can block the great people proud of independence, powerful thanks to Songun politics and advancing in unity, convinced of truth.

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