Research and Analysis on the DPRK Leadership
Daily NK reports that the currency change under way in the DPRK was announced at 14:00 by the radio broadcasts directly piped into the homes of North Korean citizens. Street markets have remained shuttered since 11:00 as of Monday, 30 November. Daily NK also reports that on 1 December the currency decision was announced in special call meetings of county and town KWP and People’s Committees and that county branches of the DPRK Central Bank had commenced the new currency exchange of old Won for new. In the closest we may get to an official announcement, Xinhua reported the DPRK’s currency revaluation.
Daily NK recalls the previous revaluation of North Korean currency in 1992 with some fascinating analysis and anecdotes contrasting the currency switch in 1992 to the one that occurred this week. DNK suspects the DPRK Leadership is turning tricks in revaluing the won. The ROK press has begun editorializing about the revaluation in different degrees. Dong-A Ilbo, while making amends to Daily NK, concludes that “the strong resistance against the revaluation by the North Korean people might have put the Communist regime in a fix.” Korea Times opines that the DPRK “seems to be gambling economically and politically with the redenomination.” Korea Herald concludes “the currency redenomination rather looks like a move back to tighter control.” Chosun Ilbo brings up the DPRK’s upcoming possible return to the Six-Party Talks: “there is a strong possibility that North Korea will take a more accommodating stance in talks with Seoul and Washington.”
Chosun Ilbo also carried a report containing excellent analysis combining the economics of the revaluation with the brutal power play at work here. To parallel its labor mobilization campaigns, the DPRK Leadership has engaged in a battle campaign of its own against the public markets over which it previously had a kind of gedogen. In July of this year the SPA Presidium set up a Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessity, perhaps a harbinger of the current realities in the DPRK and an indication of North Korean tightening its belt.